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ABSTRACT In this commentary, I delve into areas in which I agree as well as disagree with Glen Pettigrove’s interesting ideas. I am very much in agreement with his views about the limited use of the proportionality principle in attempting to explain what virtue adds to value. The main portion of his essay, however, lies in his treatment of three approaches purporting to explain how virtue adds to value: Hurka’s recursive theory; what Pettigrove calls the ‘response-dependent’ view; and his own (...) |
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Thanks to pioneering work in the mid to late twentieth century by the likes of Elizabeth Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Slote, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse, virtue ethics has estab... |
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1. This is the second in a two-part investigation of the relationship between virtue and value. It focuses principally on two questions that part 1 [Pettigrove 2022] left readers asking.1 First, is... |
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ABSTRACT Glen Pettigrove argues against the proportionality principle that it cannot accommodate important phenomena of our moral practice, namely forgiveness, love, and ambition: each of the cases involve pro- or contra-attitudes that are disproportionate to the intrinsic value or disvalue of their object. In this commentary, I offer alternative interpretations of forgiveness, love, and ambition and show that each of these phenomena is in line with the proportionality principle. |
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ABSTRACT I focus on Pettigrove’s attack on the ‘proportionality principle’ of value, according to which our actions and attitudes ought to be proportioned to the degree of value present in an object, action, or event. I compare Pettigrove’s strong rejection of this principle with Aristotle's less radical view. There is no room in Aristotelian theory for a phronetic decision that does not take account of overall value. Yet how phronesis operates is clearly no mere utility calculus. What is clear is (...) |
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ABSTRACT Glen Pettigrove wishes to accommodate the thought that exemplary instances of love, forgiveness and ambition need not be strictly proportional to the value present in their objects and that agents who are excellent may value the same things somewhat differently from one another or differently over time. To make room for these attractive ideas, he sketches an approach according to which (i) the virtuous agent’s particular modus operandi constitutes an important locus of value and (ii) the value of virtue (...) |
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ABSTRACT Pettigrove advances a persuasive case against the proportionality principle. In my view, the moral respect that his modus operandi account of virtue affords to each person’s ‘characteristic way of being’ is also to be applauded. While various philosophers have come to believe in the proportionality principle, it is something that presupposes a monistic account of value. Moreover, it is readily arguable that the kind of abstraction that this involves provides nothing more than an illusion of understanding, and that any (...) |
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