Pummer argues against the thesis: Desert. When people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they deserve punishment in the following sense: at least other things being equal, they ought to be made worse off, simply in virtue of the fact that they culpably did wrong – even if they have repented, are now virtuous, and punishing them would benefit no one. This has strong intuitive appeal and is arguably central to many people’s views of punishment. If Pummer’s arguments succeed, (...) they matter. He argues that what, in certain cases, defenders of Desert must say is the morally right allocation of punishment is intuitively morally unacceptable. He explains that it is only Desert in conjunction with other theses which entails this. But he argues that these are acceptable. I reject this. One additional thesis is Pummer’s ‘Numbers Matter’. This can be rejected by defenders of Desert. Pummer’s case against Desert fails. (shrink)

Pummer : 43–77, 2014) ingeniously wraps together issues from the personal identity literature with issues from the literature on desert. However, I wish to take issue with the main conclusion that he draws, namely, that we need to rethink the following principle: Desert.: When people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they deserve punishment in the following sense: at least other things being equal they ought to be made worse off, simply in virtue of the fact that they culpably (...) did wrong—even if they have repented, are now virtuous, and punishing them would benefit no one. :43–77, 2014: 43–44) Pummer offers an argument that is intended to show that this principle, along with widely-held views about personal identity, entails an inconsistent triad of propositions. I agree. But I think Pummer's argument attacks a straw man. I believe that no-one holds Desert, at least as it is stated, and that once the principle is stated correctly it is easy to see that no inconsistent triad follows from it. So, Desert does not need rethinking. It just needs to be stated correctly. (shrink)