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  1. Representation Theorems and Radical Interpretation.Edward J. R. Elliott - manuscript
    This paper begins with a puzzle regarding Lewis' theory of radical interpretation. On the one hand, Lewis convincingly argued that the facts about an agent's sensory evidence and choices will always underdetermine the facts about her beliefs and desires. On the other hand, we have several representation theorems—such as those of (Ramsey 1931) and (Savage 1954)—that are widely taken to show that if an agent's choices satisfy certain constraints, then those choices can suffice to determine her beliefs and desires. In (...)
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  • Newcomblike Problems.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):224-255.
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  • Binding and its consequences.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):49-71.
    In “Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding”, Arntzenius et al. (Mind 113:251–283, 2004 ) present cases in which agents who cannot bind themselves are driven by standard decision theory to choose sequences of actions with disastrous consequences. They defend standard decision theory by arguing that if a decision rule leads agents to disaster only when they cannot bind themselves, this should not be taken to be a mark against the decision rule. I show that this claim has surprising implications for a (...)
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  • Pascalian Wagers.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1996 - Synthese 108 (1):11 - 61.
    A person who does not have good intellectual reasons for believing in God can, depending on his probabilities and values for consequences of believing, have good practical reasons. Pascalian wagers founded on a variety of possible probability/value profiles are examined from a Bayesian perspective central to which is the idea that states and options are pragmatically reasonable only if they maximize subjective expected value. Attention is paid to problems posed by representations of values by Cantorian infinities. An appendix attends to (...)
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  • Partition-theorems for causal decision theories.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (1):70-93.
    Two partition-theorems are proved for a particular causal decision theory. One is restricted to a certain kind of partition of circumstances, and analyzes the utility of an option in terms of its utilities in conjunction with circumstances in this partition. The other analyzes an option's utility in terms of its utilities conditional on circumstances and is quite unrestricted. While the first form seems more useful for applications, the second form may be of theoretical importance in foundational exercises. Comparisons are made (...)
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  • The law student and his teacher.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1987 - Theoria 53 (1):1-18.
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  • Objects of Choice.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2021 - Mind 111.
    Rational agents are supposed to maximize expected utility. But what are the options from which they choose? I outline some constraints on an adequate representation of an agent’s options. The options should, for example, contain no information of which the agent is unsure. But they should be sufficiently rich to distinguish all available acts from one another. These demands often come into conflict, so that there seems to be no adequate representation of the options at all. After reviewing existing proposals (...)
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  • Utility theory and the Bayesian paradigm.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1989 - Theory and Decision 26 (3):263-293.
    In this paper, a problem for utility theory - that it would have an agent who was compelled to play “Russian Roulette’ with one revolver or another, to pay as much to have a six-shooter with four bullets relieved of one bullet before playing with it, as he would be willing to pay to have a six-shooter with two bullets emptied - is reviewed. A less demanding Bayesian theory is described, that would have an agent maximize expected values of possible (...)
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  • Circumstances and dominance in a causal decision theory.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1985 - Synthese 63 (2):167 - 202.
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  • Deliberational equilibria.Brian Skyrms - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):59-67.
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  • Hierarchical maximization of two kinds of expected utility.Paul Weirich - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (4):560-582.
    Causal decision theory produces decision instability in cases such as Death in Damascus where a decision itself provides evidence concerning the utility of options. Several authors have proposed ways of handling this instability. William Harper (1985 and 1986) advances one of the most elegant proposals. He recommends maximizing causal expected utility among the options that are causally ratifiable. Unfortunately, Harper's proposal imposes certain restrictions; for instance, the restriction that mixed strategies are freely available. To obtain a completely general method of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Decisions in Dynamic Settings.Paul Weirich - 1986 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986 (1):438-449.
    The expected utility of an option for a decision maker is defined with respect to probability and utility functions that represent the decision maker’s beliefs and desires. Therefore, as the decision maker’s beliefs and desires change, the expected utility of an opinion may change. Some options are such that their realizations change beliefs and desires in ways that change the expected utilities of the options. If a decision is made among options that include one or more of these special options, (...)
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  • True to oneself.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1993 - Erkenntnis 38 (1):57 - 85.
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  • Notes on decision theory: Old wine in new bottles.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):407 – 437.
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  • Maximization, stability of decision, and actions in accordance with reason.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (1):60-77.
    Rational actions reflect beliefs and preferences in certain orderly ways. The problem of theory is to explain which beliefs and preferences are relevant to the rationality of particular actions, and exactly how they are relevant. One distinction of interest here is between an agent's beliefs and preferences just before an action's time, and his beliefs and preferences at its time. Theorists do not agree about the times of beliefs and desires that are relevant to the rationality of action. Another distinction (...)
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