- Submit
-
Browse
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- More
Switch to: References
Citations of:
Add citations
You must login to add citations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This paper is about conjunctions and disjunctions in the scope of non-doxastic atti- tude verbs. These constructions generate a certain type of ignorance implicature. I argue that the best way to account for these implicatures is by appealing to a notion of contex- tual redundancy (Schlenker, 2008; Fox, 2008; Mayr and Romoli, 2016). This pragmatic approach to ignorance implicatures is contrasted with a semantic account of disjunctions under `wonder' that appeals to exhausti cation (Roelofsen and Uegaki, 2016). I argue that (...) |
|
|
Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. Belief is thus central to epistemology. It comes in a qualitative form, as when Sophia believes that Vienna is the capital of Austria, and a quantitative form, as when Sophia's degree of belief that Vienna is the capital of Austria is at least twice her degree of belief that tomorrow it will be sunny in Vienna. Formal epistemology, as opposed to mainstream epistemology (Hendricks 2006), is epistemology done in a formal way, (...) |
|
|
This paper investigates the implicative conditional, a connective intended to describe the logical behavior of an empirically defined class of natural language conditionals, also namedimplicative conditionals, which excludes concessive and some other conditionals. The implicative conditional strengthens the strict conditional with the possibility of the antecedent and of the contradictory of the consequent.$${p\Rightarrow q}$$p⇒qis thus defined as$${\lnot } \Diamond {(p \wedge \lnot q) \wedge } \Diamond {p \wedge } \Diamond {\lnot q}$$¬◊(p∧¬q)∧◊p∧◊¬q. We explore the logical properties of this conditional in (...) |
|
|
This paper studies proof systems for the logics of super-strict implication ST2–ST5, which correspond to C.I. Lewis’ systems S2–S5 freed of paradoxes of strict implication. First, Hilbert-style axiomatic systems are introduced and shown to be sound and complete by simulating STn in Sn and backsimulating Sn in STn, respectively(for n=2,...,5). Next, G3-style labelled sequent calculi are investigated. It is shown that these calculi have the good structural properties that are distinctive of G3-style calculi, that they are sound and complete, and (...) |
|
|
– We offer a new motivation for imprecise probabilities. We argue that there are propositions to which precise probability cannot be assigned, but to which imprecise probability can be assigned. In such cases the alternative to imprecise probability is not precise probability, but no probability at all. And an imprecise probability is substantially better than no probability at all. Our argument is based on the mathematical phenomenon of non-measurable sets. Non-measurable propositions cannot receive precise probabilities, but there is a natural (...) |
|
|
Plural definite descriptions across many languages display two well-known properties. First, they can give rise to so-called non-maximal readings, in the sense that they ‘allow for exceptions’. Second, while they tend to have a quasi-universal quantificational force in affirmative sentences, they tend to be interpreted existentially in the scope of negation. Building on previous works, we offer a theory in which sentences containing plural definite expressions trigger a family of possible interpretations, and where general principles of language use account for (...) |
|
|
The paper is motivated by the need of accounting for the practical syllogism as a piece of defeasible reasoning. To meet the need, the paper first refers to ranking theory as an account of defeasible descriptive reasoning. It then argues that two kinds of ought need to be distinguished, purely normative and fact-regarding obligations (in analogy to intrinsic and extrinsic utilities). It continues arguing that both kinds of ought can be iteratively revised and should hence be represented by ranking functions, (...) |
|
|
This paper studies proof systems for the logics of super-strict implication \(\textsf{ST2}\) – \(\textsf{ST5}\), which correspond to C.I. Lewis’ systems \(\textsf{S2}\) – \(\textsf{S5}\) freed of paradoxes of strict implication. First, Hilbert-style axiomatic systems are introduced and shown to be sound and complete by simulating \(\textsf{STn}\) in \(\textsf{Sn}\) and backsimulating \(\textsf{Sn}\) in \(\textsf{STn}\), respectively (for \({\textsf{n}} =2, \ldots, 5\) ). Next, \(\textsf{G3}\) -style labelled sequent calculi are investigated. It is shown that these calculi have the good structural properties that are distinctive (...) |
|
|
Proves Completeness for the Evidential Conditional. |
|
|
The paper is motivated by the need of accounting for the practical syllogism as a piece of defeasible reasoning. To meet the need, the paper first refers to ranking theory as an account of defeasible descriptive reasoning. It then argues that two kinds of ought need to be distinguished, purely normative and fact-regarding obligations. It continues arguing that both kinds of ought can be iteratively revised and should hence be represented by ranking functions, too, just as iteratively revisable beliefs. Its (...) |
|
|
This paper explores the connective ‘because’, based on the idea that ‘_C_ because _A_’ implies the acceptance/truth of the antecedent _A_ as well as of the consequent _C_, and additionally that the antecedent makes a difference for the consequent. To capture this idea of difference-making a ‘relevantized’ version of the Ramsey Test for conditionals is employed that takes the antecedent to be relevant to the consequent in the following sense: a conditional is true/accepted in a state \(\sigma \) just in (...) |
|
|
Motivated by supplying a new strategy for connexive logic and a better semantics for conditionals so that negating a conditional amounts to negating its consequent under the condition, we propose a new semantics for connexive conditional logic, by combining Kleene’s three-valued logic and a slight modification of Stalnaker’s semantics for conditionals. In the new semantics, selection functions for selecting closest worlds for evaluating conditionals can be undefined. Truth and falsity conditions for conditionals are then supplemented with a precondition that the (...) |
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6f97f49787-4dlf6 uwo