In “Two Cheers to Constitutionalism” Karl Klare and Dennis Davis take us through a longue durée analysis of South Africa’s constitutional democracy, its genesis, essence and implications for the future. Their reflections about the 25 years of South Africa’s constitution coincide with the 30-years milestone since the dawn of the so-called democratic breakthrough. In this article, I grapple with some of the epistemic and axiological specificities that define both the constitution of 1996 and the notion of a constitutional democracy in (...) the afterlife of apartheid and colonialism. More directly, I invite both Klare & Davis to attempt to contend with South Africa through a decolonial lens. I invoke my own positionality, not only as a locus of enunciation, but as a legitimate marker in discussions about the constitution, and constitutionalism; my contention is that frank conversations about our own positionalities will help us sieve through and decisively discern between the [p]olitics and [P]olitics of the constitution. In fleshing out the four dominant themes/positions in ongoing debates about the constitution, I lean towards the grammar of constitutional abolitionists, to conclude that the fundamental crisis about the South African constitution and present conceptions of constitutionalism is that they are a normal framework in an abnormal society. Given our history/present of anti-Black racism, the systemic dehumanization of indigenous people, colonial theft/dispossession, epistemicides, historicides, linguisticides, et cetera, I insist that ours is an abnormal society, consequently an abnormal constitution/constitutionalism would have been a more just outcome. (shrink)

This is a reply to Cees Maris. He wrote two articles in Dutch purporting to be a dialogue with Mogobe Ramose. The two articles have subsequently been compressed into one and published in the South African Journal of Philosophy. Mogobe’s reply is directed at all three articles, meaning the two published in Dutch together with the one published in English. The core of the argument is the meaning of ubu-ntu against ubuntu. The former is a philosophical concept and the latter (...) is the everyday language usage presupposing but not explicitly manifesting awareness of its reliance upon ubu-ntu. In elaborating upon his criticism of some of the writings of Mogobe on “ubuntu”, Maris appeals to other writers to support his position. Mogobe dismisses all this on the ground that neither Maris nor his supporters actually address and challenge the philosophical exposition of ubu-ntu in the various writings of Mogobe. Maris and his supporters have at best looked at Ramose but have not seen him. The result is that there never was “a dialogue” with Ramose, except the imaginary one by Maris. (shrink)

This article discusses two complementary themes that play an important role in contemporary South African political philosophy: (1) the racist tradition in Western philosophy; and (2) the role of ubuntu in regaining an authentic African identity, which was systematically suppressed during the colonial past and apartheid. These are also leading themes in Mogobe Ramose’s African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. The first part concentrates on John Locke. It discusses the thesis that the reprehensible racism of many founders of liberal political philosophy has (...) lethally infected liberal theory. This view neglects the distinction between genesis and justification. Political liberalism has since cleansed itself of the prejudices of its spiritual ancestors. Liberal human rights exclude racism as a matter of principle. The second part discusses the claim that the ubuntu philosophy provides a better basis for a constitution in a modern society than political liberalism. A major problem is that ubuntu is an essentially contested concept. Some philosophers consider ubuntu to be a moribund notion (Matolino); others see it as a vital concept par excellence. In the latter case, it is elaborated from sundry incompatible political views, ranging from African nationalism (Ramose) via humanist communitarianism (Metz) to liberalism (Mboti). Conclusion: as an essentially contested ideological concept, ubuntu should not be a decisive constitutional standard for the application of state force. In contrast, the constitutional model of political liberalism provides a reasonable alternative, as it is designed precisely to solve the problem of social plurality and ideological contest. (shrink)