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Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations

Ganna Pogrebna, David H. Krantz, Christian Schade & Claudia Keser

Theory and Decision 71 (4):473-502 (2011)

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Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination.Francisca Jiménez-Jiménez & Javier Rodero Cosano - 2021 - Theory and Decision 91 (2):235-263.details This paper investigates experimentally the effects of communication in distinct games with complete information. We design four games resulting from the interaction between two incentive elements: strategic complementarity and coordination. These incentive elements allow to analyse the use of cheap talk as an efficiency-enhancing and coordinating device. We implement a restricted communication protocol in repeated settings with fixed partners. Our findings provide robust evidence about how cheap talk interacts with incentives to explain strategic behaviour in a dynamic way. As expected, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Either with us or against us: experimental evidence on partial cartels.Georg Clemens & Holger A. Rau - 2022 - Theory and Decision 93 (2):237-257.details This paper analyzes the coordination challenge a partial cartel faces when payoff asymmetries between potential cartel insiders and potential cartel outsiders are large. We introduce two experimental treatments: a standard treatment where a complete cartel can be supported in a Nash equilibrium and a modified treatment where a complete cartel and a partial cartel can both be supported in a Nash equilibrium. To assess the role of communication both treatments are additionally run with a “chat option,” yielding four treatments in (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
The Integrative Effects of Leading by Example and Follower Traits in Public Goods Game: A Multilevel Study.Huiqing Qiu, Youlan Zhang, Gonglin Hou & Zhongming Wang - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:381627.details As an important way to understand leadership based on voluntary contribution mechanisms, the importance of leading by example to teamwork is becoming more and more evident in recent years. However, existing theories based on signaling and reciprocity perspectives respectively provide incomplete theoretical explaining. This study adds clarity by conducting a cross-level study that indicates a possible integrative framework of both signaling and reciprocity perspective on leading by example. Results were using data gathered from 130 Chinese college students, which were allocated (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Communication, leadership and coordination failure.Lu Dong, Maria Montero & Alex Possajennikov - 2018 - Theory and Decision 84 (4):557-584.details We investigate the limits of communication and leadership in avoiding coordination failure in minimum effort games. Our environment is challenging, with low benefits of coordination relative to the effort cost. We consider two leader types: cheap-talk leader-communicators who suggest an effort level, and first-mover leaders who lead by example. Both types of leadership have some ability to increase effort in groups with no history, but are insufficient in groups with a history of low effort. Using the strategy method for followers’ (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Who are the voluntary leaders? Experimental evidence from a sequential contribution game.Raphaële Préget, Phu Nguyen-Van & Marc Willinger - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (4):581-599.details We rely on the methodology of Fischbacher et al. :397–404, 2001) in order to identify subjects’ behavioral types. We then link the likelihood to act as a leader in a repeated public goods game to the elicited behavioral types. The leader in a group is defined as the subject who voluntarily decides in the first place about his contribution. The leader’s contribution is then reported publicly to the remaining group members who take their contribution decisions simultaneously. Our main findings are (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations

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