Professor Imwinkelried is surely right: the propriety of bioethicists serving as expert witnesses in litigation is problematic, and, I would add, it should remain problematic. Such testimony most certainly does not belong everywhere it will be offered by lawyers and litigants in an effort to advance their interests. Yet in contrast to some commentators, Imwinkelried and I both see a place for bioethicists serving as expert witnesses, although we differ significantly on how to understand and justify this place. In any (...) event, serious questions regarding the proper place for expert bioethicist testimony in the courtroom do exist, not only for law but also bioethics as well.The threshold question regarding the prospect of bioethicists serving as expert witnesses would seemingly have to be: “could a bioethicist qualify as an expert witness under the controlling rules of evidence?” Imwinkelried, however, does not perceive any need to even entertain this question as he claims that “technical evidentiary standards are inapplicable when information is presented to a judge to permit the judge to perform… a legislative or law-making function.”. (shrink)

Professor Imwinkelried is surely right: the propriety of bioethicists serving as expert witnesses in litigation is problematic, and, I would add, it should remain problematic. Such testimony most certainly does not belong everywhere it will be offered by lawyers and litigants in an effort to advance their interests. Yet in contrast to some commentators, Imwinkelried and I both see a place for bioethicists serving as expert witnesses, although we differ significantly on how to understand and justify this place. In any (...) event, serious questions regarding the proper place for expert bioethicist testimony in the courtroom do exist, not only for law but also bioethics as well.The threshold question regarding the prospect of bioethicists serving as expert witnesses would seemingly have to be: “could a bioethicist qualify as an expert witness under the controlling rules of evidence?” Imwinkelried, however, does not perceive any need to even entertain this question as he claims that “technical evidentiary standards are inapplicable when information is presented to a judge to permit the judge to perform… a legislative or law-making function.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWilliam Morgan presents two diametrically opposed normative conceptions of sport and athletic excellence from late nineteenth/early twentieth-century British and American athletes. He claims that this example shows that the normative theory of sport presented by broad internalism is false or at least inadequate. As an alternative, he presents the concept of deep conventions, which, he claims, can successfully adjudicate such normative disputes. I argue that Morgan’s counterexample is not nearly so decisive against broad internalism as it might seem and that (...) his own solution, deep conventionalism does no better in solving the dispute and suffers from further issues of its own. (shrink)

Any fundamental examination of managerial practices must consider a philosophical conundrum at the heart of market exchange. Economically, the opportunity for profit seems to demand somebody else’s loss, and ethically, we must not take advantage of others’ misfortune. In a market system involving a multiplicity of stakeholders, profit opportunities may arise in which relationships between winners and losers are distant, indirect, or even nonexistent; their motives are multivalent; and their market participation may be intentional or accidental. Reflecting two decades later (...) upon several cases arising from the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks, this paper describes several examples of profiting from loss that demonstrate the ubiquity and variety of the problem. It also invokes numerous bodies of literature that demonstrate the inherent complexity and interdisciplinarity of the problem and the absence of determinative principles to answer the question of when it is justifiable to profit from loss. The paper positions casuistry, the ancient philosophical art of case analysis that resembles modern business pedagogy, as a complement to ethical theory. The Loss Agency-Division of Benefits framework developed in the paper demonstrates the value of philosophy to managerial practices when economic theory is insufficient for ethically classifying and evaluating forms of profiting from loss. (shrink)

This paper compares and contrasts the philosophical positions of Hobbes and Rousseau from the standpoint of interpersonal communication theory. Although both men argued from the state of nature, they differed fundamentally on the nature of humankind and the purpose of relationships. These differences should be of concern for interpersonal scholars insofar as they reflect differing sets of axioms from which to begin theorizing. The second part of the paper establishes a link between Hobbes' philosophy and the social exchange tradition: The (...) Hobbes-social exchange tradition begins with the assumption that individuals form relationships to maximize rewards and minimize costs; a Rousseauist position must begin with the assumption that individuals form relationships in pursuit of some common goal. Thus, relational continuity and quality are not a function of cost-benefit ratios, but of how well partners work together toward their common good. (shrink)

Weak psychological egoism is the doctrine that anything an agent does intentionally, that agent does at least expecting thereby to realize one of her self-regarding ends. (Strong psychological egoism, by contrast, is the doctrine that agents act always intending thereby to realize a self-regarding end.) Though weak psychological egoism is a doctrine ultimately answerable to empirical evidence, we presently have excellent a priori reasons for accepting it and attempting to construct psychological theories that include it as an organizing principle. These (...) reasons have mainly to do with the idea that to understand the motivation behind an action, we need to understand the force of the consideration that motivates the agent, and the way to do this is to find a self-regarding end associated in the agent''s mind with acting on that consideration. (shrink)

Some public health behavioral intervention research studies involve deception. A methodological imperative to minimize bias can be in conflict with the ethical principle of informed consent. As a case study, we examine the specific forms of deception used in three online randomized controlled trials evaluating brief alcohol interventions. We elaborate our own decision making about the use of deception in these trials, and present our ongoing findings and uncertainties. We discuss the value of the approach of pragmatism for examining these (...) kinds of ethical issues that can arise in research on public health interventions. (shrink)

Work-family conflict has been examined quite often in human resources management and industrial/organizational psychology literature. Numerous statistics show that the magnitude of this employment issue will continue to grow. As employees attempt to balance work demands and family responsibilities, organizations will have to decide to what extent they will go to minimize this conflict. Research has identified numerous negative consequences of work-family stressors for organizations, for employees and for employees' families. There are however many options to reduce this strain, each (...) with advantages and disadvantages. An ethical analysis, from a virtue ethics perspective, is applied to this timely issue to present an alternative view in addressing this critical business decision. In addition, a strong connection between the virtue ethics analysis and a well-known management theory is given to provide a foundation for managerial implications for resolving work-family conflict. (shrink)

Wolves have a special resonance in many human cultures. To appreciate fully the wide variety of views on wolves, we must attend to the scientific, social, and ethical discourses that frame our understanding of wolves themselves, as well as their relationships with people and the natural world. These discourses are a configuration of ideas, language, actions, and institutions that enable or constrain our individual and collective agency with respect to wolves. Scientific discourse is frequently privileged when it comes to wolves, (...) on the assumption that the primary knowledge requirements are matters of ecology, cognitive ethology, and allied disciplines. Social discourse about wolves implicitly challenges this privilege and provides a rich array of social perspectives on human-wolf relations. Ethical discourse has until recently lagged behind the other two. So too, ethicists are increasingly challenging the adequacy of scientific and social discourse. They do so by calling attention to the value-laden character of all discourse, and the unavoidable ethical questions that confront us as we learn to share the landscape with large predators like wolves. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The core teaching of Buddhism revolves around understanding and alleviating suffering. Since the purpose of international humanitarian law (IHL) is to minimise suffering during armed conflict, by protecting the innocent and restricting the means and methods of warfare, Buddhists should support IHL. In this paper, I try not to utilise the Buddha’s well-known teachings such as karma, impermanence, non-self, emptiness, compassion and so on, to explain why Buddhists should support IHL. Instead, I present how and why Buddhism underlines the (...) importance of secular ethics, indicating that humanity comes first for Buddhism, which would be the main reason for Buddhists to support IHL. Buddhist monks such as Yinshun and the 14th Dalai Lama view common humanity, conventional morality and inner values as the grounds for Buddhism. An enhancement of humanity and the promotion of morality are also part of the way of Buddhist practice. Viewed from a humanistic perspective, Buddhism may endorse all laws, rules, and regulations that are in the best interest of the public and align with values such as peace, freedom, equality, justice, benevolence, and more, regardless of whether they are applied internationally or domestically. Buddhism upholds IHL for similar reasons. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper I will defend a version of pluralistic relativism. In the first section of this paper I will present my view of a functional morality by appealing to the moral diverse traditions in China. If each is indeed conceptually consistent and practically sufficient, then it seems to me that each is a functional morality. In the second section I explain the connection between moral plurality and the perception of moral ambivalence that our own moral beliefs might not be (...) true. In the third section I argue that radical moral relativism and weak universalism cannot accommodate moral plurality and moral ambivalence. In the fourth section I explain why pluralistic relativism can best accommodate moral plurality and moral ambivalence. In the last section I present how pluralistic relativism helps us to deal with disagreement and motivates us to respect those who are different from us. (shrink)

The growing interest in ethics and ethical behavior has not manifested itself in an ethical analysis of television programming beyond a journalism context. This study examines one social/ethical issue - lying in prime time network television situation comedies. Results show sitcom characters who lie are motivated primarily by self-interest. This egoistic approach raises questions of ethical maturity and provides a model of behavior that may have negative implications for society.

In this article, we offer a rebuttal to a key thesis in Chapter 5 of Engelhardt’s After God: namely, that there exists an “unbridgeable gap” between the dominant secular culture and traditional religious believers. Contra Engelhardt, we argue that it is possible to bridge the gap by employing a strategy that includes, but is not limited to, methods for cultivating understanding and respect and a sense of solidarity. Our argument proceeds in three steps. First, we elucidate Engelhardt’s thesis in light (...) of some of the key concepts he discusses elsewhere in After God. Second, in the hope of developing understanding and respect, we elucidate the history and teachings that form the consciences of traditional Christian medical professionals concerning abortion, euthanasia, and disfiguring surgeries. Third, in the hope of developing a sense of solidarity, we explain the broad scope of the dominant secular culture’s attempt to limit people’s freedom of conscience rights, showing that it includes not only traditional Christians but also members of other traditional religions, members of mainline religious groups, people with alternative conceptions of secularity, and even faithful members of the dominant secular culture. (shrink)

In the case of an intellectually disabled patient, the attending physician was restricted from writing a Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) order. Although the rationale for this restriction was to protect the patient from an inappropriate quality of life judgment, it resulted in a worse death than the patient would have experienced had he not been disabled. Such restrictions that are intended to protect intellectually disabled patients may violate their right to equal treatment and to a dignified death.

Legal and ethical concerns have been raised since the inception of the commercial mug shot website industry in the United States. These issues include the violation of the presumption of innocence, privacy interests, humiliation, extortion, and sensationalizing crime. These websites lend comparison to Bedlam asylum, which allowed visitors to mock and humiliate the patients. The popularity of these websites renders it essential that the legality and ethics of these websites be reevaluated. The deontological and utilitarian perspectives offer converging assessments regarding (...) the need to regulate the industry and to modify the practices of law enforcement agencies and news organizations. (shrink)

Could a Nazi soldier or terrorist be courageous? The Courage Problem asks us to answer this sort of question, and then to explain why people are reluctant to give this answer. The present paper sheds new light on the Courage Problem by examining a controversy sparked by Bill Maher, who claimed that the 9/11 terrorists’ acts were ‘not cowardly.’ It is shown that Maher's controversy is fundamentally related to the Courage Problem. Then, a unified solution to both problems is provided. (...) This solution entails that gutsy people who lack good ends are not courageous. (shrink)

Rudyard Kipling famously penned, “East is East, West is West, and never the twain shall meet.” His poetic line suggests that Eastern and Western cultures are irreconcilably different and that their members engage in fundamentally incommensurable ethical practices. This paper argues that differing cultures do not necessarily operate by incommensurable moral principles. On the contrary, if we adopt a virtue ethics perspective, we discover that East and West are always meeting because their virtues share a natural basis and structure. This (...) article sketches the rudiments of what a universal virtue ethic might look like. Such an ethic is especially relevant and valuable in this era of global business. (shrink)

The author explores bioethics and “life enhancing” technology from the perspective of traditional Chinese value systems.

In his introduction to this symposium, “Religions and Cultures of East and West: Perspectives on Bioethics,” Dr. Robert Sade defined its purpose as follows: “The objective of [our] discussions…is to explore the limits of enhancement technologies in light of what makes us essentially human, in the view of world-wide cultures and religions.”These issues would seem to be at the cutting edge of any informed deliberation concerning the merits of “human enhancement” technologies. For instance, the issue of how “what makes us (...) essentially human” affects our reflection on issues of technological “life enhancement” is raised in a 2007 book by Harvard professor Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering. (shrink)

Choosing for whom to work is one of the most difficult ethical questions public relations practitioners have to address. This article attempts to examine the issue of client choice in the philosophical context of universalism versus ethical relativism. In this article, while acknowledging that differences between cultures exist, I argue public relations practitioners should take a universalistic approach in choosing their clients because ethical relativism itself is seriously flawed.

Despite growing interest in examining the role of religion in business ethics, there is little consensus concerning the basis or standards of “good” or ethical behavior and the reasons behind them. This limits our ability to enhance ethical behavior in the workplace. We address this issue by examining worldviews as it relates to ethics research and practice. Our worldview forms the context within which we organize and build our understanding of reality. Given that much of our academic work as well (...) as business practice operate from a modern worldview, we examine how modernism shapes our beliefs and approaches to ethics in business and academia. We identify important limitations of modernism in addressing moral issues and religion. We then introduce the Christian worldview as an alternative approach to examining ethical issues in business. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of ‘openness with patients’ from the stand-point of the limitations of biomedical ethics. Initially we review contemporary critiques of bioethics and, in particular, of principlism; we relate how other; somewhat neglected, forms of medical ethics can yield useful information and provide moral guidance. The main section of the paper then shows how a bioethical approach to openness misses the social context in our example, the viewpoints of patients; we present some of the increasing wealth of (...) research evidence which points towards patients wanting more information and a greater degree of openness. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of ‘openness with patients’ from the stand-point of the limitations of biomedical ethics. Initially we review contemporary critiques of bioethics and, in particular, of principlism; we relate how other; somewhat neglected, forms of medical ethics can yield useful information and provide moral guidance.The main section of the paper then shows how a bioethical approach to openness misses the social context in our example, the viewpoints of patients; we present some of the increasing wealth of research (...) evidence which points towards patients wanting more information and a greater degree of openness.Finally we put forward that a principlist’s objection to active encouragement of openness might be based on the risk of infringing upon the ‘right not to know’. We reject this by arguing how rights can be trumped. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the implications of Karsten Stueber's account of imaginative resistance, particularly as it relates to the phenomenon of moral dumbfounding described by Jonathan Haidt and colleagues. I suggest that Stueber's account allows us to redescribe the phenomenon as a failure of the folk psychological project of interpretation and so to challenge Haidt's metaethical conclusions. I close by considering some implications for moral deliberation and judgment in those, such as autistic people, whose interpretive capacities are impaired.

This paper investigates consistency in applied moral philosophy with regard to the recent controversy over Makah whaling in the state of Washington. The first part presents both sides of the controversy. The second part examines the meaning of 'tradition' and distinguishes between 'new' and 'old' traditions. The third part explores what might constitute moral consistency for the Makah and what might constitute moral consistency for the larger community.

There are questions about how ethics is best taught to undergraduate business students. There has been a proliferation in the number of stand-alone ethics courses for undergraduate students but research on the effectiveness of integrated versus stand-alone mode of delivery is inconclusive. Christensen et al. :347–368, 2007), in a comprehensive review of ethics, corporate social responsibility and sustainability education, investigated how ethics education has changed over the last 20 years, including the issue of integration of these topics into the core (...) course offerings. We use Brenner and Molander’s :57–71, 1977) situational ethics survey instrument to examine the effect of the mode of delivery of business ethics education on undergraduate student responses. We found a significant difference on mode of delivery. Studies have also found interesting results in respect of the effect of cultural differences and gender on the effectiveness of business ethics instruction. While not the primary focus of this study, we also looked at the influence of gender and culture on students’ responses. Our results indicate significant differences in respect of mode of delivery and culture. In contrast to other studies, we found that gender was not significant. We did test for any interactive effects of gender, culture and mode of delivery. However, no significant differences were found. (shrink)

Natural theology is still practiced as though substantive theological conclusions can be derived by a quasi-deductive process. Perhaps relevant "evidence" may lead to interesting theological conclusions -- the fact of natural evil, or the cosmic fine-tuning we hear about in contemporary cosmology, both cry out for theological explanation. I remain a skeptic, however, about the value of "a priori" methods in natural theology. The case study in this short discussion is the well known attempt to establish the logical incoherence of (...) the divine command theory of moral objectivity. If skeptics can make good on this charge, they will have gone a long way toward undercutting a central tenant of western theism. I will argue, however, that the case against theologically based moral absolutism is not as simple as showing some internal paradox or logical tension. (shrink)

This paper presents the idea of a decision-support system for a livestock farm, called “ethical accounting”, to be used as an extension of traditional cost accounting. “Ethical accounting” seeks to make available to the farmer information about how his decisions affect the interests of farm animals, consumers and future generations. Furthermore, “ethical accounting” involves value-based planning. Thus, the farmer should base his choice of production plan on reflections as to his fundamental objectives, and he should make his final decision only (...) after having seriously considered the various consequences for the affected parties. (shrink)

Bioethics as an academic discipline comes into public discourse when real life “hard cases” receive media attention. Since cases of this sort increasingly often become the subject of litigation, the forum for debate can be a court of law, with judges as the final arbiters. Judges (unlike philosophers) are obliged to give final and definitive rulings in a constrained time period. Their training is in a type of discourse very different from moral philosophy, though still concerned with right and wrong. (...) This paper explores the differences between the tools and methods used in public legal debate and private academic discourse, and the different nature of the answers they produce. It attempts to suggest some ways in which bioethicists can better understand lawyers’ reasoning in cases of this sort, and how communication between bioethics and law might be improved. (shrink)

(2013). Heather L. Reid, Introduction to the Philosophy of Sport. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport: Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 279-286. doi: 10.1080/00948705.2013.836708.

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 1, Page 35-36, January 2012.

Critics of homosexual activity often appeal to some form of natural law theory as a basis for their arguments. According to one version of natural law theory, actions that “pervert” or misuse a bodily faculty are immoral. In this paper, I argue that this “perverted faculty argument” provides a successful account of good and evil action. Several objections are assessed and found inadequate.

In production and consumption of food, several ethical values are at stake for different affected parties and value conflicts in relation to food choices are frequent. The aim of this article was to present an ethical framework for well-grounded decisions on production and consumption of food, guided by the following questions: Which are the affected parties in relation to production and consumption of food? What ethical values are at stake for these parties? How can conflicts between the identified values be (...) handled from different ethical perspectives? Four affected parties, relevant for both production and consumption of food, were identified, namely animals, nature, producers and consumers. Working form a bottom-up perspective, several values for these parties were identified and discussed. For animals: welfare, not being exposed to pain and natural behavior; for nature: low negative impact on the environment and sustainable climate; for producers: fair salaries and safe working conditions; and for consumers: access to food, autonomy, health and food as part of a good life. As several of these values can come into conflict when choices of what to eat should be made, the article argues for the need of weighing values from four different perspectives in food ethics dilemmas, namely duties, consequences, virtues and care. The suggested ethical framework can provide moral guidance to both producers of food and to consumers in a supermarket. Thereby, it can contribute to more well-grounded decisions concerning what to eat and make people feel a little bit more secure when reflecting over the question: What shall we eat? (shrink)

CITATION: Hattingh, L. 2015. Moral challenges in managed care. South African Journal of Bioethics and Law, 8:17-20, doi:10.7196/SAJBL.431.

Smith has argued that moral realism need not be threatened by apparent moral disagreement. One reason he gives is that moral debate has tended to elicit convergence in moral views. From here, he argues inductively that current disagreements will likely be resolved on the condition that each party is rational and fully informed. The best explanation for this phenomenon, Smith argues, is that there are mind-independent moral facts that humans are capable of knowing. In this paper, I seek to challenge (...) this argument—and more recent versions of it—by arguing that historical convergence in moral views may occur for various arational reasons. If such reasons possibly result in convergence—which Smith effectively concedes—then the moral realist would require an additional a posteriori argument to establish that convergence in moral views occurred for the right reasons. Hence, Smith-style arguments, as they stand, cannot be mobilised in support of moral realism. Rather, this investigation demonstrates the necessity of a genuine history of morality for any convergence claim in support of a meta-ethical view. (shrink)

One of the dominant traditions in normative ethics is characterised by the attempt to develop a comprehensive moral theory that can distinguish right from wrong in a range of cases by drawing on a philosophical account of the good. Familiar versions of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics have emerged from this tradition. Yet such theories often seem to lack the resources needed to evaluate the broader contexts in which moral dilemmas arise, which may cause them to encourage moral complicity. Context-insensitive (...) complicity of this sort receives surprisingly little direct philosophical attention, despite its being a ubiquitous concern for ordinary moral agents and despite the threat it poses to this form of ethical theorising. The present paper sketches the problem more formally and canvasses some leading responses before locating its source in the implicit distinction between moral and non-moral domains at the root of much traditional normative theorising. (shrink)

In the current era patient autonomy is enormously important. However, recently there has also been some movement back to ensure that trust in the doctor's skill, knowledge and virtue is not excluded in the process. These new nuances of informed consent have been referred to by terms such as beneficent paternalism, experience-based paternalism and we would add virtuous paternalism. The purpose of this paper is to consider the history and current problematic nature of counselling and consent. Starting with the tradition (...) founded by Hippocrates we trace and seek to understand how relevant aspects of the patient-doctor relationship have evolved under the influences of subsequent moral theories. Finally we tentatively endorse certain modes of counselling in the current era in order to promote morally sound, good clinical practice. (shrink)

Oceania is a diverse region consisting of 29 countries, all of which are islands; its total population is approximately 379 million people. Business Ethics is firmly established as an academic field in the region’s two OECD countries, Australia and New Zealand, and in Singapore, is still developing in a dozen other countries, but no development at all has been found in half of the region’s countries, including each of those that has no higher education institutions. A major task for Business (...) Ethics in this region is to seed the development of the field in countries in which development has not yet begun, and to assist development where it is nascent. The key change to the focus of academic business ethics in this region over the past 15 years has been a shift in focus from the organisation and its employees, to business’ impact on the natural environment and external stakeholders. (shrink)

The present article attempts to evaluate various tenets of moral philosophy by reviewing empirical data from the field of organizational justice bearing on: (a) people''s concerns about fairness in organizations, and (b) the consequences of following or not following rules of justice. With respect to concerns about fairness in organizations, utilitarian claims that people believe that fairness requires distributions of reward based on merit were assessed. Similarly, evidence was reviewed bearing on the claim of psychological egoists that judgments of fairness (...) reflect a self-interested bias. Finally, Kant''s view that people should never lie was evaluated in light of evidence describing people''s actual attitudes toward lying. In all three cases, the underlying philosophical premises were concluded to be overly simplistic in view of complexities about human nature revealed in empirical research. In addition, evidence was reviewed that shed light on the teleological claims of utilitarians regarding the purported benefits of following two common organizational practices — using merit-based pay, and punishing harmdoers. Here, too, the empirical evidence (findings that these techniques do not consistently yield the greatest good for the greatest number) suggests that the premise underlying utilitarian thought is based on unfounded, overly simplistic assumptions about the effects of following various allegedly moral ideas. It is concluded that our analyses provide a useful first step toward the desired goal of business ethicists of integrating prescriptive and descriptive approaches to justice. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDespite a resurgence of interest in character education, just what ‘character’ means is contested. Two strands, while overlapping, diverge on several questions: Is character centrally about moral qualities or more inclusive? Does it consist of one or multiple traits? Does it regard virtue as independently or instrumentally good? Is character a set of dispositions or behaviors? Is it a matter of reflection and reason or habits and skills? Those aligned with the first part of each dichotomy I label purists, the (...) second reformists. In Parts I and II the two perspectives are detailed. While some advocate merging the two camps, as reviewed in Part III, I objection to this proposal. Such a marriage blurs key distinctions and obscures the centrality of morality to character. It also questionably enlarges the role of schools. The conclusion reached is that the role of schools in teaching character is limited. (shrink)

This paper argues against the priority of pure, virtue-based accounts of argumentative norms [VA]. Such accounts are agent-based and committed to the priority thesis: good arguments and arguing well are explained in terms of some prior notion of the virtuous arguer arguing virtuously. Two problems with the priority thesis are identified. First, the definitional problem: virtuous arguers arguing virtuously are neither sufficient nor necessary for good arguments. Second, the priority problem: the goodness of arguments is not explained virtuistically. Instead, being (...) excellences, virtues are instrumental in relation to other, non-aretaic goods—in this case, reason and rationality. Virtues neither constitute reasons nor explain their goodness. Two options remain for VA: either provide some account of reason and rationality in virtuistic terms, or accept them as given but non-aretaic goods. The latter option, though more viable, demands the concession that VA cannot provide the core norms of argumentation theory. (shrink)

With regard to existing concept of the moral education (ethics) in Slovakia, the questions of ethics and morals are only one of the partial sections. The dominant role is played by psychology based on Roberto Olivar’s concept with emphasis on pro–socialization and on Erickson’s concept of the psychosocial development. From the philosophy basis point of view, only Aristotle, even in reduced form and Spranger’s concept of the life forms are mentioned. Philosophy and ethics are only complements to more psychologically based (...) educational program which is resulting from the problematic division of a social and moral experience into egoistic and prosocial. Egoism is presented in a distorted form and is characterized as the cause of all moral evil. However, there are several different types of understanding of the term egoism in philosophy and ethics as for example psychological and ethical egoism, or self-interest. Ethical egoism or self-interest cannot be identified with selfishness. The main aim of moral education should not be only to form the desired children and youth moral orientation but on the other hand, to form morally self-confident individuals who are able to solve the moral problems, to help the others to solve them as well and to be able to bear moral responsibility for their own deeds. (shrink)

Three views of sustainability are juxtaposed with four views about who the members of the moral community are. These provide points of contact for understanding the moral issues in sustainability. Attention is drawn to the preferred epistemic methods of the differing factions arguing for sustainability. Criteria for defining membership in the moral community are explored; rationality and capacity for pain are rejected as consistent criteria. The criterion of having interests is shown to be most coherent for explaining why all living (...) humans belong to the moral community. This criterion allows inclusion of future generations as well, and extends to animals and plants membership in the moral community. Inferences are drawn that food sufficiency advocates hold only presently living persons to be full-fledged members of the moral community, but that this view is internally inconsistent. Stewards should agree that all living things are members of the moral community. A distinction between welfare interests and ulterior interests allows the steward to include the aims of those who argue for sustainability as community without committing some of their errors. Community advocates argue that essential values and virtues will be lost is the culture of agriculture is transformed. I argue that community advocates may fail to pass on our most important virtue — justice — without such a transformation. (shrink)