ABSTRACT Pettigrove’s paper argues strongly and effectively against a proportionality principle grounded on a univocal scale of value, and argues in favour of a kind of virtue ethics that is focused exclusively on the characteristic and non-univocal attitudes of the subject. In my critique, however, I point out that not all proponents of value ethics adhere to the proportionality principle and that the radical shift from object to subject has risks that were highlighted in a book by C. S. Lewis, (...) The Abolition of Man. I also point out that Pettigrove in fact treats ‘I love you’ and ‘I forgive you’ substantively in terms of a first-person act in which any relationship-enabling response by the second person is accidental. On this account, there seems to be an underlying ethical challenge, namely that the Pettigrovian valuers are in reality isolated, cut off from relationships based on genuine union with second persons. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I focus on Pettigrove’s attack on the ‘proportionality principle’ of value, according to which our actions and attitudes ought to be proportioned to the degree of value present in an object, action, or event. I compare Pettigrove’s strong rejection of this principle with Aristotle's less radical view. There is no room in Aristotelian theory for a phronetic decision that does not take account of overall value. Yet how phronesis operates is clearly no mere utility calculus. What is clear is (...) that phronesis does not only attach itself to individual virtues in individual agents; it acts as a conductor of the whole virtue orchestra. Aristotle’s phronesis theory seems to bring him close to ‘proportionality principle’ territory. However, on a closer look, the whole idea of maximization is totally alien to Aristotelian virtue ethics. I explain how Aristotle's solution to the problem Pettigrove addresses lies in his individuality-adjusted account of virtue. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Glen Pettigrove wishes to accommodate the thought that exemplary instances of love, forgiveness and ambition need not be strictly proportional to the value present in their objects and that agents who are excellent may value the same things somewhat differently from one another or differently over time. To make room for these attractive ideas, he sketches an approach according to which (i) the virtuous agent’s particular modus operandi constitutes an important locus of value and (ii) the value of virtue (...) is sui generis. I note that the principle of universalizability threatens his project. I sketch a way to reject this principle that agrees with the thesis that an agent’s modus operandi may be an important locus of value but puts pressure on the thesis that the value of virtue is sui generis. I question whether Pettigrove needs the second thesis. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this commentary, I delve into areas in which I agree as well as disagree with Glen Pettigrove’s interesting ideas. I am very much in agreement with his views about the limited use of the proportionality principle in attempting to explain what virtue adds to value. The main portion of his essay, however, lies in his treatment of three approaches purporting to explain how virtue adds to value: Hurka’s recursive theory; what Pettigrove calls the ‘response-dependent’ view; and his own (...) account, which he calls the ‘modus operandi’ view. Though I agree with his criticisms of the recursive theory, I express concerns about his treatment of the response-dependent view, as well as about Pettigrove’s own modus operandi account. (shrink)

ABSTRACT According to one widely accepted view, our actions and emotions ought to be proportional to the degree of value present in their objects. Against this proportionality principle, Pettigrove sketches a view according to which the value of some virtuous actions and attitudes derives from the characteristic way of being of the agent herself, and not from any other goods that agent appreciates, pursues, or promotes. Granting Pettigrove’s rejection of the proportionality principle, I raise some questions for his replacement account. (...) I suggest that it is not just the characteristic way of being of an agent who loves and forgives virtuously that explains the goodness of their love and forgiveness, but also the role such virtues play in making possible valuable relationships that are partially constitutive of human flourishing. (shrink)

Thanks to pioneering work in the mid to late twentieth century by the likes of Elizabeth Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Slote, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse, virtue ethics has estab...

ABSTRACT Pettigrove advances a persuasive case against the proportionality principle. In my view, the moral respect that his modus operandi account of virtue affords to each person’s ‘characteristic way of being’ is also to be applauded. While various philosophers have come to believe in the proportionality principle, it is something that presupposes a monistic account of value. Moreover, it is readily arguable that the kind of abstraction that this involves provides nothing more than an illusion of understanding, and that any (...) supposed insights associated with it have no genuine or practical application. While Pettigrove presents the modus operandi account of virtue as something that competes with consequentialist accounts of virtue, his discussion of consequentialist considerations is both minimal and equivocal. With this in mind, I seek to challenge Pettigrove’s apparent suggestion that the goodness of virtue is always ‘fundamental’. (shrink)

1. This is the second in a two-part investigation of the relationship between virtue and value. It focuses principally on two questions that part 1 [Pettigrove 2022] left readers asking.1 First, is...