Background: Research indicates that shunning and ostracism may have long-lasting and severe effects on the individual’s well-being. However, there is scarcity of research into shunning enacted in a religious context. Therefore, using Jehovah’s Witnesses as an example, the present research explores the experiences of being shunned from a religious community, with particular reference to the impact on the lives of individuals, and the strategies employed to cope with such an event. Methodology: Social Identity Theory and Identity Process Theory, integrated with (...) the constructs of power and the Social Dominance Theory, provide the theoretical framework which underpins the current thesis. The narratives of two groups of participants, those of members who have been shunned as well as PIMO and former Elders, form the research data. The data are analysed using Reflexive Thematic Analysis. Results: The thesis has generated three main findings. First, the participants’ journey is a complex experience, where intrinsic and extrinsic forces combine in influencing the individual’s behaviour and decisions. Second, shunning may produce constructive outcomes, but by-and-large, shunning is an experience of loss which has serious impacts on the individual’s physical and emotional well-being. Third, the individual after being shunned embarks on a journey towards personal emancipation which culminates with a cognitive revolution. However, the process towards regaining ownership and autonomy is not defined by fixed stages of coping. Rather, it appears to be a continuum with the individual advancing from personal stagnation to personal progression over time. Implications: By developing an awareness of the underlying factors which may facilitate or hinder personal progression, this research may assist healthcare professionals in providing a more effective support that aims at helping the shunned client to progress towards autonomy and self-reliance. Also, the contribution of this research leads to new lines of inquiry. Future work would focus on the need of informing and engaging the police force, legislators, educational stakeholders, and policy makers. This is firstly, to properly address reports of discrimination because of religious shunning, secondly, to enhance child safety in ensuring their best interests are met, and lastly, to guarantee the individual’s basic rights during the judicial process. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that it is possible to have an account of shame and guilt as mature concepts in moral psychology that sit alongside immature ones. In arguing for this, I adopt the critical r...

This discussion concentrates on the meaning of Nausicaa's words in lines 286–8, in particular on the force of the phrase κα δ' λλ κτλ. and the sense of the verb μσγηται. On the latter Hainsworth comments, ‘In later usage the simple verb in such a context is used as a euphemism for the sexual act. The line must have sounded most odd to the classical age.’ Thus he translates ‘associate with’, citing Odyssey 7.247 as an exact parallel; since, in that (...) place, the verb refers to nothing more than ordinary human intercourse , with no further connotations, one must conclude that Hainsworth sees no innuendo whatever in 6.288. (shrink)

This article argues that shame is fundamentally interpersonal. It is opposed to the leading interpretation of shame in the field of moral psychology, which is the cognitivist, morally rationally, autonomous view of shame as a negative judgment about the self. That view of shame abandons the social and interpersonal essence of shame. I will advance the idea, as developed by the tradition of philosophical anthropology and, in particular, in the works of Helmuth Plessner, Erwin Straus, F. J. J. Buytendijk, and (...) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, that shame is a heteronomous affective response that is caused by a breakdown in our fundamental interpersonal connection with others. It is a feeling that comes from the denial of our basic need to live with others in a state of trusting acceptance. (shrink)

Shame is a puzzling emotion. On the one hand, to feel ashamed is to feel badly about oneself; but on the other hand, it also seems to be a response to the way the subject is perceived by other people. So whose standards is the subject worried about falling short of, his own or those of an audience? I begin by arguing that it is the audience's standards that matter, and then present a theory of shame according to which shame (...) is a response to the subject's perception that he is not thought of in the way he intrinsically values himself for being thought of by someone else. Then I go on to suggest some refinements to this basic view. First, the subject of shame is primarily concerned about his audience's attitudes toward him, not what they believe about him. And second, there may be one particular attitude which he values himself for inspiring. There is no very perspicuous term for this attitude, so I call it ‘proto-respect’ – the attitude a social animal directs toward those it regards as valuable allies or bad enemies. (shrink)

This research examines whether religious conceptions of guilt in Protestant and Roman Catholic groups account for constructive or non-constructive guilt-reactions and for different guilt-frequency. Participants in three groups filled in the Leuven Guilt and Shame Scale, the Leuven Emotion Scale and the Post Critical Belief Scale. Protestants were expected to experience more non-constructive guilt than Catholics, who were expected to experience more constructive guilt. Both were expected to have a higher frequency of guilt experience than the control group. Differences between (...) the groups were found: Catholics show more constructive guilt reactions than the other groups. Differences in non-constructive guilt reactions were not found. The Protestant and Catholic group experienced guilt more frequently than the control group. (shrink)

Racines »Phèdre« wird zum Opfer eines tödlichen Schamkonflikts. Der tief in ihre Psyche eingeschriebene Familienfluch ihrer sexuell devianten Vorfahren sowie die Erfahrung des Liebesverlusts, der aus der Zurückweisung ihres Stiefsohns Hippolytes resultiert, bringen sie dazu, den letzten Zielpunkt ihrer Scham zum Tode – den Suizid – auszuführen. Racines Seelenspektakel wird durchgehend von dem Affekt der Scham strukturiert. Stets ist die Figur vom brennenden Blick ihres mythisch-göttlichen Großvaters Helios begleitet. Racine verortet die unlösbaren Konflikte der Tragödie im Inneren der Figur und (...) benennt den Affekt der Scham durch die sprachliche Ästhetisierung. Phèdres autodestruktive Flucht in die Höllennacht bleibt der letzte Ausweg für die von der tödlichen Scham geplagte Figur. (shrink)

This article argues against a leading cognitivist and moral interpretation of shame that is present in the philosophical literature. That standard view holds that shame is the felt-response to a loss of self-esteem, which is the result of negative self-assessment. I hold that shame is a heteronomous and primitive bodily affect that is perceptual rather than judgmental in nature. Shame results from the breakdown and thwarting of our desire for anonymous, unexceptional, and disattentive co-existence with others. I use the sociological (...) theory of Erving Goffman and the theory of shame found in philosophical anthropology to support this view. I also use the cases of shame and chronic shame that often accompany disability to show that shame is separable from negative self-assessment and, instead, emerges as an affective response to a world (of equipment, things, and people) that disallows unburdened and unreflective interpersonal equilibrium. (shrink)

This discussion concentrates on the meaning of Nausicaa's words in lines 286–8, in particular on the force of the phrase κα δ' λλ κτλ. and the sense of the verb μσγηται. On the latter Hainsworth comments, ‘In later usage the simple verb in such a context is used as a euphemism for the sexual act. The line must have sounded most odd to the classical age.’ Thus he translates ‘associate with’, citing Odyssey 7.247 as an exact parallel; since, in that (...) place, the verb refers to nothing more than ordinary human intercourse, with no further connotations, one must conclude that Hainsworth sees no innuendo whatever in 6.288. (shrink)

Recent accounts support the existence of two distinct feelings of guilt: altruistic guilt (AG), arising from the appraisal of not having been altruistic toward a victim and deontological guilt (DG), emerging from the appraisal of having violated an intuitive moral rule. Neuroimaging data has shown that the two guilt feelings trigger different neural networks, with DG selectively activating the insula, a brain area involved in the processing of disgust and self-reproach. Thus, insula activation could reflect the major involvement of self-reproach (...) in DG rather than in AG. However, only a few studies have empirically tested whether and how DG and AG differently affect decision making and none have compared enhanced self-worth. Here we asked three groups of participants, respectively, induced with either pride, DG or AG, to participate in a third-party version of the ultimatum game in which they were asked to decide on behalf of others to accept or reject economic offers with several degrees of fairness. Results revealed that only deontological participants had higher median acceptances of Moderately Unfair offers as compared to proud participants. However fairness judgments were not different between groups, suggesting that deontological participants’ moral standards had not decreased. Crucially, a higher increase in DG was associated with an increase in the odds of accepting 30:70 offers. The opposite effects that DG and pride exert on self-worth can account for these results. Specifically, proud participants felt entitled enough to take action in order to restore equity, while deontological participants followed the “Do not play God” principle, which limited their decisional autonomy, not allowing them to decide on behalf of others. (shrink)

Many experiences of shame centrally involve exposure. This has suggested to a number of writers that shame is essentially a social emotion that involves being exposed to the view or appraisal of an audience—call this the Audience Thesis. Others reject the Audience Thesis on the basis of private experiences of shame that seem to involve no exposure. This disagreement marks a basic fault line in theorizing about shame. I develop and explore a simple but effective way to shield the Audience (...) Thesis from the private shame objection, by understanding the notion of an audience in a very minimal way. Rather than conceiving of the audience in terms of an other whose appraisal is an element in shame, we can conceive of shame generally as a response to appraisals of the subject—either by others or by the subject herself. On this view, shame requires an audience in the sense that it is not a first-order self-appraisal—like disappointment in or disapproval of oneself—but rather an appraisal of appraisals. This approach yields substantial benefits: it renders the private shame objection harmless; it explains why exposure cases strike us as particularly paradigmatic instances of shame; it clarifies what is happening when we feel shame before appraisals with which we do not agree; it helps to understand how it may be possible to feel shame in the face of neutral or even positive appraisals; and it captures a significant but neglected sense in which shame might be considered a social emotion. (shrink)

We investigated the cognitive structure of emotions in Indonesia and The Netherlands in a series of three studies. Sets of 120 emotion terms were selected based on local ratings of prototypicality for "emotion". With similarity sortings a three-dimensional (evaluation, arousal, dominance) and a four-cluster (positive emotion, sadness, fear, anger) structure was found in each group. Of 50 pairs of translation-equivalent terms, 42 pairs were also found to be cognitively equivalent. With these equivalent terms a good fit of a common cognitive (...) emotion structure was demonstrated in both countries. In a fourth and final study, the location of two social emotions, "shame" and "guilt", in the common structure was found to be closer to "fear" and somewhat further away from "anger" in Indonesia than in the Netherlands. (shrink)