States cannot legitimately enforce their borders against migrants if dominant conceptions of sovereignty inform enforcement because these conceptions undermine sufficient respect for migrants’ basic human rights. Instead, such conceptions lead states to assert total control over outsiders’ potential cross-border movements to support their in-group’s self-rule. Thus, although legitimacy requires states to prioritize universal respect for basic human rights, sovereign states today generally fail to do so when it comes to border enforcement. I contend that this enforcement could only be rendered (...) legitimate if it was predicated on more desirable conceptions of sovereignty that supported the universal prioritization of basic human rights. Specifically, desirable conceptions would not establish and require absolute state sovereignty over borders as a necessary precondition for true popular self-governance. (shrink)

Over the decades, scholarly discourses on sovereignty and globalization have been produced following various theories and numerous debates about the strength and weakness of the sovereign nation-state and globalization. In this paper, the various theories on the discourse of sovereignty and globalization are traced and placed into four categories as: contending paradigm, globalization paradigm, transformation paradigm and complementary paradigm. Both concepts, sovereignty and globalization, are explored by adopting the methodological framework, sources of explanation. The argument is that there is an (...) intricate relationship between these concepts. To determine the relationship between sovereignty and globalization, three world systems were examined and it revealed that, globalization is born of the sovereign nation-state and that globalization can only be assert in the current sovereign world system and not the ones preceding it. The overall conclusion is that globalization emerged as a result of sovereignty and since the discourse of sovereignty and globalization is about the same space and its inhabitants, they are bound to be discursively set against each other if the discourse focusses solely on the phenomena seen as globalization. The forces of globalization and sovereignty need to be further researched into to be able to tell where they are leading us. (shrink)

Dit werkstuk betrekt zich op de vraag of de de facto legitimiteit van Knoet de Grote als koning van Angelsaksisch Engeland, te verklaren is aan de hand van de theorieën over legitimiteit zoals gepostuleerd door Maximilian Carl Emil Weber (1864—1920). Bestaande literatuur over Knoet de Grote zijn troonsbestijging, zoals dat van vooraanstaand 19e-eeuws historicus Edward Augustus Freeman, zou een ‘geromantiseerd’ beeld hebben geschetst van de kwestie. Dit werkstuk zal kijken of dit beeld, aan de hand van Webers theorie over waar (...) legitimiteit in gegrond kan zijn, ten eerste terecht te noemen is en, ten tweede, of het Knoets status als legitiem vorst van het ‘Angelsaksische’ volk goed kan verklaren. (shrink)

Contemporary proponents of republican political theory often focus on the concept of freedom as non-domination, and how best to promote it within a state. However, there is little attention paid to what the republican conception of freedom demands in the international realm. In this essay I examine what is required for an agent to enjoy freedom as non-domination, and argue that this might only be achieved for individuals if one of two possibilities is pursued internationally: either (1) all nations are (...) made equally powerful, such that none may arbitrarily impose its will on another without penalty, or (2) all nations are joined under a global sovereign which guarantees that the weaker states are not subject to the whims of the stronger. I further argue that the first condition cannot suffice for achieving true non-domination, and as a result, republicanism must prescribe working toward the establishment of a global state. This paper provides an important contribution to the literature by addressing the international implications of the republican conception of freedom. (shrink)

Pe parcursul anului trecut, la Institutul de Cercetări Economice şi Sociale „Gheorghe Zane” din Iaşi, a avut loc workshopul „Concepte şi argumente în filosofia social-politică. Interpretări şi dezbateri”. Workshopul s-a desfăşurat în cadrul proiectului POSDRU „Societatea bazată pe cunoaştere: cercetări, dezbateri, perspective”. Cartea de faţă este principalul rezultat al acestui workshop. Ea a fost gândită şi propusă spre publicare în primul rând din speranţa că va fi utilă celor care doresc să se iniţieze – sau celor care încearcă să-i iniţieze (...) pe alţii – în teoria şi filosofia social-politică (mai ales cea contemporană). Aceasta cu atât mai mult cu cât, la noi, lucrările de acest tip (fie semnate de autori români, fie traduceri) sunt încă destul de rare. Mă refer aici la lucrările care acordă o atenţie specială (şi) filosofiei politice (teoriei politice normative), nu doar ştiinţei politice sau politologiei (teoriei politice empirice). Dacă cele din urmă apar din ce în ce mai frecvent în ultima vreme, cele dintâi rămân, din păcate, foarte puţine, chiar insuficiente. Cartea nu este nici pe departe una exhaustivă. În ciuda acestui „defect”, cred că ea îşi poate îndeplini totuşi obiectivul fundamental, fie şi numai pentru că oferă analize, prezentări şi comentarii despre câteva dintre cele mai importante concepte şi teorii din teoria socială şi politică recentă. Mai mult, în cadrul ei sunt discutate inclusiv unele concepte sau/şi teorii încă puţin analizate la noi (precum „multiculturalismul”, „dreptatea socială”, „genul” sau „democraţia deliberativă”). Se obişnuieşte uneori ca autorul introducerii unui volum de acest tip să prezinte în rezumat şi principalele idei apărate sau/şi metodologii utilizate de autorii fiecăruia dintre capitole. Eu nu voi face acest lucru. Motivul? Aş risca să fiu redundant, de vreme ce astfel de precizări şi rezumate au fost deja realizate de autorii volumului, chiar în debutul capitolelor pe care le semnează. Acestea fiind spuse, ţin să mai evidenţiez doar un singur lucru: aşa cum se va observa cu siguranţă, multe dintre capitolele lucrării nu sunt simple texte introductive (deşi au, fără îndoială, şi o astfel de dimensiune). Altfel spus, autorii acestor capitole nu s-au mulţumit să prezinte doar ideile, argumentele sau teoriile altor autori (şi în special ale celor consideraţi de referinţă) în problemele pe care le analizează. De multe ori, ei prezintă, dimpotrivă, şi idei, opinii, interpretări, argumente, perspective sau chiar teorii ori măcar „semiteorii” proprii asupra conceptelor şi problemelor pe care le abordează. Acest lucru nu ar trebui să fie surprinzător. Pentru fiecare dintre autorii capitolelor din acest volum, conceptele şi problemele pe care le prezintă aici constituie o preocupare sistematică şi constantă, dacă nu chiar preocuparea lor fundamentală, cel puţin în ultimii ani. De altfel, cel puţin în România, preocupările şi contribuţiile în domeniu ale multora dintre ei sunt deja cunoscute şi comentate, fie şi doar în cercul restrâns al specialiştilor şi al celor interesaţi de teoria social-politică. (shrink)

Self-consciousness in non-human animals is a complex phenomenon which raises both conceptual and methodological problems. First, what do we mean by the concept of ‘self-consciousness’? Secondly, what is the best experimental approach to self-consciousness? This paper gives a short overview of the concept of self-consciousness in section 1. We can understand the concept of self-consciousness as capturing the ability of subjects to consciously think about themselves as themselves. If this is accurate, then it is prudent to look at a broad (...) bundle of abilities which are related to this ability. The paper then focuses on advantages and problems of the multipronged approach, a kind of empirical approach which uses several different test criteria to determine whether a subject is self-conscious or not. Section 2 briefly contrasts this kind of approach with other possibilities. The main disparity is to singlepronged approaches, which have been discussed and dismissed in greater detail elsewhere. Section 3 discusses the advantages of a multipronged approach, whereas section 4 is dedicated to the discussion of some of its problems. (shrink)

In this article, I ask whether the state, as opposed to its individual members, can intelligibly and legitimately be criminalized, with a focus on the possibility of its domestic criminalization. I proceed by identifying what I take to be the core objections to such criminalization, and then investigate ways in which they can be challenged. First, I address the claim that the state is not a kind of entity that can intelligibly perpetrate domestic criminal wrongs. I argue against it by (...) building upon an account of the modern state as a moral agent proper, capable of both culpable moral and legal wrongdoing. I then consider objections to the intelligibility and legitimacy of subjecting states to domestic criminal processes, which primarily find their source in the assumption that such subjection would necessarily involve the state prosecuting, judging, and punishing itself. I argue that whether this (questionable) assumption is sound or not, it does not create the kinds of unsolvable quandaries its exponents think it does. I then move on to reject the distinct, yet related, objection that, at least in aspiring liberal jurisdictions, treating the state as a criminal objectionably involves extending to it various substantive and procedural guarantees that, given its nature and raison d’être, it should not have. Finally, I discuss three central objections to punishing the state. First, that organizations like states do not have the phenomenal consciousness required to suffer punishment. Second, that the constant possibility of dispersion of state punishment amongst individual members stands in the way of its justification. Lastly, that whatever justification there may be for making things harder for the state in response to its culpable wrongdoing, such treatment need not be understood as punishment. While partially conceding the strength of these objections, I strive to loosen their grip in ways that show that justified punishment of the state, meaningfully understood as such, remains a distinct possibility. I conclude by contrasting supposed alternatives to the criminalization of states, and by contending that my analysis leaves us with enough to keep the possibility of state criminalization on the table as a justifiable response to state wrongdoing. (shrink)

Within the literature in green political theory on global environmental threats one can often find dissatisfaction with liberal theories of justice. This is true even though liberal cosmopolitans regularly point to global environmental problems as one reason for expanding the scope of justice beyond the territorial limits of the state. One of the causes for scepticism towards liberal approaches is that many of the most notable anti-cosmopolitan theories are also advanced by liberals. In this paper, I first explain why one (...) of the strongest expressions of liberal anti-cosmopolitanism cannot simply be dismissed because it may fail to support desired environmental ends. The political conception of justice represents one of the most important challenges to cosmopolitanism generally and is thus a serious challenge to viewing global environmental problems in terms of cosmopolitan justice. Second, I will show through the case of anthropogenic global warming that the political conception of justice under current conditions does have clear cosmopolitan implications despite its proponents' claims. (shrink)

We commonly attribute to states and other institutional organizations moral duties and obligations. For example, it is widely held that the state has a moral duty to protect its citizens from external threats and it is claimed that it ought to positively promote the welfare of its members. When we focus on the surface grammar of such institutional duty-claims, we see that they seem to differ from individual duty-claims only with respect to the subject of the claim. Whereas an institutional (...) duty-claim asserts that an institution has a duty to do some action a, an individual duty-claim asserts that a particular individual person has a duty to a. For example, we might claim that parents ought to protect their children, or that a particular person, Doe, ought to take better care of his child. Many scholars have argued or at least assumed that institutions are ultimately just collections of individuals, and hence institutional duty-claims can be analyzed in terms of claims about individuals' duties and obligations. Other scholars have rejected this reductive approach to institutional duty-claims as well as the individualist assumption upon which it is premised--viz., that institutions are nothing "over and above" individuals. Instead, it is argued that at least some institutional organizations are moral agents in their own right which have duties and obligations that are uniquely their own. According to this antireductive holist approach, at least some institutional duty-claims resist being analyzed into claims about individuals' duties and obligations. My aim in this dissertation is to clarify what is meant when we assert that the state has moral duties, and I do so by entering into dialogue with both the reductive individualist and antireductive holist views. In Chapter One I situate and motivate my project by reference to two well-known debates in which claims about the state's duties play an inescapably central role; viz., the debate concerning the propriety of using so-called "enhanced interrogation techniques" in the War on Terror and the debate surrounding the most recent reforms to the health care system here in the United States. Since my aim is to shed light on the meaning of and truth-makers for institutional duty-claims, I devote Chapter Two to the task of clarifying what we mean and imply when we advance duty-claims in what we may assume to be paradigmatic circumstances: namely, those circumstances in which an individual is said to have a duty to do something or another. I then frame the further investigation into the meaning and significance of institutional duty-claims as one which has the aim of revealing whether the phrase 'has a duty' has a univocal, analogous, or equivocal signification across institutional and individual contexts. In Chapter Three I take up the task of characterizing and distinguishing the relevant reductive individualist and antireductive holist viewpoints, considering both historically significant and contemporary versions of each. In Chapter Four I present and critically evaluate a rather influential argument in favor of institutional moral agency, which, if true, would vindicate the antireductive holist approach. I conclude that chapter by arguing that, contrary to the claims made by those who defend institutional agency, we are unjustified in believing that institutions possess those properties requisite for moral agency. Having set aside what I take to be a "best-case" for an antireductive holism, I turn, in Chapter Five, to the task of making plausible the reductive individualist approach. In doing so, I propose that some institutional duty-claims actually resist reduction to claims about individuals' duties and that such claims are thus better understood as claims about the extrinsic value of an institutional arrangement. (shrink)

Natural disasters are social disruptions triggered by physical events. Every year, hundreds of natural disasters occur and tens of thousands of people are killed as a result. I maintain that everyone would want to be provided with assistance in the aftermath a natural disaster. If a national government is not providing post disaster assistance, then we expect that some other institution has the responsibility to provide it. Unfortunately, that is not the case currently. Therefore, in this thesis I argue that (...) in some situations the international community is required to intervene on behalf of those affected by the disaster caused by a natural hazard. Natural disaster intervention is a moral requirement: because the international community has a duty to provide the goods we are entitled to as per the human right to welfare, even in natural disaster scenarios. After making my argument as to why a natural disaster intervention policy should be developed I explain the basic principles of such a policy by applying the Just War criteria to natural disaster scenarios in which a national government is unable or unwilling to provide assistance to its people. (shrink)

A great deal of attention has been paid in recent years to the legality of the actions of states and state agents in international and non-international cyber conflicts. Less attention has been paid to ethical considerations in these situations, and very little has been written regarding the ethics of the participation of non-state actors in such conflicts. In this article, I analyze different categories of non-state participation in cyber operations and undertake to show under what conditions such actions, though illegal, (...) might be morally defensible. (shrink)

As manifestações de 2013 evidenciaram problemas que ainda não faziam parte da agenda sociopolítica brasileira, entre eles, destaca-se a crise da representação política. A pesquisa investiga esses fenômenos a partir deste problema: Por que as instituições não avançam com a sociedade? Nosso viés de análise é interdisciplinar, aplicando o procedimento reconstrutivo através de teorias e diagnósticos dos cenários atuais. Iniciamos nossa análise das teorias da representação sociopolítica na filosofia política moderna, partindo da consolidação do republicanismo nas cidades-estados em território italiano (...) na transição do Medievo para a Renascença, período extremamente influente para o pensamento político moderno; prosseguimos nosso estudo dando um maior foco ao desenvolvimento sociopolítico durante a Idade Moderna, abordando a emergência do liberalismo e da democracia representativa idealizada por Jean-Jacques Rousseau. A seguir, tratamos o tema da representação sociopolítica na formação do pensamento político brasileiro, que começou a idealizar-se a partir da Constituição de 1824. Porém, aqui nos delimitamos a estudar a formação do pensamento brasileiro na Segunda República, com o desenvolvimento industrial, a emergência da sociedade civil organizada e a criação dos partidos políticos. Apesar do longo período de dominação das elites na esfera política e da repressão aos movimentos sociais, o Brasil produziu uma geração de pensadores importantes que refletiram sobre a constituição do povo e a formação do Estado nacional brasileiro. Por fim, problematizamos a democracia representativa em seu estágio atual, analisando cenários, fazendo diagnósticos para recriar a democracia, tal como é institucionalizada na forma-estado ocidental. Porém, como fazer isso, sem incorrer no vício espontaneísta ou no movimentismo sem foco, ou no processismo que nunca se realiza? Os partidos têm pouca capacidade de elaborar estratégias, apenas divulgam ilusões programáticas, de como gerir mais ou menos os negócios estatais, através de marketing e planejamento eleitoral. Trata-se de construir uma gestão democrática, que supere ações emergenciais, reagindo às crises, estados de necessidade econômica e shows eleitorais; uma representação que não fique reduzida a dicotomia de ser gestor a serviço do mercado ou do Estado, mas que articule a horizontalidade das redes sociais, conectando o pensar e o agir estrategicamente, superando dualismos entre público ou privado, entre Estado ou Mercado. (shrink)

The United Nation’s mandate to engineer international peacecraft is correlated with the promotion of universal human rights. Universal human rights are held to apply consistently to everyone everywhere without conceivable exception. There is some debate as to whether universal human rights possibly exist. This debate centers around two difficulties: 1) the task of identifying a single trait or capability that all human beings necessarily share, and 2) the task of relating human rights to this trait or capability. Conventional epistemic justifications (...) defending the existence of universal human rights attempt to address both difficulties. However, they have become the focus of numerous criticisms. By conducting systematizing and critically reviewing text analyses, I will conclude that conventional epistemic justifications are unable to refute standard criticisms satisfactorily. In their place, I will introduce an epistemic justification from the philosophy of mind. I will attempt to demonstrate that this justification is capable of 1) identifying a single trait that all human beings necessarily share, 2) relating human rights to this trait, and 3) satisfactorily refuting the standard criticisms raised against conventional epistemic theories. I have produced this paper in the hope of further legitimizing the UN’s mandate to engineer international peacecraft by providing a more philosophically optimal justification of claims affirming the existence of universal human rights. (shrink)

Resumen Nicolás Gómez Dávila caracteriza la Modernidad democrática como una época gnóstica. En este artículo pretendo reconstruir esta caracterización a partir de una lectura intertextual de Textos. Desde una filosofía de la historia y desde una antropología filosófica Gómez Dávila interpreta fenómenos históricos como la Modernidad y la democracia con una perspectiva que privilegia lo religioso. Su conclusión es que en la Modernidad democrática el ser humano se ha arrogado atributos divinos, es decir, se ha divinizando. Así, intentaré mostrar cómo (...) funciona la intertextualidad de Textos en la crítica a la Modernidad democrática y ofreceré además algunas consideraciones críticas.Nicolás Gómez Dávila characterizes democratic Modernity as a gnostic age. This article pretends to reconstruct his characterization by way of an intertextual reading of Textos. Gómez Dávila’s thesis is derived from a philosophy of history and a philosophical anthropology; both allow him to interpret Modernity from a religious perspective. His conclusion is that democratic Modernity bestows human beings unlimited sovereignty, which for him means gnostic divinization. Thus, I intend to explain how intertextuality works in the assessment of democratic Modernity and put forward a few critical considerations. (shrink)

Who owns nature? The question could be less important than reducing animal sufferings in nature. It does not matter if nature does not belong to anyone or if it belongs to someone, because in both cases there are limitations, linked with animal welfare, regarding what we should do in nature. Sentient beings have interests that we must take into account when designing environmental policies. Since neither ecosystems nor plants have interests, preserving nature is less important than reducing animal sufferings. The (...) relevant moral issue is, therefore, knowing what happens to sentient animals in nature and developing policies to reduce their sufferings. This implies that we have the moral obligation of intervening in nature with the aim of reducing animal sufferings, so conservationist environmental policies defended by ecologists are morally unacceptable. (shrink)