Political parties have been the subject of a recent resurgent interest among political philosophers, with prominent contributions spanning liberal to socialist literatures arguing for a more positive appraisal of the role of parties in the operation of democratic representation and public deliberation. In this article, I argue for a similar re-evaluation of the role of political parties within contemporary republicanism. Contemporary republicanism displays a wariness of political parties. In Philip Pettit’s paradigmatic account of republican democracy, rare mentions of political parties (...) often stress their tendency to lead to factionalism or corruption. Others working in the republican tradition such as Richard Bellamy and Ian Shapiro provide more extended discussion of the role of parties, but limit their theoretical function to enabling electoral competition. I argue that political parties play a far more significant role in promoting non-domination than this. In addition to enabling electoral competition, I show that political parties are also essential to the effective operation of two other components of republican democracy: contestation and interest-formation. I further argue that understanding political parties in these terms is compatible with republican democracy more generally, addressing the worry that parties will produce factional rather than common-good oriented public decisions. (shrink)

Trata-se, neste trabalho, de refletir acerca da recuperação do republicanismo de Nicolau Maquiavel para o debate democrático contemporâneo. Com esse intento, entre as muitas atualizações possíveis do pensamento do secretário florentino para os dias atuais, destaco duas matrizes conceituais, justamente aquelas mais concernidas com as noções de liberdade e ação política popular. Seguindo as sugestões de Helton Adverse, procuro então aprofundar e esclarecer a sua proposta de uma matriz “institucional” e uma matriz “conflitiva” quando da interpretação e recuperação das ideias (...) de Maquiavel. (shrink)

Epistemic democrats are rightly concerned with the quality of outcomes and judge democratic procedures in terms of their ability to ‘track the truth’. However, their impetus to assess ‘rule by experts’ and ‘rule by the people’ as mutually exclusive has led to a meagre treatment of the role of expert knowledge in democracy. Expertise is often presented as a threat to democracy but is also crucial for enlightened political processes. Contemporary political philosophy has so far paid little attention to our (...) reliance on experts and has not sufficiently addressed the question of how expertise can be used to improve the epistemic quality of democratic decision making. We believe this lack of interest is spurred by a too hasty acceptance of arguments dismissive of the political role of experts. The article examines a series of often-cited epistemic objections and concludes that several of them are overstated or misconceived, yet they all reflect real difficulties that need to be addressed. On this background, we tentatively outline a set of mechanisms that can contribute to alleviating the irreducible problem of epistemic asymmetries and ensuring that experts really are experts and use their expertise in the right way. (shrink)

Arbitrary state and corporate powers are helping to turn the Internet into a global surveillance dragnet. Responses to this novel form of power have been tepid and ineffective. Liberal critiques of surveillance are constrained by their focus on privacy, security and the underlying presupposition that freedom consists only of freedom from interference. By contrast, (post)Foucauldian critiques rejecting liberalism have been well rewarded analytically, but have proven incapable of addressing normative questions regarding the relationship between surveillance and freedom. Quite apart from (...) these debates, neorepublicans have excavated a third concept of freedom, understood as non-domination. Could neorepublicanism overcome the limitations of liberal and (post)Foucauldian critiques of surveillance? We argue, positively, that neorepublicanism can accommodate much of the (post)Foucauldian analyses while also incorporating a normative critique of surveillance vis-à-vis freedom. We further argue, negatively, that surveillance power has outstripped the capacities of traditional republican institutional responses to domination. We conclude by considering ways in which neorepublicanism can be recalibrated to address the novelty of surveillance power while adhering to the ideal of non-domination. Two ways of addressing the problem are proposed: an offensive, dedicated surveillance antipower and a defensive republican amplification of privacy. (shrink)

An important branch of neo-republicanism holds that freedom as non-domination is the supreme ideal that should be pursued in a polity. In this paper I set out to better specify what neo-republicanism has to say about education. I propose a series of reforms that ought to track the common avowable interests of children, focusing on two important dimensions: i) establishing a proper institutional framework through which children can effectively influence decisions that will in turn affect them; and ii) how the (...) civic education curricula should be modified so that the institutional framework will be upheld by virtuous future citizens. I then turn to showing how we can employ the neo-republican framework in order to criticise certain lacunae of educational systems and to improve upon these in a manner that would be in line with the desideratum of freedom as non-domination. The particular example that I focus on is that of Romania, a country whose educational legislation contains some minimal stipulations regarding civic education and pupils’ involvement in the decision-making process. Nonetheless, such stipulations either do not go far enough or are indeterminate, which might make them susceptible to implementation in a way that would be detrimental to the pupils’ common avowable interests. (shrink)

Should the EU be a federal union or an intergovernmental forum? Recently, demoicrats have been arguing that there exists a third alternative. The EU should be conceived as a demoicracy, namely a ‘Union of peoples who govern together, but not as one’. The demoi of Europe recognise that they affect one another’s democratic health, and hence establish a union to guarantee their freedom qua demoi – which most demoicrats cash out as non-domination. This is more than intergovernmentalism, because the demoi (...) govern together on these matters. However, if the union aims at protecting the freedom of the different European demoi, it cannot do so by replacing them with a ‘superdemos’, as federalists want. This paper argues that demoicracy does possess distinctive normative features; it claims, however, that an institutional choice between intergovernmentalism and federalism is necessary. Depending on how we interpret what the non-domination of demoi requires, demoicracy will either ground a specific way of practicing intergovernmentalism or a specific form of federalism. It cannot, however, ground an institutional model which is genuinely alternative to both. (shrink)

Democracy is usually justified either on intrinsic or instrumental, particularly epistemic, grounds. Intrinsic justifications stress the values inherent in the democratic process itself, whereas epistemic ones stress that it results in good outcomes. This article examines whether epistemic justifications for deliberative democracy are superior to intrinsic ones. The Condorcet jury theorem is the most common epistemic justification of democracy. I argue that it is not appropriate for deliberative democracy. Yet deliberative democrats often explicitly state that the process will favour the (...) best argument. This can only be the case if deliberation improves the overall competence of the group and of the individuals that constitute it. I analyse when deliberation will increase competences and when it will not do so and find that individual competences will not reliably increase as a result of deliberation. In order for deliberative democracy to be epistemically more effective than representative democracy, strong procedural assumptions need to be made and deliberative democracy needs to be justified based on a combination of epistemic and intrinsic elements. (shrink)

This paper analyzes critically the appeal the unpolitical is enjoying among contemporary political philosophers who are democracy's friends. Unlike a radical critique of democracy, what I propose to call "criticism from within," takes the form of dissatisfaction with the erosion of an independent mind and impartial judgment per effect of the partisan character of democratic politics. This paper proposes three main criticisms of the actual trend toward unpolitical views of democracy: the first points to the strategic use of deliberation as (...) an antidote against democratic procedures themselves ; the second to the negative conception of democracy that the unpolitical aspiration makes visible; and the third to the dissolution of political judgment within a model of judgment that is tailored around justice. (shrink)

This essay argues that the neo-Roman republican principle of "non-domination," as developed in the recent work of Philip Pettit, cannot serve as a single overarching political ideal, because it responds to only one of two important dimensions of concern about human agency. Through critical engagements with several aspects of Pettit's work, ranging from his philosophical account of freedom as "discursive control" to his appropriation of the distinction between dominium and imperium, the essay argues that the idea of domination, which responds (...) to concerns about "control," needs to be supplemented by the idea of usurpation, which responds to questions about "involvement"; and it shows how attention to both domination and usurpation (and to the interaction between them) can shed light on such phenomena as imperialism, slavery, and democracy. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for the following conclusions. First, quotas are not normative goals in themselves but only a means to reach non-discriminatory selection procedures. Second, in a democracy quotas are most plausibly used as a means to fill offices in those bodies which have a major impact on how well interests or discourses are translated into policy. Third, quotas for the young can be justified since, due to demographic development, their discourses tend to be marginalized. Fourth, youth quotas (...) cannot be a means to ensure long-term policy-making, but they can enhance legitimacy of long-term impacts from policy decisions taken today. (shrink)

Populist movements have become key players in European politics. These movements are readily criticized by journalists or political rivals, yet none of the common objections to populism seems to arrest their success. This article turns to normative political theory to cultivate sensitivity to problems arising from some existing arguments against populism, and to explore possible alternatives. It offers a critical reading of prototypical liberal and conservative arguments against populism, and proposes that the principles of solidarity and procedure provide good grounds (...) for a sustainable critique of populism. (shrink)

Cet article analyse le risque de corruption que les arrêts Citizens United de 2010 et l’apparition des Super-PACs font peser sur le système électoral états-unien. Lors de la dernière campagne présidentielle, plus de 730 millions de dollars ont été investis dans des publicités électorales par de riches contributeurs et des entreprises privées regroupés en Super-PACs. Nous montrons que cet afflux d’argent consacré à des publicités politiques expose la démocratie américaine à trois formes de « corruption grise », en favorisant la (...) banalisation de pratiques contestables et en troublant la frontière entre ce qui est licite et ce qui ne l’est pas. (1) Déplafonné, le soutien financier aux candidats risque de s’apparenter à de la subornation; (2) certaines des techniques publicitaires employées semblent réduire l’exercice de conviction démocratique à une tentative de corruption de l’électeur; (3) enfin les immenses inégalités d’influence politique que ce système de financement induit participent de la corruption des affaires démocratiques en favorisant leur captation par un petit nombre d’individus fortunés. Nous mettons en évidence que le refus systématique de la Cour Suprême d’envisager ces phénomènes comme des vecteurs de corruption se fonde sur une conception discutable de la démocratie comme système de libre concurrence pour le pouvoir politique. Comprendre la démocratie à partir de son impératif d’égalité permet à l’inverse de rendre visible la corruption à laquelle son système de financement électoral expose la démocratie américaine. (shrink)

Robert Pippin's masterful account of rational agency in Hegel emphasizes important dimensions of freedom and independence, where putative independence is always bound up with a profound dependence on others. This insistence on the complex relationships between freedom, dependence and independence raise an important question that Pippin does not consider: is Hegel a republican? This is especially significant given the fact that modern republicanism has explored this same conceptual terrain. I argue that a form of republicanism is in fact an important (...) aspect of Hegel's theory of freedom, and this should lead us to moderate Pippin's account of the conservative side of Hegel's conception of social dependence. These affinities mean that even if Hegel does not fully endorse contemporary versions of republicanism (such as that of Philip Pettit), he shares core features of the republican view of domination and freedom. In fact, Hegel is a republican to the extent that he shares what Pippin calls ?that noble nineteenth century idea that my freedom depends upon the freedom of others?. Or, to put it in a more directly republican way typical of the eighteenth century, the freedom of each is dependent upon the freedom of all and thus freedom exists only if it is shared. As developed by Pippin, Hegel's conception of shared freedom is inadequate to the extent that it cannot give a full account of the possibilities of domination and dependence in modern institutions, I illustrate this difficulty through examples taken from Hegel's Philosophy of Right, including marriage, markets, and political deliberation. (shrink)

El presente trabajo analiza la relación entre política y moral en la democracia deliberativa de Jürgen Habermas teniendo en cuenta los fundamentos filosóficos de esta teoría política. A diferencia de lo que actualmente plantea el filósofo alemán, se sostiene que el sentido reconstructivo inherente a esta teoría de la democracia permite justificar tal relación a partir de explicitar los presupuestos normativo-morales ya siempre reconocidos en los procedimientos decisorios de deliberación racional que la misma establece. Como resultado de esta estrategia argumentativa, (...) se afirma que el filósofo debe comprometerse con reconocer tal relación porque de otro modo se altera radicalmente el concepto mismo de democracia deliberativa. (shrink)

Philosophers increasingly argue that collective agents can be blameworthy for wrongdoing. Advocates tend to endorse functionalism, on which collectives are analogous to complicated robots. This is puzzling: we don’t hold robots blameworthy. I argue we don’t hold robots blameworthy because blameworthiness presupposes the capacity for a mental state I call ‘moral self-awareness’. This raises a new problem for collective blameworthiness: collectives seem to lack the capacity for moral self-awareness. I solve the problem by giving an account of how collectives have (...) this capacity. The trick is to take seriously individuals’ status as flesh-and-blood material constituents of collectives. The idea will be: under certain conditions that I specify, an individual can be the locus of a collective's moral self-awareness. The account provides general insights concerning collectives’ dependence on members, the boundaries of membership, and the locus of collectives’ phenomenology. (shrink)

When a liberal-democratic state signs a treaty or wages a war, does its whole polity do those things? In this article, we approach this question via the recent social ontological literature on collective agency. We provide arguments that it does and that it does not. The arguments are presented via three considerations: the polity's control over what the state does; the polity's unity; and the influence of individual polity members. We suggest that the answer to our question differs for different (...) liberal-democratic states and depends on two underlying considerations: the amount of discretion held by the state's officeholders; the extent to which the democratic procedure is deliberative rather than aggregative. (shrink)

This article argues that Hayek employed a neo-Roman concept of liberty. It will show that Hayek’s definition of liberty conforms to that provided by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, respectively...

What should we do if climate change or global injustice require radical policy changes not supported by the majority of citizens? And what if science shows that the lacking support is largely due to shortcomings in citizens’ individual psychology such as cognitive biases that lead to temporal and geographical parochialism? Could then a plausible case for enhancing the morality of the electorate—even against their will –be made? But can a democratic government manipulate the will of the people without losing democratic (...) legitimacy? This paper explores the problems that governmental manipulation of voters pose for democratic legitimacy and the tensions between non-manipulated input and morally acceptable output. These venerable issues of political theory resurface in light of recent suggestions to tackle today’s global mega-problems by Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu. They suggest that to avert the looming catastrophe, governments should alter psychological traits of the citizenry through biomedical means, from pharmaceuticals to genetics. However, we argue that a government cannot rule with democratic legitimacy if elected by a will of the people it manipulated before. Normatively, conferring power from the governed onto governors is a one-directional relation that is incompatible with manipulation. But while it is tempting to rebut suggestions to morally enhance the people as antithetical to essential ideas of democracy, swift rebuttals tend to overlook the deeper challenge: Majoritarian decision-making may lead to inacceptable outcomes. The dilemma between input and output runs through major works in political theory. Rather than wishfully ignoring the dangers of democracy, democratic theory has to provide answers. (shrink)

This essay asks if there is a role for an active public in ratcheting down the harsh politics of crime control in the United States and the United Kingdom that has led to increased use of the criminal law and greater severity in punishment. It considers two opposing answers offered by political and legal theorists and then begins to develop a participatory democratic framework for institutional reform.

The deliberative model of democracy, as presented by Jürgen Habermas and others, claims to reconstruct the normative content of the idea of democracy. However, since it overemphasises the epistemic facet of decision‐making, the model is unable to take into account other valuable aspects of democracy. This is shown in reference to two concrete phenomena from political reality: majority voting and the problem of the dissenter. In each case, the deliberative model inevitably fails to account for several normatively desirable features of (...) democracy, such as formal political equality and proper respect for the judgement of each citizen. (shrink)

The article discusses the implications of the well‐known discursive dilemma. The dilemma arises whenever a reasoned decision has to be taken by a collective decision‐maker and generates persistent contradiction between what is defined as collective reason and public opinion. Following Philip Pettit, I argue that collective reason is normatively preferable and that the role of existing constitutional institutions in contemporary democracies is to collectivise reason. However, this makes the frustration of popular will a systematic by‐product of any well‐functioning political process. (...) I argue that the only way out is if individual beliefs are subject to revision during cycles of public deliberations with the responsibility to lead this thrusted upon elected representatives. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 1, February 2019, Page 20-39.

Opponents of compulsory voting often allege that it violates a ‘right not to vote’. This paper seeks to clarify and defend such a right against its critics. First, I propose that this right must be understood as a Hohfeldian claim against being compelled to vote, rather than as a mere privilege to abstain. So construed, the right not to vote is compatible with a duty to vote, so arguments for a duty to vote do not refute the existence of such (...) a right. The right against compulsion is most easily defended within a liberal framework, hence its critics often appeal instead to a republican conception of freedom. In the latter part of the paper, I argue that even these republican arguments are inconclusive. Even non-dominating interference still conditions freedom, which may require justification. Further, citizens can live up to republican ideals, so long as they are vigilant; they need not actually vote. Thus, republican arguments fail to refute a right not to vote. (shrink)

An emerging branch of political theory, ‘the politics of dissensus’, starts out from the premise that in order to understand the politics of constitutional democracies, one needs to focus on parliamentary politics, which compromises both institutional settings and debates. Politics takes place among adversaries, and dissensus and argumentation pro et contra is the rule. The focus on the conditions for consensus in contemporary democratic theory accordingly misses the essence of politics. The politics of dissensus tends to think that the political (...) philosophy inaugurated by John Rawls, political liberalism in particular, is too idealistic and utopian to capture real parliamentary politics. I argue that this basic objection against political liberalism is misconceived. To the contrary, the politics of dissensus and political liberalism supplement each other. The impact of my argument is that research in these disparate fields of political studies ought to enlighten each of them. (shrink)

This article argues that current economic upheaval should be understood as a problem of domination, in two respects: the ‘dyadic’ domination of one actor by another, and the ‘structural’ domination of individuals by a diffuse, decentralized, but nevertheless human-made system. Such domination should be contested through specifically democratic political mobilization, through institutions and practices that expand the political agency of citizens themselves. The article advances this argument by synthesizing two traditions of political thought. It reconstructs radical democratic theory from the (...) Progressive Era. These thinkers in turn help to reinforce contemporary debates in neorepublican thought, resolving disputes over the scope of domination and the relationship between domination and democracy. This synthesis offers a novel normative framework for diagnosing and responding to the current combination of economic upheaval and political dysfunction. (shrink)

Republicans understand freedom as the guaranteed protection against any arbitrary use of coercive power. This freedom is exercised within a political community, and the concept of arbitrariness is defined with reference to the actual ideas of its citizens about what is in their shared interests. According to many current defenders of the republican model, this form of freedom is understood in strictly negative terms representing an absence of domination. I argue that this assumption is misguided. First, it is internally inconsistent. (...) The central republican focal point of arbitrariness is a necessarily socially constructed ideal that only exists as the creation of the citizens themselves. Second, republican freedom operates in two distinct realms or spheres. There is freedom under a law that is required to uphold the collective good as reflected in society’s norms, and there is freedom within that very system of norms. The threats to freedom from within each sphere are different and must be addressed accordingly. The negative approach, however, conflates the two and emphasises only the dangers faced under the law. This exposes citizens – especially those from marginalised social groups – to domination in the second realm from oppressive social norms. Only by clearly recognising the nature of both kinds of threats can a comprehensive republican freedom be formulated. (shrink)

This article critically engages with Philip Pettit’s republican political philosophy, and with his republican theory of democracy in particular. After a brief summary of Pettit’s conceptualisation of freedom as non-domination, the paper focuses on the question as to which institutional arrangement Pettit considers commensurate with this normative ideal. The paper prepares the ground for a critical reconstruction of Pettit’s theory of democracy by highlighting the understanding of democracy in the republican tradition within which Pettit aims to develop his contemporary theory (...) of democracy. The reconstruction leads to the argument that Pettit, in neo-Roman republican tradition, has written “the people” as a transformative actor out of the script of democratic theory. (shrink)

Many commentators today lament the politicization of bioethics, but some suggest distinguishing among different kinds of politicization. This essay pursues that idea with reference to three traditions of political thought: liberalism, communitarianism, and republicanism. After briefly discussing the concept of politicization itself, the essay examines how each of these political traditions manifests itself in recent bioethics scholarship, focusing on the implications of each tradition for the design of government bioethics councils. The liberal emphasis on the irreducible plurality of values and (...) interests in modern societies, and the communitarian concern with the social dimensions of biotechnology, offer important insights for bioethics councils. The essay finds the most promise in the republican tradition, however, which emphasizes institutional mechanisms that allow bioethics councils to enrich but not dominate public deliberation, while ensuring that government decisions on bioethical issues are publicly accountable and contestable. (shrink)

E l conflict o entr e l a democraci a a g r e gat iva (basad a e n e l v alo r igualitari o d e l a r e gla d e l a m a y oría ) y l a deliberat iva (centrad a e n l a fuerz a epistémic a de l mejo r a r gumento) constitu ye un a d e la s principale s tensione s d e l a (...) teorí a contemporáne a d e l a democracia. Est e trabaj o sostien e qu e quiene s dibuja n dich o conflict o l o hace n a pa r ti r d e un a visión e xces iv ament e optimist a de l v alo r mora l d e l a primer a y demasiad o pesimist a de l carácte r no igualitari o d e l a s e gunda . N i l a con e xió n d e l a r e gl a d e l a m a y orí a co n l a igualda d política sería n ta n fue r t e y e xclus iv a , n i l a deliberació n u n proces o controla b l e únicament e po r la búsqued a objet iva d e solucione s política s co r recta s y n o tambié n po r e xigencia s d e justicia procedimental . N o obstante , aunqu e co n una s proporcione s mucho s meno s e xagerada s a la sugeridas , e xistirí a entr e ambo s procedimiento s u n cie r t o g rad o d e incompatibilida d que podría , s i n o superars e po r completo , s í relajars e d e admiti r qu e cualquie r justi f icació n de u n procedimient o d e tom a d e decisione s n o pued e desa r rollars e d e fo r m a completamente abstracta , sin o qu e h a d e ajustars e a l cont e xto. (shrink)

What should we do if climate change or global injustice require radical policy changes not supported by the majority of citizens? And what if science shows that the lacking support is largely due to shortcomings in citizens’ individual psychology such as cognitive biases that lead to temporal and geographical parochialism? Could then a plausible case for enhancing the morality of the electorate—even against their will –be made? But can a democratic government manipulate the will of the people without losing democratic (...) legitimacy? This paper explores the problems that governmental manipulation of voters pose for democratic legitimacy and the tensions between non-manipulated input and morally acceptable output. These venerable issues of political theory resurface in light of recent suggestions to tackle today’s global mega-problems by Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu. They suggest that to avert the looming catastrophe, governments should alter psychological traits of the citizenry through biomedical means, from pharmaceuticals to genetics. However, we argue that a government cannot rule with democratic legitimacy if elected by a will of the people it manipulated before. Normatively, conferring power from the governed onto governors is a one-directional relation that is incompatible with manipulation. But while it is tempting to rebut suggestions to morally enhance the people as antithetical to essential ideas of democracy, swift rebuttals tend to overlook the deeper challenge: Majoritarian decision-making may lead to inacceptable outcomes. The dilemma between input and output runs through major works in political theory. Rather than wishfully ignoring the dangers of democracy, democratic theory has to provide answers. (shrink)

This paper attempts to demonstrate that bottom-up popular vote processes (the optional referendum and citizens’ initiative) focused on ordinary legislation can help to improve democratic self-government by uniquely facilitating the development and expression of various forms of political agency. Most significantly, it is argued that such popular vote processes can be designed in ways that endow them with significant deliberative credentials. Methodologically, the paper employs Mark E. Warren’s problem-based approach to democratic theory, which provides the conceptual tools necessary to advance (...) a) a novel case for recovering popular vote processes as a valid institutional toolkit for exploration by democratic theory and b) an empirically informed set of best practices that can provide critical resources for normatively scrutinizing existing institutionalizations of bottom-up popular vote processes across the world. (shrink)

This article argues that Hayek employed a neo-Roman concept of liberty. It will show that Hayek’s definition of liberty conforms to that provided by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, respectively the chief theorist and leading historian of the neo-Roman concept. It will go on to demonstrate how the genealogy of liberty Hayek provides is also the same as that offered by Pettit and Skinner. This is important, as the neo-Roman concept is not regarded, either by Hayek or by neo-republicans led (...) by Pettit, as a product of political theory. Instead it is viewed as underpinning a historical tradition. Hayek’s self-conscious association with this tradition reinforces the article’s prior claim that Hayek’s conceptual writing on liberty is neo-Roman. Finally, the article considers how the neo-Roman nature of Hayek’s work complicates the historical narrative and political claims the neo-republicans make for the neo-Roman concept. It concludes that it is open to use by another, very different, political tradition: free market liberalism. (shrink)

Philip Pettit’s conception of freedom as nondomination is modally robust in that it requires not simply reducing the probability of uncontrolled interference by others but entirely eliminating that possibility. In this article, I consider whether freedom as nondomination provides an attractive analysis of official discretion, particularly in the context of the criminal law, an area of recurring interest for Pettit. I argue that not only does the modally robust character of freedom as nondomination have some rather unattractive implications in the (...) criminal law, but that it sits poorly with Pettit’s more general ambitions to provide a consequentialist framework for the evaluation of social institutions. Drawing on recent work by Niko Kolodny, I develop an ‘anti-deference’ interpretation of nondomination and contrast it to Pettit’s modally robust conception. (shrink)

For many liberal democrats toleration has become a sort of pet-concept, to which appeal is made in the face of a myriad issues related to the treatment of minorities. Against the inflationary use of toleration, whether understood positively as recognition or negatively as forbearance, I argue that toleration may not provide the conceptual and normative tools to understand and address the claims for accommodation raised by at least one kind of significant minority: democratic dissenting minorities. These are individuals, or aggregates (...) of them, who oppose, on principled grounds, the outcomes of the majoritarian decision-making process. I argue that democratic dissenting minorities' claims are better understood as calls for respect for a person's capacity for self-legislation. I view respect as the cornerstone of justice in a liberal democracy: all norms resulting in a constraint on a person's conduct should be appropriately justified to her. I argue that the reconciliation of democratic dissenting minorities' claims requires an enhancement of the justificatory strategies of democratic decisions by enhancing in turn citizens' rights to political participation. This should be done both during decision making and after a provision is enacted by also securing space for contestation through such forms of illegal protest as civil disobedience and conscientious objection. (shrink)

Many commentators today lament the politicization of bioethics, but some suggest distinguishing among different kinds of politicization. This essay pursues that idea with reference to three traditions of political thought: liberalism, communitarianism, and republicanism. After briefly discussing the concept of politicization itself, the essay examines how each of these political traditions manifests itself in recent bioethics scholarship, focusing on the implications of each tradition for the design of government bioethics councils. The liberal emphasis on the irreducible plurality of values and (...) interests in modern societies, and the communitarian concern with the social dimensions of biotechnology, offer important insights for bioethics councils. The essay finds the most promise in the republican tradition, however, which emphasizes institutional mechanisms that allow bioethics councils to enrich but not dominate public deliberation, while ensuring that government decisions on bioethical issues are publicly accountable and contestable. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt’s concept of freedom is exceptional in contemporary political theory. First, it is positive, which puts it into opposition to the both current versions of its negative counterpart, the liberal, and the republican concepts of freedom. In particular, a comparison between Arendt’s and Pettit’s approaches allows establishing some striking points of antagonistic logical mirroring. Based on this, the notion of “schools of thought” is introduced, which plays an essential role in the subsequent discussion of Arendtian realism. Second, although Arendt’s (...) theory of freedom shares features that are common to the major continental thinkers, like Martin Heidegger, Gilles Deleuze, or Alain Badiou, her solution to the problem of freedom aligns her closer to the liberals. Third, I argue that one should consider this logical irregularity as evidence in favor of her political realism, rather than a trivial inconsistency. This realism is the genuinely exceptional part of her legacy, which may guide us eventually, with modifications applied, to a paradigm shift in the current political philosophy. Finally, I present an evaluation of her solution to the problem of freedom, and a brief follow-up to some seemingly-out-of-place Arendtian notions, such as “excellence” and “elite.” Although in the final analysis, her solution seems to be artificial, it opens up a new promising area of research related to the notion of “benevolent excellence.”. (shrink)

La versión seniana del enfoque de las capacidades define a la libertad individual en términos de la posesión de una preferencia decisiva. A través del análisis de la discusión con la definición provista por el republicanismo, se mostrará que la primera desconoce el papel que las instituciones deben jugar a la hora de proteger esas libertades y que, por lo tanto, es inadecuada. En este artículo se argumenta que, cuando esta definición es considerada dentro del marco más general del pensamiento (...) seniano, es posible hallar una solución a tales problemas, y que ella consiste en vincular las libertades con una concepción deliberativa de la democracia. Sin embargo, se mostrará que esta solución tiene costos teóricos y que parte de esa definición de la libertad o bien debe abandonarse o bien relativizarse. Senian Version of the Capability Approach defines individual freedom in terms of having a decisive preference. Through the analysis of the discussion with the definition provided by republican conceptions, it will be shown that Senian definition ignores the role that institutions should play at protecting those freedoms and that this is a reason to consider it inadequate. This article argues that, when this definition is considered in the more general framework of Senian thinking, a solution can be founded. This solution consists in the construction of a solid link between freedom as decisive preference and a deliberative conception of democracy. However, it will be argued that this solution has some theoretical costs and that part of that definition should be given up or at least relativized. (shrink)