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Some questions about the justification of morality

Peter Railton

Philosophical Perspectives 6:27-53 (1992)

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(1 other version)An argument against motivational internalism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt2):135-156.details I argue that motivational internalism should not be driving metaethics. I first show that many arguments for motivational internalism beg the question by resting on an illicit appeal to internalist assumptions about the nature of reasons. Then I make a distinction between weak internalism and the weakest form of internalism. Weak internalism allows that agents fail to act according to their normative judgments when they are practically irrational. I show that when we clarify the notion of practical irrationality it does (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 8 citations
Reasons, rational requirements, and the putative pseudo-question “why be moral?”.John Tilley - 2008 - Synthese 161 (2):309 - 323.details In this paper, I challenge a familiar argument -- a composite of arguments in the literature -- for the view that “Why be moral?” is a pseudo-question. I do so by refuting a component of that argument, a component that is not only crucial to the argument but important in its own right. That component concerns the status of moral reasons in replies to “Why be moral?”; consequently, this paper concerns reasons and rationality no less than it concerns morality. The (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
The special status of instrumental reasons.Stephanie Beardman - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):255 - 287.details The rationality of means-end reasoning is the bedrock of the Humean account of practical reasons. But the normativity of such reasoning can not be taken for granted. I consider and reject the idea that the normativity of instrumental reasoning can be explained – either in terms of its being constitutive of the very notion of having an end, or solely in terms of instrumental considerations. I argue that the instrumental principle is itself a brute norm, and that this is consistent (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 9 citations
Moral motivation.Connie S. Rosati - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details In our everyday lives, we confront a host of moral issues. Once we have deliberated and formed judgments about what is right or wrong, good or bad, these judgments tend to have a marked hold on us. Although in the end, we do not always behave as we think we ought, our moral judgments typically motivate us, at least to some degree, to act in accordance with them. When philosophers talk about moral motivation, this is the basic phenomenon they seek (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 46 citations
Interpersonal comparisons with preferences and desires.Jacob Barrett - 2019 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (3):219-241.details Most moral and political theories require us to make interpersonal comparisons of welfare. This poses a challenge to the popular view that welfare consists in the satisfaction of preferences or des... Download Export citation Bookmark 10 citations
Reply to Justin D’Arms.Peter Railton - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):481-490.details Download Export citation Bookmark
(1 other version)VIII-An Argument Against Motivational Internalism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):135-156.details In this paper I argue that I argue that motivational internalism should not be driving metaethics. I first show that many arguments for motivational internalism beg the question by resting on an illicit appeal to internalist assumptions about the nature of reasons. Then I make a distinction between weak internalism and the weakest form of internalism. Weak internalism allows that agents fail to act according to their normative judgments when they are practically irrational. I show that when we clarify the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations

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