The pressure on companies to practice corporate social responsibility (CSR) has gained momentum in recent times as a means of sustaining competitive advantage in business. The pharmaceutical industry has been acutely affected by this trend. While pharmaceutical product recalls have become rampant and increased dramatically in recent years, no comprehensive study has been conducted to study the effects of announcements of recalls on the shareholder returns of pharmaceutical companies. As product recalls could significantly damage a company's reputation, profitability and brand (...) integrity, this paper investigates the effect on shareholder wealth and the extent to which the adoption of CSR practices by pharmaceutical companies in the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the United States (U.S.), the two largest markets for pharmaceutical products in the world, affected market reactions surrounding product recall announcements. The analysis of product recall announcements from 1998 to 2004 compiled from The Pharmaceutical Journal and U.S. Food and Drug Administration enforcement reports revealed marked differences in the way market participants in the two countries responded to news of product recalls. U.S. investors penalised firms according to the severity of product defects while U.K. investors were indifferent. While U.K. investors rewarded product recalls by firms which were not usually CSR-active, U.S. investors punished non-CSR active firms that performed recalls. These observations could pose strategic challenges to pharmaceutical firms operating in both countries. (shrink)

Abstract:Shareholders’ relationship to the firm is a central theme in corporate governance, yet the investors’ perspective has been virtually ignored in governance research. This paper attempts to explain the previously unexplored role of trust in the investor decision-making process. The proposed model suggests that trust acts as the antecedent of the risk variable in existing investor decision-making models. Stock ownership involves both financial and ethical risk, which by definition requires some level of implicit trust in management and the market.

We analyze whether companies involved in a security class action suit (SCAS) exhibit differential capital structure decisions, and if the information revealed by a corporate scandal affects the security issuances and stock prices of industry peers. Our findings show that before a SCAS is filed, companies involved in a scandal show a greater amount of security offerings than their peers and, due to equity mispricing, are more likely to use equity as a financing mechanism. Following a SCAS filling, these companies (...) exhibit a decreasing amount of total external finance raised and lower levels of book and market leverage. Industry peers' issuance patterns exhibit significant contagion, with reduced debt and equity issuance following the SCAS filing. Corporate scandals also have meaningful negative effects on stock prices and bond ratings. Similar to capital structure, we document contagion at the industry level with peers' share prices yielding negative returns as well. (shrink)

This study investigates whether financial performance is affected by corporate violations of laws and regulations. In a sample of 128 publicly traded banks that were subject to enforcement actions by US regulatory authorities over a 20-year period, we observed a significant negative market reaction pursuant to the violations. However, the market reaction did not vary meaningfully in accordance with the severity or repetitiveness of the violation. The results of this study are in conformity with previous research on industries other than (...) banking, notably with regard to negative market reaction. This confirms that shareholders in the banking industry react in a manner considerably similar to their counterparts in other industries. (shrink)

Abstract:Shareholders’ relationship to the firm is a central theme in corporate governance, yet the investors’ perspective has been virtually ignored in governance research. This paper attempts to explain the previously unexplored role of trust in the investor decision-making process. The proposed model suggests that trust acts as the antecedent of the risk variable in existing investor decision-making models. Stock ownership involves both financial and ethical risk, which by definition requires some level of implicit trust in management and the market.

Rather than being inherently evil, business lobbying is a socially responsible activity which needs to be restrained by ethical standards. To be effective in a business environment, traditional ethical standards need to be translated into language which business persons can speak comfortably. Economical explanations must also be available to explain why ethical standards are appropriate in business. Eight such standards and their validating arguments are proposed with examples showing their use. Internal dialogues regarding the ethics of lobbying objectives and tactics (...) will plausibly occur only in businesses which recognize social responsibility mandates. Public interest stakeholders could hasten this recognition by making use of information made available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to institute external dialogues regarding lobbying by specific businesses and industry groups. Given practical ethical standards and the information on business lobbying provided by the law, the press, corporate activists, consumers, pension fund managers and the public can apply pressure for ethical lobbying practices. (shrink)

This article clarifies the relationship between profits and principles by distinguishing four alternative perspectives: the win-win perspective in which ethical behaviour generates the highest profits; a licence-to-operate perspective in which a minimum ethical performance is required to receive legitimation from the society; an acceptable profits perspective, in which an acceptable profitability is required to assure the financial continuity; and an integrated perspective. These four perspectives are illustrated by statements from Shell reports and from interviews with managers of a large European (...) retail company. (shrink)

The Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act was passed in 2002 in response to various instances of corporate malfeasance. The Act, designed to protect investors, led to wide-ranging regulation over various actions of managers, auditors and investment analysts. Part of SOX, and the focus of this study, targeted the disclosure by firms of “pro forma” earnings, an alternate (from GAAP earnings), flexible and unaudited measure of firm performance. Specifically, SOX directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to craft regulation which would reduce – (...) and preferably eliminate – any pro forma earnings disclosure which might be “misleading”. Examining earnings press releases over a 3-year period, this study addresses three questions. Were firms disclosing pro forma in a potentially misleading manner, what was the nature of this potentially misleading disclosure, and did SOX affect the disclosure practices? We find the following. In 2001 (prior to SOX), 53 firms – over 10% of all U.S. S&P 500 firms – were disclosing pro forma earnings in a potentially misleading manner. This was being done most commonly by using traditional GAAP terminology (e.g., “net income”) in the press release headline to describe what was later in the press release revealed to be a pro forma amount (i.e., “net income excluding special items”). By 2003 (subsequent to the SEC regulation), potentially misleading disclosure practices were seen in less than 1% of the earnings press releases of S&P 500 firms. This significant reduction suggests that managers, prior to the regulation, were either careless in their pro forma reporting practice, or were intentionally – and unethically – attempting to mislead investors. Either way, we conclude that the SEC regulation was both necessary and effective. (shrink)