From the early modern period, Western epistemologists have often been concerned with a rigorous notion of epistemic justification, epitomized in the work of Descartes: properly held beliefs require insulation from extreme skepticism. To the degree that veridical cognitive states may be indistinguishable from non-veridical states, apparently veridical states cannot enjoy high-grade positive epistemic status. Therefore, a good believer begins from what are taken to be neutral, subjective experiences and reasons outward—hopefully identifying the kinds of appearances that properly link up to (...) the world and those that do not. Good beliefs, beliefs that are justified (warranted, etc.), are those that a believer has .. (shrink)

This paper intends to present a cognitive model of anuvyavasāya through causal and logical analysis of the moment examinations (kṣaṇavicāra), remaining consistent with the fundamental presuppositions of the Nyāya system. The Naiyāyikas hold that no cognition is self-revealing in nature. A subsequent mental perception, introspection or after-perception (anuvyavasāya) reveals the determinate cognition. In anuvyavasāya, along with the cognition and Self, the object of determinate cognition (vyavasāya) also is known. The vyavasāya itself, working as cognition-induced extraordinary sensory connection (jñānalakṣaṇa alaukika sannikarṣa), (...) connects its object to the mental sense-organ. We can formulate the moment examination of the after-perception ‘I know that it is a pitcher’ in the following way: (M1) sense-pitcher connection, (M2) indeterminate perception of pitcher, (M3) determinate perception of pitcher, (M4) indeterminate perception of the vyavasāya, (M5) determinate mental perception of vyavasāya, i.e. anuvyavasāya. But, according to the Naiyāyikas cognition exists only for two moments. So at M5, the vyavasāya is destroyed, which is the object or cause of anuvyavasāya. Gaṅgeśopādhyāya replies that a cause is only required to exist at the immediately previous moment of the effect. The paper analyses the moment examinations of anuvyavasāya offered by Udayanācārya and Vardhamānopādhyāya and tries to arrive at a consistent model of anuvyavasāya. The paper also discusses whether at all anuvyavasāya is an instance of jñānalakṣaṇa. Udayana’s account suggests that it is so, but Gadādhara does not admit it. On the other hand, Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi hold that like vyavasāya all the internal states having contents (saviṣayaka) may work as jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. (shrink)

Some ten years ago an interesting discussion took place in the pages of this journal. It began with an article by Arindam Chakrabarti (2000) whose title betrays its intention: "Against Immaculate Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating Nirvikalpaka Perception from Nyāya." There followed a response by Stephen H. Phillips (2001), "There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception: A Response to Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyāya's Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa," which in turn was commented upon in Chakrabarti's "Reply to Stephen Phillips" (2001).This discussion, as is clear (...) from the titles, concerns the need and even possibility of nirvikalpaka perception. What Chakrabarti tries to do is "to show why we can easily do without .. (shrink)