This article aims to show that Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief and religious statements can be understood in modest philosophical terms, consistent with the thought that they are neither intended as serving to justify or undermine religious beliefs, nor as the expression of any theorizing about the nature of religious belief or the meaning of religious language. Instead, their philosophical significance is held to consist in their functioning to remind us of what we already know about the latter: such things (...) as in what circumstances one utters religious statements, what the consequences of accepting or rejecting religious beliefs are, and so on. His position is that all attempts to say something more than this are either a mark of philosophical arrogance or a manifestation of one’s own personal commitment to adopting a stance of religious belief or non-belief. As such, they do not furnish us with genuine philosophical insights. I argue that such an interpretation possess two principal merits. Firstly, it demonstrates that there is no tension between Wittgenstein’s remarks on the nature of philosophy and his remarks on religious belief and religious statements. Secondly, it shows that it is possible to philosophize about religion in a manner that does not assume that this has to consist either in presenting an apology for or critique of religion or in formulating philosophical theories regarding the nature of religious belief and the meaning of religious language. (shrink)

Pilate asked an important and pertinent question of Jesus regarding truth. A simple answer to his question would be ‘a statement is true only if it says what is the case.’ What that means, however, is another matter. By exploring options, I hope to elucidate some common disagreements among believers and non-believers, as well as squabbles between different religious positions. While most attention will be given to examples within Christianity, similar sorts of disagreements also occur in other religions. It is (...) hoped that exploring such options will also help contribute to improved dialogue among the various contenders. (shrink)

Dieser Aufsatz hält der Meinung, daß die Analytische Religionsphilosophie zu rationalistisch sei, entgegen, daß es auch in Sachen Religion nicht zu viel Vernunft geben kann. Dies begründe ich, indem ich das Zweistufenmodell des christlichen Glaubens verteidige, nach dem der christliche Glaube einerseits aus dem Annehmen einer metaphysischen Lehre und andererseits aus einer darauf gründenden Hingabe besteht. Dies ist ein Kennzeichen einer sowohl tiefen als auch rationalen Religion.

In this article, I describe a multidisciplinary project at the interface of philosophy, science, and theology. The project is the product of an ongoing collaboration between the author and Christopher Southgate, to whom this special issue of Zygon is dedicated. At the philosophical core of the project is a development of C. S. Peirce's semiotics (theory of signs). The scientific branch of the project involves the application of semiotic theory to the problem of the origin of life, and to questions (...) about human evolution and human distinctiveness. The theological branch of the project involves the articulation of a semiotic approach to the Christian concepts of Incarnation and Trinity, and to the ideas of vestiges of the Trinity in creation and of participation in God's life. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the project in terms of Robert John Russell's model of ‘creative mutual interaction’ between science and theology. (shrink)

When a Christian refers to the future full realization of the kingdom of God in an afterlife, it is typically assumed that she is expressing beliefs about the existence and activity of God in conjunction with supernatural beliefs about an otherworldly realm and the possibility of one’s personal survival after bodily death. In other words, the religious language is interpreted in a realist fashion and the religious person here is construed as a religious believer. A corollary of this widely-held realist (...) view is the assumption that if one were to conclude that there is no good reason to believe the asserted claims—for example, no reason to believe that we may survive our bodily deaths in a heavenly realm—then there is no reason to engage in the use of such religious language and the practices which accompany it. I argue that this assumption is false—that there is a meaningful way to use such language in a religious context that does not rest on believing supernatural claims. Against the backdrop of Kant’s discussion of a kingdom of ends understood as a regulative ideal, I argue that religious discourse about the kingdom of God being brought to fruition may be reinterpreted as a useful fiction to draw our attention to and engage our emotions with a distinctive ideal of restorative justice. Though I and others have previously offered fictionalist accounts of language about God, I extend the view here to some religious language about the afterlife. (shrink)

Contrary to a widespread interpretation, Wittgenstein did not regard credal statements as merely metaphorical expressions of an attitude towards life. He accepted that Christian faith involves belief in God's existence. At the same time he held that although as a hypothesis, God's existence is extremely implausible, Christian faith is not unreasonable. Is that a consistent view? According to Wittgenstein, religious faith should not be seen as a hypothesis, based on evidence, but as grounded in a proto‐religious attitude, a way of (...) experiencing the world or certain aspects of it. A belief in religious metaphysics is not the basis of one's faith, but a mere epiphenomenon. Given further that religious doctrine is both falsification‐transcendent and that religious faith is likely to have beneficial psychological effects, religious doctrine can be exempt from ordinary standards of epistemic support. An unsupported religious belief need not be unreasonable. However, it is hard to see how one could knowingly have such an unsupported belief, as Wittgenstein seems to envisage. How can one believe what, at the same time, one believes is not likely to be true? This, I argue, is the unresolved tension in Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Notwithstanding his own spiritual inadequacies, Wittgenstein has a profound respect for those capable of living a genuinely religious life; namely, those whose “passionate,” “loving” faith demands unconditional existential commitment. In contrast, he disapproves of those who see religious belief as hypothetical, reasonable, or dependent on empirical evidence. Drawing primarily on Culture and Value, “Lectures on Religious Belief,” and On Certainty, in this essay I defend two claims: (1) that there is an unresolved tension between Wittgenstein's later descriptive-therapeutic approach and the (...) implicit normativity of his conception of genuine/passionate religious belief; and (2) that the demarcation between the latter and its pseudo-religious counterpart is itself problematic. To illustrate these claims I argue that apocalyptic Christian fundamentalism presents a significant challenge to Wittgenstein's taxonomy. Despite these shortcomings, however, I conclude by suggesting that his characterization of religious belief as a “passion” or “love” remains valuable. (shrink)

John Dewey points out in A Common Faith (1934) that what stands in the way of religious belief for many is the apparent commitment of Western religious traditions to supernatural phenomena and questionable historical claims. We are to accept claims that in any other context we would find laughable. Are we to believe that water can be turned into wine without the benefit of the fermentation process? Are we to swallow the claim that there is such a phenomenon as the (...) spontaneous conception of a child without the intervention of the traditional technique? Were we to confront these claims in any but a religious context, we would dismiss them as the workings of an overactive imagination or simple cover for an overactive sex life. But for the devout believer, there is no doubt even with a paucity of evidence. At the same time, the rise of science has forcibly suggested the idea that the natural world is self-contained and, if explainable, that explanation will come from within. There seems to be no room for the traditional God and, much as one might wish otherwise, nothing for him to do. Perhaps... (shrink)

نظریه‌های معنای زندگی را در یک تقسیم‌بندی کلان و اجمالی می‌توان به دو دستۀ دیدگاه‌های طبیعت‌گرا و غیرطبیعت‌گرا افراز کرد. یکی از اشکالات همیشگی وارد بر دیدگاه‌های طبیعت‌گرا ناتوانی آنها در حل معضل پوچی است؛ طبیعت‌گرایی خوش‌بینانه عنوان ایده‌ای است که مدعی شده بر مبنای پیشرفت‌های علمی و دستاوردهای فناورانه می‌توان، در عین پای‌بندی به طبیعت‌گرایی، از معضل پوچی رهایی یافت. در این مقاله، با تأکید بر دیدگاه‌های لئو تولستوی و تامس نیگل دربارۀ معضل پوچی، طبیعت‌گرایی خوش‌بینانه، بر مبنای دیدگاه (...) دن ویجرز، با یک صورت‌بندی استدلالی تقریر می‌شود. همچنین، به منظور داوری دربارۀ کارآمدی طبیعت‌گرایی خوش‌بینانه در رهایی یافتن از معضل پوچی، مبانی و پیشفرض‌های معناشناختی، معرفت‌شناختی، و انسان‌شناختی آن از جمله جعل‌گرایی، علم‌گرایی و فیزیکالیسم مورد بررسی و واکاوی قرار می‌گیرد و نشان داده می‌شود که این دیدگاه، بر خلاف ادعای مطرح‌شده از سوی ویجرز، قابلیت حل معضل پوچی را ندارد، بلکه مؤیدی بر ناتوانی طبیعت‌گرایی در حل معضل پوچی است. (shrink)

Calls for decolonization are on the rise in social and academic life, but ‘decolonization’ can mean various things. This article expounds and critically evaluates the programme of conceptual decolonization, chiefly as promulgated in relation to African philosophy by Kwasi Wiredu. The programme involves both resisting the unreflective acceptance of non-indigenous concepts and constructively utilizing indigenous conceptual resources to address philosophical questions. Examining recent objections from Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò and giving particular attention to Wiredu’s treatment of religious concepts, I concur with Wiredu (...) that conceptual decolonization can encourage conceptual enlargement but argue that care is needed to avoid oversimplifying the non-indigenous concepts that are subjected to scrutiny. (shrink)

در این مقاله سعی شده است فهم دینی کرکگور از «سوبژکتیویته» با استناد به گفته‌های او به ویژه در دست‌نوشته‌ها و سایر نوشته‌هایش تبیین شود. او مفاهیم کلیدی نظیر «مسیحیت»، «حقیقت»، «شور»، «خدا»، و «ایمان» را برای توصیف و تبیین «سوبژکتیویته» به کار می‌برد. برای مثال تلقی وی از مسیحیت به مثابۀ «سوبژکتیویته» با تلقی رایج و عمدتاً تاریخی از مسیحیت که عمدتاً درک ابژکتیو از آن دارند کاملاً متفاوت است. مسیحیت از نظر این متفکر عمدتاً در قالب آموزه‌ها مطرح (...) می‌شود و چیزی که برای او حائز اهمیت است مسیحی شدن است، نه این که مسیحیت چیست. کرکگور به دنبال آن است که در برابر سوبژکتیویتۀ فلسفی فلسفۀ مدرن نظیر تفکر دکارتی و کانتی موضعی انتقادی اتخاذ کند. باید گفت که کرکگور با سوبژکتیویته سروکار دارد، نه سوبژکتیویسم که یک مسئلۀ معرفت شناختی است و او علاقه‌ای به آن ندارد. بنابراین هدف این مقاله این است که ماهیت دینی سوبژکتیویته و فهم دینی از آن را در نوشته‌های این متفکر دانمارکی نشان دهد. (shrink)

It has been observed, by D. Z. Phillips among others, that philosophy suffers from a “lack of imagination”. That is, philosophers often fail to see possibilities of sense in forms of life and discourse due to narrow habits of thinking. This is especially problematic in the philosophy of religion, not least when cross-cultural modes of inquiry are called for. This article examines the problem in relation to the philosophical investigation of reincarnation beliefs in particular. As a remedial strategy, I argue (...) for increased attention both to ethnographic sources and to the articulation of distinctively religious moral visions that reincarnation-talk facilitates. (shrink)

Can a contemplative philosopher describe a particular religious practice as superstitious, or is he thereby overstepping his boundaries? I will discuss the way in which the Wittgensteinian philosopher of religion D. Z. Phillips uses ‘Superstition’ as a contemplative term. His use of the distinction between genuine religion and superstition is not a weakness as is often supposed, but a necessity. Without contemplating ‘Superstition’ and ‘genuine religion’ Phillips would not have been able to elucidate the meaning that religious beliefs have in (...) the lives of both the faithful and their critics. I will defend the aptness of Phillips’s use of this term and illustrate his approach using examples such as the concept of genuine friendship or gratitude, and then I apply this approach to the question whether, from a philosophical point of view, particular Christian practices such as the prosperity gospel are genuinely religious or should be called superstitious. (shrink)

This article addresses some issues concerning the relation between religious beliefs and the fruits of those beliefs, where ‘fruits’ implies certain relevant forms of behaviour and affective attitudes. My primary aim is to elucidate the dispute between D. Z. Phillips and theological realists, emphasizing the extent to which this dispute is symptomatic of a deeper disagreement over how words acquire their meanings. In the course of doing so, I highlight an important difference between two alternative realist claims, exemplified by Trigg (...) and Hick respectively, and draw attention to an infelicity in Phillips’ way of presenting his case. (shrink)