Work on analogy has been done from a number of disciplinary perspectives throughout the history of Western thought. This work is a multidisciplinary guide to theorizing about analogy. It contains 1,406 references, primarily to journal articles and monographs, and primarily to English language material. classical through to contemporary sources are included. The work is classified into eight different sections (with a number of subsections). A brief introduction to each section is provided. Keywords and key expressions of importance to research on (...) analogy are discussed in the introductory material. Electronic resources for conducting research on analogy are listed as well. (shrink)

Time is central to Luhmann’s writings on social systems. Social systems, as systems of meaning, operate within three dimensions: factual, social and temporal. Each of these dimensions entails selections of actualities from potentialities (or contingencies) within horizons. Whilst the factual dimension involves selections based on distinguishing ‘this’ from ‘something else’, and the social distinguishes between alter and ego (asking with respect to any meaning whether another experiences it as I do), the temporal dimension operates with the primary distinction of before (...) and after. In the temporal dimension, everything is ‘ordered only according to the when and not to the who/what/where/how of experience and action’ (Luhmann in Social systems. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 78). In this paper, we explore the connection between the temporal dimension of meaning within the legal system and its connection to justice. We begin by setting out succinctly the role played by justice within the legal system, as presented by Luhmann, particularly in his book Law as a social system (2004). From this beginning, we move on to consider the relationship between law, justice and time, taking two examples. The first is the temporality of judicial decisions. The second concerns the relationship between the temporal meaning of law’s own operations, and the presumption of innocence. (shrink)

The author begins by sketching the characteristics or elements of every tradition. Some reasons are then suggested for the propensity of so many authors to contrast statutes with other, allegedly more traditional kinds of law. However, it is argued that statutes are deeply embedded, along with customary and judge‐made law, in the highly traditional practices of law and that this matters much more than is commonly suspected. The thesis being defended here is not merely that law includes traditions along with (...) rules, principles, maxims, and so on, but rather that legal systems should be understood as traditions, albeit highly complex ones. Not only are ancient legal systems (the Talmudic, for example) held to be traditional; modem legal positive orders are viewed as being traditional too. Finally, the concept of “communities of interpretation” is applied to the contemporary posited statutes which are believed by many to be a distinguishing feature of modem legal systems. (shrink)

A legal fiction is a knowingly false assumption that is given effect in a legal proceeding and that participants are not permitted to disprove. I offer a semantic pretence theory that shows how fiction-involving legal reasoning works.

Twice in the _Journal of Business Ethics_, Walter Block provides a libertarian argument that The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is unjust because it is a violation of a business’s property rights and therefore ought to be repealed. No libertarian reply to Block has ever been given, creating the mistaken impression that his argument is the true representation of libertarian theory with regards to civil rights. This paper focuses on Title II and argues that both Block, and this prevailing opinion (...) of libertarian theory, are wrong. There are different types of libertarian theory. Block’s theory of natural rights is one of them, but there is another strain of libertarian thought that embraces the common law, at least as it existed up until the late 1800’s. This paper explicates a libertarian argument, based on the common law, which supports and defends Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Specifically, the evolution of contracts via assumpsit arguments, found in Blackstone’s _Commentaries,_ endogenously and consistently gives rise to the obligation to serve all. Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is consistent with this common law tradition on public accommodations. Libertarian arguments that accept the common law on contracts ought also to accept common law doctrine on public accommodations and, _perforce_, the justness of Title II. (shrink)

The very idea of promulgation has been given little to no treatment in the philosophy of law. In this exploratory essay, I introduce three possible theories of promulgation: the ‘no-theory theory’ (which treats promulgation as a matter of particular contexts), the ‘conveyance theory’ (which treats promulgation as a function of intellectual good faith interpreters), and ‘agonistic theory’ (which treats promulgation as indistinguishable from propaganda). I suggest that (at least) three kinds of models are consistent with the theories, and can potentially (...) help us understand when law is successfully promulgated in particular legal contexts: the spread model, the chain model, and the memetic model. I end the paper by comparing the two theories with respect to a case study. Throughout I will show that the conveyance and agonistic theories have a serious advantage over the no-theory theory, in that they allow us to comparatively examine the epistemic weaknesses of diverse theories about the grounding of law on the basis of their contents. (shrink)

This article analyses the work of Martin Loughlin on the nature of public law, and in particular, his ostensibly strident anti-positivism. It is argued that despite this, Loughlin's work can be reconciled with a normative account of legal positivism, based on the work of Jeremy Waldron. The article maintains that Loughlin's account of public law as political jurisprudence is methodologically compatible with, and potentially even substantively complementary to, normative legal positivism. It is ultimately suggested that this reconciliation provides a methodology (...) for public law scholarship which is both positivist and political, and which may offer insight into the subject beyond that which either approach might generate alone. (shrink)

In this thesis I outline a view of primary legislation from a systems perspective. I suggest that systems theory and, in particular, autopoietic theory, as modified by field theory, is a mechanism for understanding how society operates. The description of primary legislation that I outline differs markedly from any conventional definition in that I argue that primary legislation is not, and indeed cannot be, either a law or any of the euphemisms that are usually accorded to an enactment by a (...) parliament. I cite two reasons for such a conclusion. The primary reason for my conclusion is that I see primary legislation as being an output of a particular subsystem of society, while the law is the output of another subsystem of society. I argue that these outputs are the discrete products of separate subsystems of society. I argue that primary legislation should be viewed as a trinity. The first state of this trinity is that, upon enactment, primary legislation is a brute fact in that it is but a thing and the only property of this thing is that of being a text. The second state of this trinity is that following the act of enactment, the thing enacted will be reproduced and this reproduction is a separate thing that will sit in some repository until used. The third state of this trinity is that, upon use, this thing that is primary legislation will be transformed into an object and the user will attribute such functions and attributes to that object as are appropriate to the context within which the object is used. The thing has therefore become an object and an institutional fact. The second reason for my conclusion that primary legislation is not a law relates to the fact that the thing that is primary legislation is a text and the only function of a text is that it is available to be read. That is to say, of itself, a text is incapable of doing anything: it is the reader who defines the status of the text and attributes functions and attributes. Upon use, primary legislation thus becomes a censored input for future action and one of these actions may be some statement by a court of law. I assert that the view of primary legislation that has been accepted within the body politic is the product of the discourse of a particular subsystem of society that I have designated 'the legal practice', and I outline why and how this has occurred. Outlining a view about primary legislation also necessitates outlining a view as to the nature of the law. I assert that the law is a myth and I see this myth as a product of the discourse of the legal practice. I have asserted that although it is the judges that state the law, such statements flow from the discourse of those who practise the law. (shrink)

Mandeville offers an evolutionary explanation of norms that pivots on the power of praise to affect individuals. Yet this sort of account is not mentioned by Hume or Ferguson, and only indirectly noted by Smith. Nonetheless, there are various similarities in the thought of Mandeville and these philosophers. After delineating some resemblances, the essay takes up the objection Hume poses to Mandeville: praise fails to motivate if individuals take no pride in moral conduct. To this challenge there is a Mandevillean (...) response that emphasizes how, in the evolutionary emergence of norms, the original praise need not be understood in moral terms. (shrink)

Legal philosophers divide over whether it is possible to analyze legal concepts without engaging in normative argument. The influential analysis of legal rights advanced by Jules Coleman and Jody Kraus some years ago serves as a useful case study to consider this issue because even some legal philosophers who are generally skeptical of the neutrality claims of conceptual analysts have concluded that Coleman and Kraus's analysis manages to maintain such neutrality. But that analysis does depend in subtle but important ways (...) on normative claims. Their argument assumes not only a positivist concept of law, but also that it counts in favor of an analysis of legal rights that it increases the number of options available to legal decisionmakers. Thus, whether Coleman and Kraus's analysis is right in the end depends on whether those normative assumptions are justified. If even their analysis, which makes the thinnest of conceptual claims, depends on normative premises, that fact serves as strong evidence of the difficulty of analyzing legal concepts while remaining agnostic on moral and political questions. (shrink)

Hume’s examination of the conventions of property, trade, and contract addresses the moral foundations that make business possible. In this light, Hume’s theory of justice is also a foundational work in business ethics. In Hume’s analysis of these conventions, both philosophers and game theorists have correctly identified “proto” game-theoretic elements. One of the few attempts to offer a Humean theory of business ethics rests on this game-theoretic interpretation of Hume’s argument. This article argues that game-theoretic reasoning is only one part (...) of a Humean business ethics and this can be shown by further analyzing Hume’s theory of justice. As we examine his theory, it becomes clear that Hume is not trying to show how it is always rational to respect the rules of business. Hume is not engaging in, or attempting, a reconciliation project and neither is a Humean business ethics. The final section of the article is a brief Humean analysis of the effectiveness of codes of ethics. The purpose of this section is not to decide the issue but to show how a Humean approach is both useful, relevant, and involves more than reconciling rationality and morality. (shrink)

In the Principles of the Penal Code, Jeremy Bentham described offences that he labelled presumed or evidentiary. The conduct penalized under such offences is punished not because it is intrinsically wrong, but because it probabilistically indicates the presence of an intrinsic wrong. Bentham was sceptical of the need to create offences, but grudgingly accepted their value in light of deficiencies in procedure and the judiciary. These days the scepticism is even greater, with courts and commentators in the United States, Canada, (...) the United Kingdom and elsewhere believing that such offences deny a defendant the right to establish that he did not engage in the conduct that the presumed offence probabilistically but not necessarily indicates. On closer analysis, however, such scepticism appears unjustified. Almost all offences, and indeed almost all legal rules, are premised on a probabilistic relationship between the behaviour the rule encompasses and the behaviour that is the rule-maker's real concern. Presumed offences may make this relationship especially obvious, but it is a relationship that exists whenever the law operates by the use of rules. (shrink)

After an initial discussion (§i) of what a theory of criminal law might amount to, I sketch (§ii) the proper aims of a liberal, republican criminal law, and discuss (§§iii–iv) two central features of such a criminal law: that it deals with public wrongs, and provides for those who perpetrate such wrongs to be called to public account. §v explains why a liberal republic should maintain such a system of criminal law, and §vi tackles the issue of criminalization—of how we (...) should determine the proper scope of the criminal law. (shrink)

The relationship of law and culture has long been a concern of legal anthropology and sociology of law. But it is recognised today as a central issue in many different kinds of juristic inquiries. All these recent invocations of the concept of culture indicate or imply problems at the boundaries of established thought about either the nature of law or the values that law is thought to express or reflect. The consequence is that legal theory must, it seems, now systematically (...) take account of the notion of culture. The present paper asks how this might best be done. I argue that a concept of culture, as such, is of limited utility for legal theory because the term “culture” embraces a too indefinite and disparate range of phenomena. But legal theory needs conceptual resources to consider at a general level the relations of law and culture. This paper suggests that these resources should include, above all, a rigorous distinguishing of different abstract types of community. Legal theory requires a sociologically‐informed concept of community. What is encompassed by the vague idea of culture is actually the content of different types of social relations of community and the networks (combinations) in which they exist. (shrink)

Ever since Jeremy Bentham wrote his scathing critique of the law of evidence, both philosophers and legal scholars have criticized the exclusionary rules of evidence, arguing that formal rules excluding entire classes of evidence for alleged unreliability violate basic epistemological maxims mandating that all relevant evidence be considered. Although particular pieces of evidence might be excluded as unreliable, they argue, it is a mistake to make such judgments for entire categories, as opposed to making them only in the context of (...) particular pieces of evidence offered for specific purposes. This paper challenges these claims, arguing that rule-based exclusions serve similar purposes to those served by rules in rule-consequentialist moral theories, and that, even more importantly, they are entirely consistent with the exclusionary nature of legal rules in general. Indeed, once we see the role that exclusionary rules might serve in legal epistemology, we can see that they might have a role to play in epistemic appraisal more generally. (shrink)

There is a perennial ambiguity in the rule-of-law preposition: it predicates that the law shall rule, but which law? This legal loophole has led to a diverse array of interpretations of the concept. Of these, two appear particularly adverse to what the rule of law should primarily be—the rulership of the law—yet still remain dominant. On the one hand, the rule of law is intended to be the vehicle to deliver above-the-law goods such as human rights or other individual entitlements (...) like property, and to forever shield them against any other force, including the law. On the other hand, the rule of law is believed to be a tool at the rulers’ disposal, who make use of the law but are not bound by it, for either legal or practical reasons. In both cases, a pre-legal setting for society allocates rulership to something but not the law, against the very essence of the ideal: an authoritative legal practice for the sake of regulating the present society. As such, the rule of law has to meet certain requirements of craftsmanship, like conditions in law-making and law-enforcement, and sources, which are to be democratically underpinned. (shrink)

Law contains many dualities, though most, if not all, of these dualities resolve into one complex puzzle: To what extent is law a matter of pure social facts, or moral value untethered to social facts? I argue that each concept of law reconciles this duality in a different way on the basis of certain beneficial consequences that might result. Instead of pitting concepts against one another universally, we should accept that the balance between law's social fact and moral value dimensions (...) is context-specific in relation to particular legal puzzles. This balance can be achieved only by considering both political theory and empirical data. (shrink)

The author analyzes fictions of legal positivist philosophy and their role in the scientific legitimation of modern law and political domination. The original function of legalist fictions was the establishment of legal science, which would be autonomous and independent of other social sciences and public morality. In the second half of the 20th century, legal positivist philosophy has nevertheless adopted the fiction of the just law as its scientific legitimation fiction and incorporated moral and political discourse into legal science, again.Legal (...) positivism and its critiques within the discourse of the sociology of law and critical legal science keep the image of a hierarchical and centralized legitimation of law. Paradoxically, current legal philosophy and theory searching for a universally valid legitimation scheme is full of many different legitimations and reveals their growing plurality and the impossibility of establishing one sovereign legitimation scheme in the current social, theoretical and political condition. (shrink)

Civil wars in England and America were catalysts in forming the jurisprudential views of Thomas Hobbes and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. Holmes's pragmatism advances a fundamentally distinct view of order from Hobbes's analytical theory. Holmes replaced the Hobbesian analytical model of law with an endogenous model that assimilates conflict in a process of formal but communal inquiry into discrete types of dispute. Holmes rejected the analytical boundary around law in favor of a holistic fallibilism, which like Dewey's encompasses all inquiry, (...) legal, scientific, aesthetic, and philosophical, under one ontological roof. Holmes also provided a practical critique of ideology, best known from the words of his famous dissent in Lochner v. New York: “The fourteenth amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics”; or, more to the point, “General propositions do not decide concrete cases.”. (shrink)

Mandeville offers an evolutionary explanation of norms that pivots on the power of praise to affect individuals. Yet this sort of account is not mentioned by Hume or Ferguson, and only indirectly noted by Smith. Nonetheless, there are various similarities in the thought of Mandeville and these philosophers. After delineating some resemblances, the essay takes up the objection Hume poses to Mandeville: praise fails to motivate if individuals take no pride in moral conduct. To this challenge there is a Mandevillean (...) response that emphasizes how, in the evolutionary emergence of norms, the original praise need not be understood in moral terms. (shrink)

In this paper, the author responds to the claim that his critique of legal positivism, based on an account of adjudication in South Ahica, misses its target because it ignores, first, the positivist thesis of judicial discretion and, secondly, the fact that positivism offers no account of judicial obligation. He argues that these theses expose a tension in positivism between its commitments to liberal individualism and to the supremacy of positive law, a tension which can be resolved only by situating (...) positivism in its true context, the Hobbesian argument for the legitimacy of law. Following Dworkin, he advocates the practice‐oriented common law tradition, one that makes the legitimacy of law a matter of standards already implicit in law which are best revealed in adjudication. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to clarify the concept of “Anglo-American philosophy of law” and highlight the debate on its subject. Both the geographical reference to the Anglo-American tradition and the content of the philosophy of law itself need to be clarified. In order to understand what the Anglo-American philosophy of law is and what is the essence of the debate around its subject matter the author of the article firstly investigates the main stages in the development of the (...) Anglo-American philosophy of law, beginning with Jeremy Bentham and ending with modern authors. As a result, we arrive at a conclusion that the ways of development of the philosophical and legal tradition in Great Britain and the United States are not identical. Secondly, we should analyze the term “philosophy of law”. Overwhelming majority of Anglo-American scholars identify the terms “legal philosophy”, “jurisprudence” and “analytical legal positivism”. Therefore, “philosophy of law” and “jurisprudence” mostly are used as synonyms. It is also important that the concept “jurisprudence” in the Anglo-American Academy is not used in its wide sense as in Russian science. It includes only abstract theoretical, not practical, study of law and general legal concepts and theoretical foundations of branches of law and legal systems. The author concludes that the debate about the method that has been going on since the 50s of twenty century between positivists and anti-positivists, smoothly turned into a new dispute about the subject matter of Anglo-American philosophy of law. The main object of the dispute is the legal philosophy “analytical core”. Supporters of the core use a conceptual analysis of legal concepts beyond time, politics, morality, and social context. The author of the article analyzed the main critical papers devoted to the current state of the legal philosophy and came to the conclusion that we can distinguish two major types: papers that criticize the “analytical core” of the philosophy of law and try to separate pluralistic jurisprudence and limited abstract legal philosophy, papers which tend to change the very philosophy of law, reorienting it to the social context, political philosophy, ethics, etc. Also, as a result of the research two different understandings of the content of analytical philosophy of law were discovered. First on the one hand is analytical positivism, which includes legal positivists. On the other hand, in a broader sense, it is perceived as an intellectual style. In this sense we can call anti-positivists like natural lawyer J. Finnis and the founder of legal interpretivism, R. Dworkin as analytical scholars. (shrink)