The Nyāya Argument for Disjunctivism

History of Philosophy Quarterly 36 (1):1-18 (2019)
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The Nyāya school of classical Indian epistemology defended (by today’s standards) a radical version of epistemic externalism. They also gave arguments from their epistemological positions to an early version of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. In this paper I assess the value of such an argument, concluding that a modified version of the Nyāya argument may be defensible.

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Henry Ian Schiller
University of Sheffield


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