In philosophy, as in any other theoretical endeavor, it is not rare to find conflicting but equally well grounded positions. Besides defending one of the positions and criticizing the other, philosophers can opt for pursuing other, more sophisticated, approaches aimed at incorporating the insights, intuitions, and arguments from both sides of the debate into a unified theory: Dialetheism, Analetheism, Gradualism, Pluralism and Relativism. The purpose of this article is to present each strategy's basic argumentative structure, relative strengths, and challenges, trying (...) to determine in which situations one is more appropriate than the others. Despite substantial differences between them, all four options have deep structural similarities; and which option is better for which dilemma or paradox will depend ultimately on a combination of epistemological, linguistic, and metaphysical factors. (shrink)

Per il dialeteismo ci sono contraddizioni vere. Questa concezione filosofica ha assunto una forma chiara e definita a partire dal lavoro del filosofo e logico Graham Priest – uno dei suoi padri fondatori, nonché uno dei suoi più strenui difensori. Questo libro intende portare il dialeteismo all’attenzione di un ampio pubblico, che non sia solo quello degli addetti ai lavori. Il volume è suddiviso in due parti. La prima include le cinque lezioni su "Dialeteismo e storia della filosofia" tenute da (...) Priest e Filippo Casati a Padova nel 2016, in occasione del Corso di Eccellenza per il dottorato in filosofia dell’Università di Padova. La seconda contiene quattro contributi sul dialeteismo di autori italiani. (shrink)

Putative examples of true contradictions in the social world have been given by dialetheists such as Graham Priest, Richard Routley, and Val Plumwood. However, we feel that it has not been decisively argued that these examples are in fact true contradictions rather than merely apparent. In this paper we adopt a new strategy to show that there are some true contradictions in the social world, and hence that dialetheism is correct. The strategy involves showing that a group of sincere dialetheists (...) can, given an appropriately formed institution, bootstrap contradictions into existence. We discuss objections and consider the implications of this finding for debates over logic. (shrink)

Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, allegedly denying motion, have been conceived to reinforce the Parmenidean vision of an immutable world. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that these famous logical paradoxes should be seen instead as paradoxes of immobility. From this new point of view, motion is therefore no longer logically problematic, while immobility is. This is convenient since it is easy to conceive that immobility can actually conceal motion, and thus the proposition “immobility is mere illusion of the (...) senses” is much more credible than the reverse thesis supported by Parmenides. Moreover, this proposition is also supported by modern depiction of material bodies: the existence of a ceaseless random motion of atoms—the ‘thermal agitation’—in the scope of contemporary atomic theory, can offer a rational explanation of this ‘illusion of immobility’. Our new approach to Zeno’s paradoxes therefore leads to presenting the novel concept of ‘impermobility’, which we think is a more adequate description of physical reality. (shrink)

I offer a novel solution to Zeno’s paradox of The Arrow by introducing nilpotent infinitesimal lengths of time. Nilpotents are nonzero numbers that yield zero when multiplied by themselves a certain number of times. Zeno’s Arrow goes like this: during the present, a flying arrow is moving in virtue of its being in flight. However, if the present is a single point in time, then the arrow is frozen in place during that time. Therefore, the arrow is both moving and (...) at rest. In “Zeno’s Arrow, Divisible Infinitesimals, and Chrysippus,” White suggests using an infinitesimal value as the length of the present. Contra Zeno, this allows the arrow to be moving in the present, rather than frozen in place. In this paper, I follow the basic outline of White’s solution but argue that his solution suffers from arbitrariness and a related theoretical artificiality in relation to the system of infinitesimals he invokes, viz. in relation to the hyperreal infinitesimals of nonstandard analysis. After arguing that any solution to the paradox must satisfy certain theoretical requirements, I examine White’s solution alongside two nilpotent solutions. One of these solutions is inspired by F.W. Lawvere’s Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis and the other is inspired by Paolo Giordano’s ring of Fermat Reals. I argue that Giordano’s nilpotents supply the best answer to Zeno’s paradox. (shrink)

A good argument is one whose conclusions follow from its premises; its conclusions are consequences of its premises. But in what sense do conclusions follow from premises? What is it for a conclusion to be a consequence of premises? Those questions, in many respects, are at the heart of logic (as a philosophical discipline). Consider the following argument: 1. If we charge high fees for university, only the rich will enroll. We charge high fees for university. Therefore, only the rich (...) will enroll. There are many different things one can say about this argument, but many agree that if we do not equivocate (if the terms mean the same thing in the premises and the conclusion) then the argument is valid, that is, the conclusion follows deductively from the premises. This does not mean that the conclusion is true. Perhaps the premises are not true. However, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is also true, as a matter of logic. This entry is about the relation between premises and conclusions in valid arguments. (shrink)

We think of a boundary whenever we think of an entity demarcated from its surroundings. There is a boundary (a line) separating Maryland and Pennsylvania. There is a boundary (a circle) isolating the interior of a disc from its exterior. There is a boundary (a surface) enclosing the bulk of this apple. Sometimes the exact location of a boundary is unclear or otherwise controversial (as when you try to trace out the margins of Mount Everest, or even the boundary of (...) your own body). Sometimes the boundary lies skew to any physical discontinuity or qualitative differentiation (as with the border of Wyoming, or the boundary between the upper and lower halves of a homogeneous sphere). But whether sharp or blurry, natural or artificial, for every object there appears to be a boundary that marks it off from the rest of the world. Events, too, have boundaries — at least temporal boundaries. Our lives are bounded by our births and by our deaths; the soccer game began at 3pm sharp and ended with the referee's final whistle at 4:45pm. It is sometimes suggested that even abstract entities, such as concepts or sets, have boundaries of their own, and Wittgenstein could emphatically proclaim that the boundaries of our language are the boundaries of our world. Whether all this boundary talk is coherent, however, and whether it reflects the structure of the world or simply the organizing activity of our mind, are matters of deep philosophical controversy. (shrink)

Deleuze never explicitly formulates his philosophy of logical truth‐values. It thus remains an open question as to the number and types he held there to be. Despite his explicit comments on these matters, additional textual evidence suggests that in his thinking on the event, he favored a third truth‐value, holding either the analetheic view that some truth‐bearers can be truth‐valueless or the dialetheic view that some truth‐bearers can be both true and false. I first argue that taking a logical approach (...) to Deleuze's thinking is feasible, despite his and others' claims that might suggest otherwise. Next, I examine his explicit statements to show that they cannot be taken at face value and that, rather, we need to transpose his claims into contemporary terminology in order to accurately assess them. I lastly turn to his Leibniz‐inspired philosophy of time to argue that the affirmations involved in this conception strongly suggest a dialetheic tendency in his thinking. (shrink)

The claim that nature is self-consistent has recently been contested by a number of paraconsistent logicians. In this paper I will survey the arguments which paraconsistent logicians have presented for the thesis that nature is actually inconsistent. My conclusion is that these arguments all fail.The paraconsistency programme has to date been concerned primarily with outlining the philosophical inadequacy of classical logic, and detailed discussions of issues bearing upon the philosophical adequacy of the paraconsistency position itself are not to be found (...) as yet in the literature. This inadequacy will be illustrated here with respect to the question of the self-consistency of nature. (shrink)

Leibniz’s and Whitehead’s analyses of motion are at the heart of their metaphysical schemes. These schemes are to be considered as two blueprints of a similar metaphysical intuition that emerged during two breakthrough eras, that is, the 17th century and the beginning of the 20th century, and retained the Aristotelian idea that existence requires an active principle. The two philosophers’ attempts to elucidate this idea in the context of their analyses of motion still interact with central, longstanding questions in philosophy, (...) in particular that concerning the ontological status of change. For both thinkers, the phenomenon of motion is an example par excellence, of the metaphysically fundamental principle of action that is required for change in the world. I focus on Leibniz’s and Whitehead’s similar understanding of the concept of transition that is inserted as an essential constitutive component of motion and ensures its status as something real.Keywords: Gottfried Leibniz; Alfred Whitehead; Motion; Change; Relativity; Transition. (shrink)