‘Unity of virtues’ (UV) in Aristotle is the claim that the ethical virtues are mutually entailing. But commentators typically focus on the fact that wisdom implies all the ethical virtues, without explaining how the ethical virtues themselves are mutually entailing. I argue that the so-called ‘Grand End’ view, understood as applying to both wisdom (φρόνησις) and political expertise (πολιτική), allows us to give an account of UV at the level of the ethical virtues. By discussing the ethical virtues individually, I (...) show how all the ethical virtues can be seen as different aspects of the philosopher-statesman’s multifaceted character. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza la aportación de Aspasio al concepto aristotélico de ergon. Hasta el momento no se ha realizado un estudio de este concepto bajo el prisma de las aportaciones aspasianas, centrándose en el capítulo séptimo del libro primero de la Ética Nicomaquea. Examina el significado que Aristóteles reconoce en la función propia del ser humano, y los matices que añade Aspasio. Para esta investigación se sigue el orden del texto y se centra el análisis en los términos clave: el (...) primer apartado se dedica al bien del hombre; el segundo, a la felicidad. El tercero y cuarto a las diversas cualidades que definen la función propia: es específica y racional; es activa, virtuosa y estable. El quinto y último apartado examina los comentarios sobre el método y los principio. (shrink)

In "Toward an Augustinian Liberalism," Paul Weithman argues that modern liberal institutions should be concerned with the political vice of pride as a threat to the neutral, legitimate use of public power that liberalism demands. By directing our attention to pride, Weithman attempts to provide an incentive to and foundation for an Augustinian liberalism that can counteract this threat. While Weithman is right to point to the centrality of pride in understanding the modern liberal tradition, an investigation of the early (...) modern reflections on pride in politics reveals a deeper tension between Augustine and modern liberalism than Weithman's analysis acknowledges. This essay discusses this tension by focusing on Hobbes's account of pride and equality in the commonwealth, asking whether Hobbes can be understood as a thinker in the Augustinian political tradition. In order to provide a background on pride as a political vice, this essay contrasts Aristotelian magnanimity with Augustinian humility. Finally, Aquinas's attempt to reintroduce magnanimity into the Augustinian political tradition is considered as a more consistent development of Augustine's thought, thereby revealing more pointedly the tension between Augustine and modern liberalism. By way of conclusion, the possibility of deflating this tension is briefly addressed by considering Jean Bethke Elshtain's discussion of an Augustinian liberalism that does not rely upon a "secular" conception of human nature. (shrink)

This paper responds to the question of whether judgements generated by judges using ChatGPT can be directly adopted. It posits that it is unjust for judges to rely on and directly adopt ChatGPT-generated judgements based on virtue jurisprudence theory. This paper innovatively applies case-based empirical analysis and is the first to use virtue jurisprudence approach to analyse the question and support its argument. The first section reveals the use of generative AI-based tools in judicial practice and the existence of erroneous (...) judgements generated by ChatGPT through empirical research. The second section contends that generative AI, while mimicking virtuous behaviour, cannot produce justified beliefs according to virtue jurisprudence theory. Moreover, using AI as a decision-making entity could undermine the protection of human rights and interests. The paper concludes by suggesting normative and technical approaches for how judges should use generative AI-based tools to develop their virtues. (shrink)