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Perspectives on Quine

Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell (1990)

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  1. (1 other version)MEANING AS HYPOTHESIS: QUINE's INDETERMINACY THESIS REVISITED.Serge Grigoriev - 2010 - Dialogue: Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. 49 (3):395-411.
    Despite offering many formulations of his controversial indeterminacy of translation thesis, Quine has never explored in detail the connection between indeterminacy and the conception of meaning that he supposedly derived from the work of Peirce and Duhem. The outline of such a conception of meaning, as well as its relationship to the indeterminacy thesis, is worked out in this paper; and its merits and implications are assessed both in the context of Quine’s own philosophical agenda, and also with a view (...)
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  • Katz’s revisability paradox dissolved.Allard Tamminga & Sander Verhaegh - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):771-784.
    Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: *noncontradiction*, *universal revisability* and *pragmatic ordering*. We show that these constitutive principles cannot be regarded as statements within a holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. This claim is a corollary of our refutation of Katz's [1998, 2002] argument that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox. According to Katz, Quine's empiricism is incoherent because its constitutive principles cannot themselves be rationally revised. Using (...)
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  • (1 other version)Semantic Eliminativism and the Theory-Theory of Linguistic Understanding.Dorit Bar-On - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):159-199.
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  • Filosofia da Linguagem - uma introdução.Sofia Miguens - 2007 - Porto: Universidade do Porto. Faculdade de Letras.
    O presente manual tem como intenção constituir um guia para uma disciplina introdutória de filosofia da linguagem. Foi elaborado a partir da leccionação da disciplina de Filosofia da Linguagem I na Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto desde 2001. A disciplina de Filosofia da Linguagem I ocupa um semestre lectivo e proporciona aos estudantes o primeiro contacto sistemático com a área da filosofia da linguagem. Pretende-se que este manual ofereça aos estudantes os instrumentos necessários não apenas para acompanhar uma (...)
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  • Underdetermination vs. Indeterminacy.Juan José Lara - 2009 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 47:219-228.
    Thomas Bonk has dedicated a book to analyzing the thesis of underdetermination of scientific theories, with a chapter exclusively devoted to the analysis of the relation between this idea and the indeterminacy of meaning. Both theses caused a revolution in the philosophic world in the sixties, generating a cascade of articles and doctoral theses. Agitation seems to have cooled down, but the point is still debated and it may be experiencing a renewed resurgence.
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  • Quine’s Behaviorism and Linguistic Meaning: Why Quine’s Behaviorism is not Illicit.Tyrus Fisher - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):51-59.
    Some of Quine’s critics charge that he arrives at a behavioristic account of linguistic meaning by starting from inappropriately behavioristic assumptions (Kripke 1982, 14; Searle 1987, 123). Quine has even written that this account of linguistic meaning is a consequence of his behaviorism (Quine 1992, 37). I take it that the above charges amount to the assertion that Quine assumes the denial of one or more of the following claims: (1) Language-users associate mental ideas with their linguistic expressions. (2) A (...)
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  • Quine's relativism.Lars Bergström - 2006 - Theoria 72 (4):286-298.
    Keywords: W.V.Quine claimed that relativism is paradoxical and unacceptable; nevertheless, his own views concerning truth and the underdetermination of theories by data amount to an interesting and plausible form of relativism.
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  • Review of W. V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Reprinted in Callaway 2008, Meaning without Analyticity). [REVIEW]H. G. Callaway - 1991 - Dialectica, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1991, Pp. 317-22 45 (No. 4):317-322.
    Quine's aim in this slim book is to "update, sum up and clarify variously intersecting views on cognitive meaning, objective referencce, and the grounds of knowledge." Only nine pages had previously appeared as the book came to print. It is based largely on unpublished lectures and informal discussions of the past ten years back to the Immanuel Kant Lectures given at Stanford in 1980. It does not, then duplicate Leonelli's Italian translation of the Kant lectures, La Scienza E I Datti (...)
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  • Logicism Revisited.Otávio Bueno - 2001 - Principia 5 (1-2):99-124.
    In this paper, I develop a new defense of logicism: one that combines logicism and nominalism. First, I defend the logicist approach from recent criticisms; in particular from the charge that a cruciai principie in the logicist reconstruction of arithmetic, Hume's Principle, is not analytic. In order to do that, I argue, it is crucial to understand the overall logicist approach as a nominalist view. I then indicate a way of extending the nominalist logicist approach beyond arithmetic. Finally, I argue (...)
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  • Quine's Naturalized Epistemology and the Third Dogma of Empiricism.Robert Sinclair - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):455-472.
    This essay reconsiders Davidson's critical attribution of the scheme‐content distinction to Quine's naturalized epistemology. It focuses on Davidson's complaint that the presence of this distinction leads Quine to mistakenly construe neural input as evidence. While committed to this distinction, Quine's epistemology does not attempt to locate a justificatory foundation in sensory experience and does not then equate neural intake with evidence. Quine's central epistemological task is an explanatory one that attempts to scientifically clarify the route from stimulus to science. Davidson's (...)
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  • (1 other version)Stroud’s Carnap.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):276-302.
    In “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” Carnap drew his famous distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ questions of existence, pronouncing the former meaningful and the latter meaningless. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud understands Carnap to be applying the verification criterion of meaningfulness in order to refute Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that Stroud misrepresents both Carnap’s aim and method. Carnap was responding to critics who suggested that his willingness to quantify over abstract entities in his work in semantics violated his (...)
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  • Reckoning the shape of everything: Underdetermination and cosmotopology.P. D. Magnus - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):541-557.
    This paper offers a general characterization of underdetermination and gives a prima facie case for the underdetermination of the topology of the universe. A survey of several philosophical approaches to the problem fails to resolve the issue: the case involves the possibility of massive reduplication, but Strawson on massive reduplication provides no help here; it is not obvious that any of the rival theories are to be preferred on grounds of simplicity; and the usual talk of empirically equivalent theories misses (...)
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  • In Defense of Definitions.David Pitt - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):139-156.
    The arguments of Fodor, Garret, Walker and Parkes [(1980) Against definitions, Cognition, 8, 263-367] are the source of widespread skepticism in cognitive science about lexical semantic structure. Whereas the thesis that lexical items, and the concepts they express, have decompositional structure (i.e. have significant constituents) was at one time "one of those ideas that hardly anybody [in the cognitive sciences] ever considers giving up" (p. 264), most researchers now believe that "[a]ll the evidence suggests that the classical [(decompositional)] view is (...)
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  • (1 other version)Stroud's Camap.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):276-302.
    In “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” Camap drew his famous distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ questions of existence, pronouncing the former meaningful and the latter meaningless. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud understands Carnap to be applying the verification criterion of meaningfulness in order to refute Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that Stroud misrepresents both Carnap's aim and method. Camap was responding to critics who suggested that his willingness to quantify over abstract entities in his work in semantics violated his (...)
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  • Scientific Philosophy and the Critique of Metaphysics from Russell to Carnap to Quine.Sean Morris - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):773-799.
    In his “Wissenschaftslogik: The Role of Logic in the Philosophy of Science,” Michael Friedman argues that Carnap’s philosophy of science “is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools of mathematical logic to dissolve rather [than] solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine”. In this paper, I take issue with this claim, arguing that Quine, too, is a part of this anti-metaphysical tradition. I begin in section I (...)
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  • Working from Within: The Nature and Development of Quine's Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    During the past few decades, a radical shift has occurred in how philosophers conceive of the relation between science and philosophy. A great number of analytic philosophers have adopted what is commonly called a ‘naturalistic’ approach, arguing that their inquiries ought to be in some sense continuous with science. Where early analytic philosophers often relied on a sharp distinction between science and philosophy—the former an empirical discipline concerned with fact, the latter an a priori discipline concerned with meaning—philosophers today largely (...)
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  • Quine and Conceptual Pragmatism.Robert Sinclair - 2012 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 48 (3):335-355.
    In comparing his conception of empiricism with that of other like-minded philosophers at the end of his 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism,' W. V. Quine famously emphasized the broader scope of his pragmatist commitment in these terms:Carnap, Lewis, and others take a pragmatic stand on the question of choosing between language forms, scientific frameworks; but their pragmatism leaves off at the imagined boundary between the analytic and the synthetic. In repudiating such a boundary I espouse a more thorough pragmatism.Such remarks have (...)
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  • Quine on the Nature of Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):96-115.
    Quine's metaphilosophical naturalism is often dismissed as overly “scientistic.” Many contemporary naturalists reject Quine's idea that epistemology should become a “chapter of psychology” and urge for a more “liberal,” “pluralistic,” and/or “open-minded” naturalism instead. Still, whenever Quine explicitly reflects on the nature of his naturalism, he always insists that his position is modest and that he does not “think of philosophy as part of natural science”. Analyzing this tension, Susan Haack has argued that Quine's naturalism contains a “deep-seated and significant (...)
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  • Indétermination de la traduction et sous-détermination chez Quine.Eve Gaudet - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (2):313-330.
    RÉSUMÉ: Je propose iei une interprétation de la position quinienne sur l’asymetrie entre l’indétermination de la traduction et la sous-détermination. Je discute les articIes de Chomsky, Rorty et Friedman, qui prétendent montrer que l’asymétrie défendue par Quine est inacceptable. J’examine en outre les points de vue de Føllesdal et Gibson, deux auteurs en accord avec Quine au sujet de l’asymétrie. Je défends l’idée selon laquelle il faut admettre le réalisme de Quine, mais pas son physicalisme, pour être en mesure de (...)
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  • Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?Ian McDiarmid - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):279-293.
    The first part of this paper discusses Quine’s views on underdetermination of theory by evidence, and the indeterminacy of translation, or meaning, in relation to certain physical theories. The underdetermination thesis says different theories can be supported by the same evidence, and the indeterminacy thesis says the same component of a theory that is underdetermined by evidence is also meaning indeterminate. A few examples of underdetermination and meaning indeterminacy are given in the text. In the second part of the paper, (...)
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  • Stimulus Meaning Reconsidered.Robert Sinclair - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):395-409.
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  • Indeterminacy and interpretation.Günter Abel - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):403 – 419.
    This paper contains a discussion of Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of translation within the more general thesis that using and understanding a language are to be conceived of as a creative and interpretative-constructional activity. Indeterminacy is considered to be ineliminable. Three scenarios are distinguished concerning, first, the reasons for indeterminacy, second, the kinds of indeterminacy and, third, different levels of a general notion of recursive interpretation. Translational hypotheses are seen as interpretational constructs. The indeterminacy thesis turns out to be a (...)
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  • Is structural underdetermination possible?Holger Lyre - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):235 - 247.
    Structural realism is sometimes said to undermine the theory underdetermination (TUD) argument against realism, since, in usual TUD scenarios, the supposed underdetermination concerns the object-like theoretical content but not the structural content. The paper explores the possibility of structural TUD by considering some special cases from modern physics, but also questions the validity of the TUD argument itself. The upshot is that cases of structural TUD cannot be excluded, but that TUD is perhaps not such a terribly serious anti-realistic argument.
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  • Tracking truth and solving puzzles.Olav Gjelsvik - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):209 – 224.
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  • La publicité et l'interdépendance du langage et de la pensée.Daniel Laurier - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (2):281-316.
    I clarify in what sense one might want to claim that thought or language are public. I distinguish among four forms that each of these claims might take, and two general ways of establishing them that might be contemplated. The first infers the public character of thought from the public character of language, and the second infers the latter from the former. I show that neither of these stategies seems to be able to dispense with the claim that thought and (...)
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  • The rise and fall of computational functionalism.Oron Shagrir - 2005 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.), Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  • Carnap, Quine, and the humean condition.Sean Morris - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13283-13312.
    In his “Epistemology Naturalized,” Quine embraces a form of Humeanism. In this paper, I try to work out the significance of this Humeanism. In particular, I argue that it represents an anti-metaphysical position that Quine shares with Carnap. Crucial to my account is that contrary to much contemporary thinking on metaphysics, Carnap, and Quine following him, recognize both an ontological and an epistemological sense of metaphysics. As commentators have frequently acknowledged, Carnap and Quine disagree over rejecting metaphysics in the ontological (...)
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  • (1 other version)Meaning as Hypothesis: Quine’s Indeterminacy Thesis Revisited.Serge Grigoriev - 2010 - Dialogue 49 (3):395-411.
    RÉSUMÉ : Même s’il formule à diverses reprises sa thèse controversée de l’indétermination de la traduction, Quine n’a jamais examiné de près le lien entre l’indétermination et la conception de la signification qu’il aurait développée à partir des travaux de Peirce et de Duhem. Cet article esquisse le plan d’une telle conception de la signification dans sa relation à la thèse de l’indétermination et évalue les avantages et les implications de cette conception dans le contexte du programme philosophique de Quine (...)
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  • Intertheoretical Identity And Ontological Reductions.Ronald Loeffler - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):157-187.
    I argue that there are good reasons to assume that Quine’s theory of reference and ontology is incompatible with reductive statements – such as ‘Heat is molecular motion’ or ‘Rabbits are conglomerations of cells’. Apparently, reductive statements imply certain intertheoretical identities, yet Quine’s theory of reference and ontology seems incompatible with intertheoretical identities. I argued that treating, for the sake of reconciliation, reductive statements along the lines of Quine’s theory of an ontological reduction (which does not imply intertheoretical identity) fails. (...)
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  • Analyticity, meaning, and education: A critique of a Quinean dogma.R. A. Goodrich - 1996 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 28 (2):27–41.
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  • “Plausible insofar as it is intelligible”: Quine on underdetermination.Rogério Passos Severo - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):141-165.
    Quine’s thesis of underdetermination is significantly weaker than it has been taken to be in the recent literature, for the following reasons: (i) it does not hold for all theories, but only for some global theories, (ii) it does not require the existence of empirically equivalent yet logically incompatible theories, (iii) it does not rule out the possibility that all perceived rivalry between empirically equivalent theories might be merely apparent and eliminable through translation, (iv) it is not a fundamental thesis (...)
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  • Modalism and theoretical virtues: toward an epistemology of modality.Otávio Bueno & Scott A. Shalkowski - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):671-689.
    According to modalism, modality is primitive. In this paper, we examine the implications of this view for modal epistemology, and articulate a modalist account of modal knowledge. First, we discuss a theoretical utility argument used by David Lewis in support of his claim that there is a plurality of concrete worlds. We reject this argument, and show how to dispense with possible worlds altogether. We proceed to account for modal knowledge in modalist terms.
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  • Evidential Holism and Indispensability Arguments.Joe Morrison - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (2):263-278.
    The indispensability argument is a method for showing that abstract mathematical objects exist. Various versions of this argument have been proposed. Lately, commentators seem to have agreed that a holistic indispensability argument will not work, and that an explanatory indispensability argument is the best candidate. In this paper I argue that the dominant reasons for rejecting the holistic indispensability argument are mistaken. This is largely due to an overestimation of the consequences that follow from evidential holism. Nevertheless, the holistic indispensability (...)
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  • Quine on Ethics.Folke Tersman - 1998 - Theoria 64 (1):84-98.
    W.V. Quine has expressed a fairly conventional form of non-cognitivism in those of his writings that concern the status of moral judgments. For instance, in Quine (1981), he argues that ethics, as compared with science, is ‘methodologically infirm’. The reason is that while science is responsive to observation, and therefore ‘retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth’ (p. 63), ethics lacks such responsiveness. This in turn leads Quine to contrast moral judgments with judgments that make cognitive claims (i.e., (...)
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  • Quine's notion of fact of the matter.Eve Gaudet - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):181–193.
    Quine’s notion of fact of the matter has received very little attention, although a good grasp of it is crucial to an understanding of some of Quine’s famous formulations of the indeterminacy of translation thesis. The notion is used and cited by many but has to my knowledge never been thoroughly analysed. In the present article, I attempt to analyse and clarify it. In the first section, my exposition focuses on the relations Quine has developed between his notion of fact (...)
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  • The Theory Movement in Educational Administration and the Administrative Reform of New Zealand Education: Are There Any Parallels to Be Drawn?John A. Clark - 1993 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 25 (2):21-30.
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  • Carnapian rationality.A. W. Carus - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):163-184.
    It is generally thought that Carnap’s principle of tolerance cannot be integrated into a coherent overall conception of rationality. The doubts come from many sides, of which two are singled out. This paper argues that both are wrong, and that Carnapian rationality is a viable and perhaps quite interesting program for further development.
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  • (2 other versions)Conceptual schemes and empiricism: What Davidson saw and McDowell missed.Jesús Coll Mármol - 2007 - Theoria 22 (2):153-165.
    This paper is an examination and evaluation of McDowell’s criticisms of Davidson’s views on conceptual schemes and empiricism. I will argue that McDowell does not understand the real nature of Davidson’s arguments against the scheme-content dualism and that his new empiricist proposal fails to solve all the problems that old empiricism has traditionally raised. This is so because Davidson does not try to reject only a certain conception of experience by rejecting the dualism of scheme and content, but a way (...)
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  • The normativity of naturalistic epistemology.Markus Lammenranta - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (3-4):337-358.
    Naturalistic epistemology is accused of ruling out the normative element of epistemology. Different naturalistic responses are considered. It is argued that the content of attributions of knowledge is best understood in purely descriptive terms. So their normative force is merely hypothetical. Attributions of justified belief, on the other hand, do have intrinsic normativity. This derives from their role in our first-person deliberation of what to believe. It is suggested that the content of them is best captured in naturalistic terms by (...)
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  • Quine on Charity and Rationality.Hamidreza Mahboobi Arani & Mojtaba Derayati - 2020 - Philosophical Investigations 14 (32):134-147.
    W. V. Quine borrows the principle of charity from Neil Wilson, but modifies and enriches its content to fit into his naturalistic philosophy and epistemology. While Wilson ties this principle to the notion of truth, Quine’s attempts in finding a ground for it lead him to the concept of common rationality shared by all human beings, which is ultimately what makes communication, as the basis of our social life, possible. According to the paper's argument, three other expressions, that is, the (...)
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  • Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy.Christian Nimtz - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (1):1-28.
    Quine and Davidson employ proxy functions to demonstrate that the use of language (behaviouristically conceived) is compatible with indefinitely many radically different reference relations. They also believe that the use of language (behaviouristically conceived) is all that determines reference. From this they infer that reference is indeterminate, i.e. that there are no facts of the matter as to what singular terms designate and what predicates apply to. Yet referential indeterminacy yields rather dire consequences. One thus does wonder whether one can (...)
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  • (1 other version)Moralities are a sign-language of the affects.Brian Leiter - 2013 - Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):237-258.
    This essay offers an interpretation and partial defense of Nietzsche's idea that moralities and moral judgments are “sign-languages” or “symptoms” of our affects, that is, of our emotions or feelings. According to Nietzsche, as I reconstruct his view, moral judgments result from the interaction of two kinds of affective responses: first, a “basic affect” of inclination toward or aversion from certain acts, and then a further affective response to that basic affect. I argue that Nietzsche views basic affects asnoncognitive, that (...)
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  • (1 other version)Quine on Objects: Realism or Anti-Realism?Antti Keskinen - 2012 - Theoria 78 (2):128-145.
    W. V. Quine describes himself as a “robust realist” about physical objects in the external world. This realism about objects is due to Quine's naturalism. On the other hand, Quine's naturalistic epistemology involves a conception of objects as posits that we introduce in our theories about the world. This conception of objects can be seen as anti-realist rather than realist. In this article, I discuss the questions whether there is a tension between Quine's realism and his epistemological conception of objects, (...)
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  • Quine's truth.Lars Bergström - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):421-435.
    W. V. Quine has made statements about truth which are not obviously compatible, and his statements have been interpreted in more than one way. For example, Donald Davidson claims that Quine has an epistemic theory of truth, but Quine himself often says that truth is just disquotational. This paper argues that Quine should recognize two different notions of truth. One of these is disquotational, the other is empiricist. There is nothing wrong with recognizing two different notions of truth. Both may (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Willard Van Orman Quine.Peter Hylton - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Patterns and descriptions.D. E. Bradshaw - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 27 (3):181-202.
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  • Beyond Radical Interpretation: Individuality as the Basis of Historical Understanding.Serge Grigoriev - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):489-503.
    Owing in part to Rorty’s energetic promotional efforts, Davidson’s philosophy of language has received much attention in recent decades from quarters most diverse, creating at times a sense of an almost protean versatility. Conspicuously missing from the rapidly growing literature on the subject is a sustained discussion of the relationship between Davidson’s interpretive theory and history: an omission all the more surprising since a comparison between Davidson and Gadamer has been pursued at some length and now, it seems,abandoned—all without as (...)
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  • Fallibilism, Objectivity, and the New Cynicism.Susan Haack - 2004 - Episteme 1 (1):35-48.
    Nobody seriously doubts the possibility, or the usefulness, of finding things out; that is something we all take for granted when we inquire about our plane schedule, the state of our bank account, the best treatment for our child's illness, and so forth – a presupposition of the most ordinary, everyday looking into things as well as of the most sophisticated scientific research, not to mention of the legal system. Of course, nobody seriously doubts, either, that sometimes, instead of really (...)
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  • Marcus, Kripke, and names.John P. Burgess - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 84 (1):1 - 47.
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  • Black, White and Gray: Quine on Convention.Yemima Ben-Menahem - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):245-282.
    This paper examines Quine’s web of belief metaphor and its role in his various responses to conventionalism. Distinguishing between two versions of conventionalism, one based on the under-determination of theory, the other associated with a linguistic account of necessary truth, I show how Quine plays the two versions of conventionalism against each other. Some of Quine’s reservations about conventionalism are traced back to his 1934 lectures on Carnap. Although these lectures appear to endorse Carnap’s conventionalism, in exposing Carnap’s failure to (...)
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