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Mark Timmons
University of Arizona
  1. Decision Procedures, Moral Criteria, and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions in Kant's Ethics.Mark Timmons - 1997 - In B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka & Jan C. Joerdan (eds.), Jahrbuch Für Recht Und Ethik. Duncker Und Humblot.
    I argue that the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative is best interpreted as a test or decision procedure of moral rightness and not as a criterion intended to explain the deontic status of actions. Rather, the Humanity formulation is best interpreted as a moral criterion. I also argue that because the role of a moral criterion is to explain, and thus specify what makes an action right or wrong, Kant's Humanity formulation yields a theory of relevant descriptions.
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  2. Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics.Mark Timmons - 1994 - In B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka & Jan C. Joerdan (eds.), Jahrbuch für Recht Und Ethik. Duncker Und Humblot.
    An examination of Kant's doctrine of radical evil as set forth in Book I of Religion.
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  3. The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons.Uriah Kriegel & Mark Timmons - forthcoming - In R. Dean & O. Sensen (eds.), Respect.
    Emotions can be understood generally from two different perspectives: (i) a third-person perspective that specifies their distinctive functional role within our overall cognitive economy and (ii) a first-person perspective that attempts to capture their distinctive phenomenal character, the subjective quality of experiencing them. One emotion that is of central importance in many ethical systems is respect (in the sense of respect for persons or so-called recognition-respect). However, discussions of respect in analytic moral philosophy have tended to focus almost entirely on (...)
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  4. The Practical and Philosophical Significance of Kant's Universality Formulations of the Categorical Imperative.Mark Timmons - 2005 - In B. Sharon Byrd & Jan C. Joerdan (eds.), Jahrbuch Für Recht Und Ethik. Duncker Und Humblot.
    This article begins with the claim that the Formula of Universal Law, interpreted as a test of the deontic status of actions, can't be made to work. If not, then one might wonder whether what other work it might do in the overall economy of Kant's ethics. I defend what I call the "formal constraint" interpretation of FUL, explaining how it can figure in a defense of the Formula of Humanity, and its psychological significance in moral thinking.
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  5.  81
    The Good, the Bad, and the Badass: On the Descriptive Adequacy of Kant's Conception of Moral Evil.Mark Timmons - 2017 - In Significance and System: Essays on Kant's Ethics. New York, USA: pp. 293-330.
    This chapter argues for an interpretation of Kant's psychology of moral evil that accommodates the so-called excluded middle cases and allows for variations in the magnitude of evil. The strategy involves distinguishing Kant's transcendental psychology from his empirical psychology and arguing that Kant's character rigorism is restricted to the transcendental level. The chapter also explains how Kant's theory of moral evil accommodates 'the badass'; someone who does evil for evil's sake.
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  6. Outline of a Contextualist Moral Epistemology.Mark Timmons - 1996 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  7. Motive and Rightness in Kant's Ethical System.Mark Timmons - 2002 - In Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Some contemporary intepreters of Kant maintain that on Kant's view fulfilling duties of virtue require doing so from the motive of duty. I argue that there are interpretive and doctinal reasons for rejecting this interpretation. However, I argue that for Kant motives can be deontically relevant; one's motives can affect the deontic status of actions.
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