Minimal risk is a central concept in the ethical analysis of research with children. It is defined as the risks “. . . ordinarily encountered in daily life . . . .” But the question arises: who is the referent for minimal risk? Commentators in the research ethics literature often answer this question by endorsing one of two possible interpretations: the uniform interpretation or the relative interpretation of minimal risk. We argue that describing the debate over minimal risk as a (...) disagreement between the uniform and the relative interpretation impedes progress on the identification of a justifiable referent for minimal risk. There are two main problems with this approach: constructing the debate over minimal risk as a disagreement between a uniform and a relative interpretation misconstrues the main difference between competing interpretations and neither the uniform nor the relative interpretation identifies one unique and consistent group of children as the referent for minimal risk. We conclude that progress on the debate over minimal risk requires that we abandon the uniform and relative interpretations and address the main moral problem at stake: whether healthy children or the subjects of the research should be the referent for minimal risk. (shrink)

Institutional Review Boards and their federal overseers protect human subjects, but this vital work is often dysfunctional despite their conscientious efforts. A cardinal, but unrecognized, explanation is that IRBs are performing a specific function – the management of risk – using a flawed theoretical and practical approach. At the time of the IRB system’s creation, risk management theory emphasized the suppression of risk. Since then, scholars of governance, studying the experience of business and government, have learned that we must distinguish (...) pure from opportunity risks. Pure risks should be suppressed. Some opportunity risks, in contrast, must be accepted if the institution is to meet its goals. Contemporary theory shows how institutions may make these decisions wisely. It also shows how a sound organizational understanding of risk, a proper locus of responsibility, and appropriate institutional oversight all contribute to effective risk management. We can apply this general theory, developed in other contexts, to the problems of the IRB system. Doing so provides a unifying explanation for IRBs’ disparate dysfunctions by spotlighting five related deficiencies in IRB theory and structure. These deficiencies are inability to focus on greater risks, loss of balanced theory, inaccessibility to guidance from senior leadership, unbalanced federal oversight, and inflexibility. These flaws are deeply rooted in the system, and superficial reform cannot resolve them. Congress should overhaul the system to meet contemporary standards of risk management; this would benefit subjects, scientists, and the public that needs the fruits of research. (shrink)

: Despite its mandate on minimizing harms in clinical trials, the Common Rule provides little guidance as to how IRBs should evaluate risk. The Common Rule and derivative commentaries tend to conceptualize risk review as an expert-based endeavor aimed at an objective and universal evaluation of possible harm; they also have tended to locate risk in the research activity itself rather than in the context of the research. These views of risk conflict with scholarship showing that risk evaluations are socially (...) determined even among experts, that the context of harms can influence how persons evaluate risks, and that forums that approach risk assessment as a technical endeavor bracket from discussion the numerous values that ground risk judgments. Possible reforms are proposed for clinical trial risk review that would render it more inclusive of the different types of risks encountered and more attuned to the priorities of trial subjects. (shrink)