This dissertation concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The dissertation demonstrates how phenomenal consciousness and gradational possible-worlds models in Bayesian perceptual psychology relate to epistemic modal space. The dissertation demonstrates, then, how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; deontic modality; logical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the (...) epistemic status of undecidable propositions and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the apriori-aposteriori distinction; to the modal profile of rational propositional intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal mental state. Examining the nature of epistemic logic itself, I develop a novel approach to conditions of self-knowledge in the setting of the modal μ-calculus, as well as novel epistemicist solutions to Curry's, the liar, and the knowability paradoxes. Solutions to previously intransigent issues concerning the first-person concept; the distinction between fundamental and derivative truths; and the unity of intention and its role in decision theory, are developed along the way. (shrink)

A wide array of syntactic phenomena can be categorized as being either direction-sensitive (e.g. coordination) or direction-insensitive (quantification and medial extraction). In the realm of categorial grammar, many frameworks are engineered to handle one class of phenomena at the expense of the other. In particular, Lambek-inspired frameworks handle direction-sensitivity elegantly but struggle with cases of direction-insensitivity, whereas in linear grammars, the situation is just the opposite. One reasonably successful attempt to unify the insights of both types of grammar and allow (...) for the analysis of direction-sensitive as well as direction-insensitive phenomena is hybrid type-logical categorial grammar (HTLCG), which augments the set of syntactic categories of an ordinary linear grammar with the directional slashes of a Lambek grammar. In this paper, the complementary nature of Lambek and linear grammars, with respect to direction-sensitive and direction-insensitive phenomena, is expounded on, as is the nature of how HTLCG attempts to reconcile the two systems. The paper further discusses an alternative to HTLCG—a linear grammar which adds Lambek-like capabilities by augmenting the string-combining (phenogrammatic) mechanism instead of the definition of syntactic categories (the tectogrammar). In particular, LCGϕ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\hbox {LCG}_\phi $$\end{document} (linear categorial grammar with phenominators) adds a form of subtyping based on phenominators—a class of linear functions which specify various modes of (phenogrammatic) combination. Most importantly, an algorithm is provided for embedding HTLCG into LCGϕ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\hbox {LCG}_\phi $$\end{document}, thereby demonstrating that LCGϕ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\hbox {LCG}_\phi $$\end{document} can handle direction-(in)sensitivity at least as well as HTLCG. (shrink)

This paper explores proof-theoretic aspects of hybrid type-logical grammars, a logic combining Lambek grammars with lambda grammars. We prove some basic properties of the calculus, such as normalisation and the subformula property and also present both a sequent and a proof net calculus for hybrid type-logical grammars. In addition to clarifying the logical foundations of hybrid type-logical grammars, the current study opens the way to variants and extensions of the original system, including but not limited to a non-associative version and (...) a multimodal version incorporating structural rules and unary modes. (shrink)

Attitudinal propositionalism is the view that all mental attitude content is truth-evaluable. While attitudinal propositionalism is still silently assumed in large parts of analytic philosophy, recent work on objectual attitudes (i.e. attitudes like ‘fearing Moriarty’ and ‘imagining a unicorn’ that are reported through intensional transitive verbs with a direct object) has put attitudinal propositionalism under explanatory pressure. This paper defends propositionalism for a special subclass of objectual attitudes, viz. experiential attitudes. The latter are attitudes like seeing, remembering, and imagining whose (...) grammatical objects intuitively denote (events or) scenes. I provide a propositional analysis of experiential attitudes that preserves the merits of propositionalism. This analysis uses the possibility of representing the target-scenes of experiential attitudes by the intersection of all propositions that are true in these scenes. I show that this analysis makes available the usual (Russellian) account of intensionality and the common (Boolean) logic for entailments. (shrink)

Co-hyperintensionality, or hyperintensional equivalence, is a relation holding between two or more contents that can be substituted in a hyperintensional context salva veritate. I argue that two strategies used to provide criteria for co-hyperintensionality fail. I argue that there is no generalized notion of co-hyperintensionality that meets plausible desiderata, by showing that the opposite thesis leads to falsity. As a conclusion, I suggest to take co-hyperintensionality as a primitive and I provide a general criterion of co-hyperintensionality whose content depends on (...) each hyperintensional notion we aim to formalize. (shrink)