This article discusses C. E. Alchourrdn and E. Bulygin's ideas regarding the distinction between strong permission and weak permission. The author takes for granted that the distinction between the two terms should be placed at the level of the assertive metalanguage about norms. But the symbolizations and the definitions of strong and weak permissions offered by Alchourrdn and Bulygin, as well as their thesis concerning the relations between the two concepts are challenged.

I argue that the principal roles standardly envisaged for abstract propositions can be discharged to the sentences themselves (and similarly for the meanings or senses of words). I discuss: (1) Cognitive Value: Hesperus-Phosphorus; (2) Indirect Sense and Propositional Attitudes; (3) the Paradox of Analysis; (4) the Picture Theory of the Tractatus; (5) Syntactical Diagrams and Meaning; (6) Quantifying-in. (7) Patterns of Use. I end with comparisons with related views of the territory.

A discussion of Quine and Davidson, as interpreted and criticized in Scott Soames’ Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume II.

As is reasonably well-appreciated, Quine struggled with his definition of the all-important notion of an observation sentence; especially in order to make them bear out his commitment to language’s being a ‘social art’. In an earlier article (_Mind_ 131(523):805–825, 2022), I proposed a certain repair, which here I will explain, justify and articulate further. But it also infects the definition of observation categoricals, and furthermore makes it a secondary matter, a seeming afterthought, that evidence, science and knowledge generally are shared—are (...) joint, social and collaborative products. Without forsaking Quine’s strict naturalism, I try to make the necessary adjustments to Quine’s scheme. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss Quine’s views on language sharing and linguistic communities. It is sometimes explicitly and often implicitly taken for granted that Quine believes that speakers can form communities in which they share a language. The aim of the paper is to show that this is a misinterpretation and, on the contrary, Quine is closer to linguistic individualism – the view according to which there is no guarantee that speakers within a community share a language and the notion (...) of idiolect is more fundamental than the notion of shared language. (shrink)

This article discusses C. E. Alchourrdn and E. Bulygin's ideas regarding the distinction between strong permission and weak permission. The author takes for granted that the distinction between the two terms should be placed at the level of the assertive metalanguage about norms. But the symbolizations and the definitions of strong and weak permissions offered by Alchourrdn and Bulygin, as well as their thesis concerning the relations between the two concepts are challenged.