Are we perhaps in the "matrix", or anyway, victims of perfect and permanent computer simulation? No. The most convincing—and shortest—version of Putnam's argument against the possibility of our eternal envattment is due to Crispin Wright (1994). It avoids most of the misunderstandings that have been elicited by Putnam's original presentation of the argument in "Reason, Truth and History" (1981). But it is still open to the charge of question-begging. True enough, the premisses of the argument (disquotation and externalism) can be (...) formulated and defended without presupposing external objects whose existence appears doubtful in the light of the very skeptical scenario which Putnam wants to repudiate. However, the argument is only valid if we add an extra premiss as to the existence of some external objects. In order to avoid circularity, we should run the argument with external objects which must exist even if we are brains in a vat, e.g. with computers rather than with trees. As long as the skeptic is engaged in a discussion of the brain-in-a-vat scenario, she should neither deny the existence of computers nor the existence of causal relations; for if she does, she is in fact denying that we are brains in a vat. (shrink)

This paper responds to Stroud's important The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. The author defends a view in which statements in a natural language have truth-evaluable content only in concrete contexts. It is argued that just what counts as a concrete possibility that must be defeated before one can say that one knows something is a highly context-sensitive matter, and that Stroud's alternative to this context-sensitive account of the way the verb "know" functions seems to be either a semantics in which (...) knowledge claims (about the "external world") are trivially logically false or no intelligible semantics at all. (shrink)

Perhaps the most dominant anti‐sceptical proposal in recent literature –advanced by such figures as Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose and David Lewis –is the contextualist response to radical scepticism. Central to the contextualist thesis is the claim that, unlike other non‐contextualist anti‐sceptical theories, contextualism offers a dissolution of the sceptical paradox that respects our common sense epistemological intuitions. Taking DeRose's view as representative of the contextualist position, it is argued that instead of offering us an intuitive response to scepticism, contextualism is (...) actually committed to a revisionist stance as regards our everyday usage of epistemic terms. In particular, it is argued that the thesis fails to present a satisfactory explication of a notion –that of‘epistemic descent’– that is pivotal to the anti‐sceptical import of the account. On the positive side, however, it is claimed that although the contextualist response to scepticism is ultimately unsatisfying, DeRose's theory does contain within it the framework for a completely different ‐ and far more persuasive ‐ account of the‘phenomenology’of scepticism which runs along non‐contextualist lines. (shrink)

Perhaps the most dominant anti‐sceptical proposal in recent literature –advanced by such figures as Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose and David Lewis –is the contextualist response to radical scepticism. Central to the contextualist thesis is the claim that, unlike other non‐contextualist anti‐sceptical theories, contextualism offers a dissolution of the sceptical paradox that respects our common sense epistemological intuitions. Taking DeRose's view as representative of the contextualist position, it is argued that instead of offering us an intuitive response to scepticism, contextualism is (...) actually committed to a revisionist stance as regards our everyday usage of epistemic terms. In particular, it is argued that the thesis fails to present a satisfactory explication of a notion –that of‘epistemic descent’– that is pivotal to the anti‐sceptical import of the account. On the positive side, however, it is claimed that although the contextualist response to scepticism is ultimately unsatisfying, DeRose's theory does contain within it the framework for a completely different ‐ and far more persuasive ‐ account of the‘phenomenology’of scepticism which runs along non‐contextualist lines. (shrink)

Since this paper is for a conference on “Contextualism in Epistemology and Beyond,” I have opted to sketch a retrospective of contextualism in epistemology, including highlights of the “relevant alternatives” approach, given how relevantism and contextualism have developed in tandem. We focus on externalist forms of contextualism, bypassing internalist forms such as Cohen 1988 and Lewis 1996, but much of our discussion will be applicable to contextualism generally. Internalist contextualism is helpfully discussed in papers by Stewart Cohen, Richard Feldman, and (...) Jonathan Vogel, in Tomberlin 1999. (shrink)

In der Schlickvorlesung ("Warte, bis Du stirbst") habe ich im Detail Geschichten erzählt, die jemand erleben müsste, um sein Weiterleben nach dem Tod zu verifizieren. Diese Geschichten hatten eine dualistische Stoßrichtung, lieferten aber kein Argument zugunsten des Dualismus, kein Argument zugunsten der Möglichkeit, dass unsere Seele auch ohne Körper weiterlebt. Niko Strobach hat implizite Argumente aus der Schlickvorlesung herausgelesen und kritisiert. In meiner Reaktion auf diese Kritik spreche ich mich für eine epistemische Lesart der dualistischen Möglichkeit aus; ob der Dualismus (...) metaphysisch möglich ist, finde ich irrelevant. Zudem verteidige ich das von mir benutzte – im weitesten Sinne empiristische – Sinnkriterium; ich biete eine narrative und eine cineastische Version des Kriteriums an: Ein Satz hat guten Sinn, wenn sich eine konkrete Geschichte denkbarer Wahrnehmungserlebnisse erzählen bzw. verfilmen lässt, denen der Erlebende Evidenzen für oder gegen den Satz entnehmen kann. Da die Geschichten von der Auferstehung des Fleisches, die Niko Strobach der christlichen Tradition entnimmt, heutzutage narrativ suboptimal sind, bleibe ich bei der These aus der Schlickvorlesung: Die Frage des Weiterlebens nach dem Tod hat guten Sinn, und um das nachzuweisen, eignen sich am besten dualistische Geschichten. (shrink)