Scientists and Bayesian statisticians often study hypotheses that they know to be false. This creates an interpretive problem because the Bayesian probability of a hypothesis is supposed to represent the probability that the hypothesis is true. I investigate whether Bayesianism can accommodate the idea that false hypotheses are sometimes approximately true or that some hypotheses or models can be closer to the truth than others. I argue that the idea that some hypotheses are approximately true in an absolute sense is (...) hard to square with Bayesianism, but that the notion that some hypotheses are comparatively closer to the truth than others can be made compatible with Bayesianism, and that this provides an adequate and potentially useful solution to the interpretive problem. Finally, I compare my ``verisimilitude'' solution to the interpretive problem with a ``counterfactual'' solution recently proposed by Jan Sprenger. (shrink)

Professional higher education is expected to educate large numbers of students to become innovative professionals within a time frame of three or four years. A mission impossible? Not necessarily, according to Henriëtta Joosten who is a philosopher as well as a teacher. She uses the experimental, liberating, but also dangerous ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche to rethink contemporary higher professional education. What does it mean to teach students to strive for better in a professional world where horizons tend to disperse and (...) the possibility of long-term orientation is disappearing? Following Nietzsche, five key elements of striving for better are explored: uncertainty, excellence, critical thinking, truth seeking friendship, and learning through ups and downs. From these five perspectives, Joosten scrutinises existing educational discourses on professional higher education in search for openings to transform these discourses into new, more appropriate ones. Understanding excellence as rising above oneself, she argues for a learning environment in which all students are encouraged to excel. Such an environment allows for uncertainty and learning through ups and downs. Furthermore, teachers are prepared to risk their certainties in order to let a joined quest - that is, a quest of students and teacher - for better truths arise. Using the Nietzschean-inspired notions which have been developed in the study, Joosten describes two factual cases. One case relates to a course in close reading: first-year students jointly read philosophical and scientific texts. The second case involves a group of eleven senior students developing a course in project management. These descriptions and the recommendations serve as a catalyst for constructive debate on the question of how all students can be equipped for a dynamic professional world. (shrink)

The metaphorization of space creates possibilities for modelling ‘complex’ phenomena. Four generic spatialities are explored - physical, social, documentary and paradigmatic. There are four irreducible constructions of physical space - realist, dualist, idealist and pluralist. The generic conception of social space plays off the static against the dynamic. Documentary space is the product of contingently defined formal and informational qualities. Paradigmatic space is divided into discreet regions, each defined in incommensurable terms, with the proviso that an ironic, reflexive position may (...) exist beyond the dissolution of metaphysics. Organization is the differentiation of space and its subsequent narrative/visual reconstruction embodied in a temporal blur. ‘Design’ has an ontologically focussed meaning - designed objects, designs as objects - and an epistemologically focussed one - design processes, design as knowledge. The museum comprises an archaeology of instit-utional forms, has an uncertain material/social boundary and is a reflexive organization. The organization of design presents a constellation of four complex objects - product, programme, process, and philosophy. The design of museum design involves a reconstruction of ideolo-gically-charged, multidisciplinary, reflexive practice. Organizations display conserva-tive, ‘museographical’ qualities and radically-creative, ‘new-museological’ qualities. The museum-design-organization complex places the practitioner at the ‘moment’ of forward-projecting and backward-projecting processes of material culture. This promotes productive processes of organizational perversion, subversion and inversion. Design is an organizational virus, the museum radically adaptive because multiply infected. Through consideration of organizational and museological objects, design research may find its centre. (shrink)

This paper attempts to analyze in detail the difference between a pragmatic and non-pragmatic approach to explanation. Proponents of a pragmatic explanation analyze it by means of the concepts of context or audience. However, there could be various disguises of this type of approach. It is possible to include pragmatic concepts into the characterization of the item to be explained or the item that explains. On the other hand, pragmatic approach may focus on the specific relation between the item to (...) be explained or the item that explains and context or audience. Finally, the paper underlines that there is a distinction between a pragmatic approach to explanation and the pragmatics of explanation, which should not be ignored. (shrink)

Hempel, Popper, and Kuhn argue that to be scientific is to be testable, to be falsifiable, and most nearly to do normal science, respectively. I argue that to be scientific is largely to be interactive, offering some examples from science to show that the ideas from different fields of science interact with one another. The results of the interactions are that hypotheses become more plausible, new phenomena are explained and predicted, we understand phenomena from a new perspective, and our worldview (...) becomes simpler. I also argue that given that the interactions are impressive features of science, astrology and religion would be regarded as science, provided that there are similar interactions in those enterprises. (shrink)

Karl Popper famously opposed Marxism in general and its philosophical core – the Marxist dialectic – in particular. As a progressive thinker, Popper saw in dialectic a source of dogmatism damaging to philosophy and political theory. Popper had summarized his views on dialectic in an article that was first delivered in 1937 and subsequently republished as a chapter of his book (2002, pp. 419-451), where he accuses Marxist dialecticians of not tolerating criticism. Ironically, Popper’s view that all Marxist dialecticians dogmatically (...) dismiss any criticism of dialectic by claiming that their opponents do not understand dialectic makes his position no less dogmatic. Indeed, any attempt to criticise Popper’s views on dialectics would be seen only as an additional example of responses by “dogmatic dialecticians”, making his theory essentially immune. This completely prevents dialecticians from being able to criticise Popper’s views. This is exactly the opposite of what the great philosopher wanted. Therefore, for the sake of “anti-dogmatic science” it is desirable and even necessary to defend dialectic. In this work I address several central points about Popper’s criticism of Marxist (materialist) dialectic. In particular, I (a) analyse Popper’s definition of dialectic as the dialectic triad (thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis) and contrast it with a notion of dialectic as a much more complex concept which occurs in dialectical materialism today, where the triad represents only one of the aspects; (b) compare dialectic with the trial and error method; (c) discuss the place of dialectic amongst valid scientific methods: Does dialectic accept logical contradictions; (e) discuss lessons dialecticians should learn from Popper’s criticism. I will test my arguments as to their constructiveness and will demonstrate explicitly the nature of my disagreement with Popper - thereby trying to avoid the “dogmatic dialecticians” response as much as possible. (shrink)

Any serious attempt to give an account of the cognitive aspect of science – as contrasted with e.g. its social or cultural aspects – cannot ignore the automation revolution. In the conception presented in this paper the results of computer science are taken seriously and integrated with many of the ideas concerning what constitutes scientific inquiry that have been proposed at least since the early Middle Ages. The central idea is that of reliable inquiry. Science makes explicit and elaborates on (...) the methods of acquiring beliefs in our daily life. The central question a scientific method applied to inquiry needs to face is if it is reliable in getting to the truth. On the reliabilist criteria presented here, if a method is logically warranted to get to the right answer – given data and background knowledge available – and to stick to it afterwards, then it is reliable. This is a normative theory, but the standard of reliability is adjusted to the domain of the inquiry at hand. This paper presents the central tenets of the reliabilist conception of science and briefly outlines the main results underlying it. Roughly, the aim of science is interesting truth about the world around us (scientific realism) and reliabilist epistemology affords us precise answers as to how far science can succeed in this task – given the methods, goals and background assumptions available. The philosophical task to deliver an adequate understanding of science is taken to be continuous with scientific research itself (naturalism), a major part of which is concerned with delivering causal explanations (causality) and can only be carried out with limited resources (computability). Many of the ideas integrated into the reliabilist conception of science and precisely articulated therewith have appeared earlier in both philosophy and science (history of ideas). I conclude the exposition of the ideas integrated into the reliabilist conception of science with discussions of sample case studies where the reliabilist conception of science has been applied to actual scientific research. For obvious reasons none of the grand conceptions of science from the distant past is adequate. Towards the end of this paper I give some substance to the claim that among the few contemporary conceptions of science reliabilist epistemology is the the most comprehensive account. For only it systematically elaborates the ideas of reliability and computability accompanying science from its inception. None of the past or contemporary alternatives to a thoroughly revised understanding of science offered by the reliabilist approach can embrace the recent outburst of new sciences such as computer science, Bayesian statistics and cognitive science. An outline of open problems and directions for future research concludes the paper. (shrink)

The APA Task Force’s treatment of research methods is critically examined. The present defense of the experiment rests on showing that (a) the control group cannot be replaced by the contrast group, (b) experimental psychologists have valid reasons to use non-randomly selected subjects, (c) there is no evidential support for the experimenter expectancy effect, (d) the Task Force had misrepresented the role of inductive and deductive logic, and (e) the validity of experimental data does not require appealing to the effect (...) size or statistical power. (shrink)

This article introduces Hegel's Eurocentric philosophy of dialectics in the 19th century and its transformation to Kelly’s planetary paradigm at the turn of the 20th-21st century. The new theory develops Hegel’s thesis—antitheses—synthesis to identity—difference—new-identity which is applicable for the entire human history, including the planetary era. The new triad generalizes Hegel’s mechanic view of nature by suggesting a dominant worldview which is featured by a series of tightening and converging dynamic fractal cycles.

Za Poppera predstavlja znanost proces reševanja problemov, ki temelji na izbiri hipotez. Pri tem ugotavlja podobnost med Darwinovo teorijo in procesom rasti znanstvenega znanja. V tej zvezi je pomembna Popperova teza, da je cilj znanosti resničen opis stvarnosti, ki vsebuje tri vrste bitnosti – ontologija treh svetov. Razlikovanje med bitnostmi pa je vprašljivo, ker temelji na subjektivni intenci interpreta. S tem pa postane vprašljivo samo opredeljevanje rasti znanstvenega znanja in njegov objektivni status, ker bi najboljša teorija morala biti korespondenca med (...) stvarnostjo in celoto vsega človeškega znanja. Tako pa se zadovoljimo z določenim doseženim nivojem znanosti kot najboljšo podobo stvarnosti, kot Resnico. (shrink)

Lane, K. A., Banaji, M. R., Nosek, B. A., & Greenwald, A. G. (2007). Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: IV. What we know (so far) (Pp. 59–102). In B. Wittenbrink & N. S. Schwarz (Eds.). Implicit measures of attitudes: Procedures and controversies . New York: Guilford Press. PDF - 652KB ].

Does work psychodynamics--a sub-discipline of clinical psychology in the field of work sciences--offer a relevant methodological reference to analyze the psychological processes that come into play when a CEO is working? The objective of this article is to propose an answer to this question by going back to a doctoral research, which focused on the clinical analysis of the CEOs' "presentation of self," noted as one aspect of their work. The author's arguments for a clinical approach are presented as well (...) as the later decision to resort to "astute" tactics that, beyond the traditional frameworks of work psychodynamics, were required to have access to the CEOs' presentation of self. Following the presentation of the research's achievements, the article shows that, while methodologically unconventional, the astute tactics proved useful in ushering in new elements of knowledge that otherwise would have remained inaccessible. Notably, the specifics of the intersubjective relationship that was established between the author and each CEO had a major positive impact on the interpretations. To legitimize this clinical approach further, the conclusion draws a few indications on criteria that could be investigated to scientifically validate the qualitative methods and their interpretive results. (shrink)