The Nyāya Argument for Disjunctivism

History of Philosophy Quarterly 36 (1):1-18 (2019)
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Abstract
The Nyāya school of classical Indian epistemology defended (by today’s standards) a radical version of epistemic externalism. They also gave arguments from their epistemological positions to an early version of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. In this paper I assess the value of such an argument, concluding that a modified version of the Nyāya argument may be defensible.
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Archival date: 2019-10-15
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2018-10-28

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