Quine est célèbre pour sa critique de la notion d’analyticité, mais il en a également proposé des substituts définissables en termes behavioristes. Cet article examine la question de savoir si de tels substituts peuvent ou non jouer un rôle épistémologique, en les comparant avec des tentatives récentes de réhabilitation de l’a priori. Il apparaît que la caractérisation de ce qu’est une définition acceptable en termes behavioristes est cruciale, et qu’un élargissement de la classe des comportements linguistiques pertinents peut ouvrir la (...) voie à une réhabilitation substantielle de l’analyticité.Quine is famous for his critics against the notion of analyticity used in epistemology and philosophy of science by philosophers of the Vienna circle. However, Quine has also proposed alternative definitions of the notion, which would be acceptable from a behaviorist perspective. In this paper, I address the question whether such alternative definitions can play any epistemologically significant role, by comparing them with recent attempts at a new defense of a priori knowledge. The upshot is that the answer cruccially depends on what is an acceptable definition in a behaviorist perspective. It might well be that an epistemologically significant notion of analyticity can be based upon a broad enough characterization of linguistic behavior. (shrink)

According to a main idea of Gentzen the meanings of the logical constants are reflected by the introduction rules in his system of natural deduction. This idea is here understood as saying roughly that a closed argument ending with an introduction is valid provided that its immediate subarguments are valid and that other closed arguments are justified to the extent that they can be brought to introduction form. One main part of the paper is devoted to the exact development of (...) this notion. Another main part of the paper is concerned with a modification of this notion as it occurs in Michael Dummett’s book The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. The two notions are compared and there is a discussion of how they fare as a foundation for a theory of meaning. It is noted that Dummett’s notion has a simpler structure, but it is argued that it is less appropriate for the foundation of a theory of meaning, because the possession of a valid argument for a sentence in Dummett’s sense is not enough to be warranted to assert the sentence. (shrink)