Localist models of spreading activation (SA) and models assuming distributed representations offer very different takes on semantic priming, a widely investigated paradigm in word recognition and semantic memory research. In this study, we implemented SA in an attractor neural network model with distributed representations and created a unified framework for the two approaches. Our models assume a synaptic depression mechanism leading to autonomous transitions between encoded memory patterns (latching dynamics), which account for the major characteristics of automatic semantic priming in (...) humans. Using computer simulations, we demonstrated how findings that challenged attractor‐based networks in the past, such as mediated and asymmetric priming, are a natural consequence of our present model’s dynamics. Puzzling results regarding backward priming were also given a straightforward explanation. In addition, the current model addresses some of the differences between semantic and associative relatedness and explains how these differences interact with stimulus onset asynchrony in priming experiments. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a wealth of studies investigating how memories are allocated in the hippocampus. Some of those studies showed that it is possible to manipulate the identity of neurons recruited to represent a given memory without affecting the memory's behavioral expression. Those findings raised questions about how the hippocampus represents memories, with some researchers arguing that hippocampal neurons do not represent fixed stimuli. Herein, an alternative hypothesis is argued. Neurons in high‐order brain regions can be tuned (...) to multiple dimensions, forming complex, abstract representations. It is argued that such complex receptive fields allow those neurons to show some flexibility in their responses while still representing relatively fixed sets of stimuli. Moreover, it is pointed out that changes induced by artificial manipulation of cell assemblies are not completely redundant—the observed behavioral redundancy does not imply cognitive redundancy, as different, but similar, memories may induce the same behavior. (shrink)