When libertarian political philosophy attracted wide public notice in the 1970s, a common view was that the distinctive individual rights advocated in libertarian theory required grounding in a theory of ethics. Recently, this view has come under challenge. It has been argued that resort to such grounding in ethical theory is unneeded. An appeal to common sense intuitions suffices to justify libertarianism. First, a brief account of libertarianism will be presented. Then, some examples of the older, pro-grounding position will be (...) discussed. Then, the principal defense of the newer view, Michael Huemer’s The Problem of Political Authority, will be examined. This discussion constitutes the substance of the present paper. The principal contention of the present article will be that the argument to libertarianism from intuitions does not succeed. In conclusion, it will be suggested that a return to the earlier, grounding view is indicated for philosophers who wish to defend libertarianism. (shrink)

Critically examining what most people take for granted is central to philosophical inquiry. Philosophers who accept positions on policy making commissions, tasks forces, or committees cannot, however, play the same uncompromisingly critical role in this capacity as they do in the classroom or in their personal research or writing. Still, philosophers have much to contribute to such bodies, and they can do so without compromising their integrity or betraying themselves as philosophers. Keywords: compromise, critical reflection, embryo research, integrity, organ transplantation, (...) policy development, Warnock Committee CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The infamous fact/value dichotomy has been a controversial thesis that, especially during the twentieth century, has influenced the ethical andepistemological reflections within analytic philosophy, several non-philosophicaldisciplines like law and economics, and also the laymen way of thinking about moralsubjects. The dichotomy basically says that our statements of fact are objective and 103 Néstor Rodríguez  La cruzada de Putnam contra La Dicotomía Hecho/Valor… rational while our value judgments are, necessarily, subjective and, therefore, don`tdeserve to be rationally discussed. This way of (...) thinking has been largely detrimentalto ethical reflection in general and various philosophers have been looking for a wayto argue against it and to promote its abandonment in order to recover talk of moralobjectivity. This article serves as a general review of the discussion concerning thefact/value dichotomy and its alleged collapse. We follow, as a guide, the work of the late American philosopher Hilary Putnamsince his has become the most significant when it comes to favor the abandonment ofthe dichotomy and the one most prominent in sketching an alternative perspective.According to this, the structure of the article puts forwards three sections. In the firstwe consider the arguments Putnam has in favor of the collapse of the fact/valuedichotomy. In the second we take a look at the ethical and metaethical landscapemodeled by the defense of the dichotomy and also at some of the assumptions thathave been linked to it. Finally, the third section presents briefly the alternativeposition Putnam offers in face of the inevitable collapse. (shrink)