- Two paradoxes of bounded rationality.David Thorstad - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
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Money-Pump Arguments.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2022 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
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Transfinitely Transitive Value.Kacper Kowalczyk - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):108-134.details
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Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
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Heavenly Freedom and Two Models of Character Perfection.Robert J. Hartman - 2021 - Faith and Philosophy 38 (1):45-64.details
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Embodied vs. Non-Embodied Modes of Knowing in Aquinas in advance.Therese Scarpelli Cory - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (4):417-46.details
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(1 other version)Arguments for–or against–Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.details
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How to think about satisficing.Chris Tucker - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1365-1384.details
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Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion).Chris Tucker - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):127-143.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Unexpected Expectations.Alan Hájek - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):533-567.details
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Can God Satisfice?Klass Kraay - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):399-410.details
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Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding.Frank Arntzenius, Adam Elga & John Hawthorne - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):251 - 283.details
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(1 other version)Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 229--251.details
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Expected utilities and rational actions and choices.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1983 - Theoria 49 (3):159-183.details
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The ruin of Homo Oeconomicus.Jan-Willem Van der Rijt - unknowndetails
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Slote on rational dilemmas and rational supererogation.Joe Mintoff - 1997 - Erkenntnis 46 (1):111-126.details
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New foundations for practical reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (2):113-144.details
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Originless Sin: Rational Dilemmas for Satisficers.Roy Sorensen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):213 - 223.details
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Can Every Option Be Rationally Impermissible?Chrisoula Andreou - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1309-1317.details
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The Dominance Principle in Epistemic Decision Theory.R. A. Briggs - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):763-775.details
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Better than.Chrisoula Andreou - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1621-1638.details
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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Is Motivated Submaximization Good Enough for God?Klaas J. Kraay - 2021 - Religious Studies.details
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Utility Maximization Generalized.Paul Weirich - 2008 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (2):282-299.details
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Decision instability.Paul Weirich - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):465 – 472.details
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Prospective Possibilism.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (2):117-150.details
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What is ceteris paribus preference?Sven Ove Hansson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):307 - 332.details
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Preferences, Proxies, and Rationality.Chrisoula Andreou - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-11.details
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