In fragments of the lost Protrepticus, preserved in Iamblichus, Aristotle responds to Isocrates’ worries about the excessive demandingness of theoretical philosophy. Contrary to Isocrates, Aristotle holds that such philosophy is generally feasible for human beings. In defense of this claim, Aristotle offers the progress argument, which appeals to early Greek philosophers’ rapid success in attaining exact understanding. In this paper, I explore and evaluate this argument. After making clarificatory exegetical points, I examine the argument’s premises in light of pressing worries (...) that the argument reasonably faces in its immediate intellectual context, the dispute between Isocrates and Aristotle. I also relate the argument to modern concerns about philosophical progress. I contend that the argument withstands these worries, and thereby constitutes a reasonable Aristotelian response to the Isocratean challenge. (shrink)

Two dogmas lie at the heart of modern work on Aristotle's ethical theory. The first is that that theory is essentially secular or non-theistic. The second is that Aristotle's ethics assumes what Gr...

While defending the principle of non-contradiction in Metaphysics 4, Aristotle argues that the Measure Doctrine of Protagoras is equivalent to the claim that all contradictions are true; given all appearances are true (as the Protagorean maintains), anytime people disagree we get a true contradiction. This argument seems clearly invalid: nothing guarantees that actual disagreement occurs over every matter of fact. The argument in fact works perfectly, I propose, because the Protagorean view falls prey to a version of Fitch's “paradox” of (...) knowability. The proposed reading shows how Aristotle treats the Protagorean view at issue as an epistemic theory of truth distinct from the mere claim that all appearances are true (which other opponents put forward on different grounds) and reveals Aristotle's underlying concern with the modal collapse of possibility into actuality. The revised Protagorean view Aristotle confronts in a subsequent chapter is furthermore best understood as an attempt to avoid this Fitch-style result. (shrink)

All kinds of identity are typical, genus, and numerical identity. This predication that is the basis of the propositional language of Aristotle is the condition of speaking and use of categories and general concepts in the realm of beings. Because of this, these categories are called categories of being. Before we can speak of prediction, everything must be self-identical. So we have now the best known and logical form of the principle of identity i.e. A=A. Aristotle with formulating the logic (...) and with a concentrate on the numerical identity leads to a kind of concept of the world i.e. conceptual-logical world. The world, after that, is the world of mind and logical thought. With the superiority of the numerical identity and constitution of the principle of identity, the nature of categories is logical-Mindy nature. The definition of identity as A=A give rise to man solely directed at the logical form of this principle and will wipe out of ontological sense. So this particular view about identity leads to a formulation of logical-mindy nature of categories. (shrink)

[full article, abstract in English; only abstract in Lithuanian] This paper investigates a particular strategy for establishing the deep connection between metaphysics and logic using Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction and the theory of predication. The decisive move, according to this strategy, is to formulate and interpret the said principle as a metaphysical principle. In this paper, it is argued that: despite the strategy’s initial appeal, a successful argument still needs to be made in order to fully establish that metaphysics and (...) logic are deeply connected, and the theory of predication is more fundamental than the principle of non-contradiction. The main reason for above is that the strategy is prone to a very powerful objection that Aristotle’s criterion of primary substance is inconsistent. The main reason for above is that the principle of non-contradiction itself is best explained using the theory of predication. In addition, it is the theory of predication that does all the important explanatory work in the context of Aristotle’s philosophical theory. (shrink)

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that metaphysics is a necessary discipline -- necessary in the sense that all areas of philosophy, all areas of science, and in fact any type of rational activity at all would be impossible without a metaphysical background or metaphysical presuppositions. Because of the extremely strong nature of this claim, it is not possible to put forward a very simple argument, although I will attempt to construct one. A crucial issue here is what (...) metaphysics in fact is -- the nature of metaphysics. The conception of metaphysics which I support could be called Aristotelian, as opposed to Kantian: metaphysics is the first philosophy and the basis of all other philosophical and scientific inquiry. I will argue that this is indeed the most plausible conception of metaphysics. (shrink)

In this paper I examine what exactly is ‘Aristotelian metaphysics’. My inquiry into Aristotelian metaphysics should not be understood to be so much concerned with the details of Aristotle's metaphysics. I am are rather concerned with his methodology of metaphysics, although a lot of the details of his metaphysics survive in contemporary discussion as well. This warrants an investigation into the methodological aspects of Aristotle's metaphysics. The key works that we will be looking at are his Physics, Metaphysics, Categories and (...) De Interpretatione. Perhaps the most crucial features of the Aristotelian method of philosophising are the relationship between science and metaphysics, and his defence of the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). For Aristotle, natural science is the second philosophy, but this is so only because there is something more fundamental in the world, something that natural science – a science of movement – cannot study. Furthermore, Aristotle demonstrates that metaphysics enters the picture at a fundamental level, as he argues that PNC is a metaphysical rather than a logical principle. The upshot of all this is that the Aristotelian method and his metaphysics are not threatened by modern science, quite the opposite. Moreover, we have in our hands a methodology which is very rigorous indeed and worthwhile for any metaphysician to have a closer look at. (shrink)

The goals of this paper are two-fold: I wish to clarify the Aristotelian conception of the law of non-contradiction as a metaphysical rather than a semantic or logical principle, and to defend the truth of the principle in this sense. First I will explain what it in fact means that the law of non-contradiction is a metaphysical principle. The core idea is that the law of non-contradiction is a general principle derived from how things are in the world. For example, (...) there are certain constraints as to what kind of properties an object can have, and especially: some of these properties are mutually exclusive. Given this characterisation, I will advance to examine what kind of challenges the law of non-contradiction faces; the main opponent here is Graham Priest. I will consider these challenges and conclude that they do not threaten the truth of the law of non-contradiction understood as a metaphysical principle. (shrink)

Formal ontology as a main branch of metaphysics investigates categories of being. In the formal ontological approach to metaphysics, these ontological categories are analysed by ontological forms. This analysis, which we illustrate by some category systems, provides a tool to assess the clarity, exactness and intelligibility of different category systems or formal ontologies. We discuss critically different accounts of ontological form in the literature. Of ontological form, we propose a character- neutral relational account. In this metatheory, ontological forms of entities (...) are their standings in internal relations whose holding is neutral on the character of their relata. These relations are “formal ontological relations”. Entities belong to ontological categories because they stand in the same formal ontological relations. We hold a nominalist relationalism about ontological categories and forms. We conclude by showing that our metatheory is useful for understanding categorial fundamentality/non- fundamentality, different formal ontologies, and for unifying metaphysical questions. (shrink)

Usage of the Greek verb ‘to be’ is generally divided into three broad categories — the predicative use, the existential and the veridical—and these usages often inform the way we understand Being in ancient philosophy. This article challenges this approach by arguing that Being is not the product of linguistic reflection in Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle; rather, these thinkers treat Being as the ontological and epistemological primary. Though this may overlap with the linguistic senses, it is not the same thing. (...) The article is divided into three sections: the first one raises several basic issues with the predicative interpretation of Being, the second argues that Being is unified and singular in a significant sense and the third brings out the special pre-immanence of Being. (shrink)

Dialetheism is the view that some contradictions are true. Resorting to either metaphysical dialetheism or semantic dialetheism may seem like an appropriate resolve to certain theological contradictions. At least for those who concede to theological contradictions, and take dialetheism seriously. However, I demonstrate that neither of these types of dialetheism would serve to be amenable in resolving an Islamic theological contradiction. This is a theological contradiction that I refer to as ‘the paradox of an unknowable and ineffable God’. As a (...) result of this, I propose an alternative type of dialetheism which aims to resolve the paradox of an unknowable and ineffable God. I call this type of dialetheism, ‘mystical dialetheism’. (shrink)

Se vorbește îndeobște mai mult despre un spirit al timpului (Zeitgeist) și amprenta acestuia asupra modului în care noi înțelegem și reflectăm lumea – asemenea cerului, al cărui joc de lumini și umbre oferă un contur de culoare lucrurilor. Nu trebuie însă să uităm solul din care ideile încolțesc și spiritul locului (Raumgeist) care le‐a animat creșterea. În acest orizont au loc întâlnirile, împlinirile, speranțele și dezamăgirile care ne edifică ca oameni și ne orientează busola căutărilor filosofice și spirituale. Există (...) roade pentru care dăm socoteală în secerișul vieții de zi cu zi și există resturi de care recolta zilei nu pare să ia seama – aparent neînsemnate pentru logica zilei, aceste resturi de roade sunt tocmai cele care la urmă, la apus, dau sens întregii strădanii. Avem sarcina existențială de a nu lăsa iarna vieții să se aștearnă pe resturile rămase în urma secerișului. Acesta este și imboldul volumului de față, care se dorește a fi un spicilegium, care în limba latină înseamnă „un mănunchi de resturi de spice rămase în urma recoltei”. Așadar, o antologie de paisprezece texte filosofice de diferite dimensiuni și subiecte, dar care reprezintă expresia unei comunități de cercetători, profesori, doctoranzi și pasionați de filosofie aduși împreună de filosofia studiată sau trăită cândva la Cluj‐Napoca. Chiar dacă este compus din texte eterogene, cititorul atent al acestui volum va putea sesiza cum spiritul acestui loc subîntinde toate tematizările: propensiunea față de idealism, profunzimea psihanalizei, subtilitatea fenomenologiei, pasiunea realist speculativă și fervoarea căutării autentice a binelui, adevărului și frumosului în lume, în gândire și artă sunt predispozițiile care însuflețesc și textele de față. - Dan Siserman. (shrink)