While different worries about population size are present in public debates, political philosophers often take population size as given. This paper is an attempt to formulate a Rawlsian liberal egalitarian approach to population size: does it make sense to speak of ‘too few’ or ‘too many’ people from the point of view of justice? It argues that, drawing on key features of liberal egalitarian theory, several clear constraints on demographic developments – to the extent that they are under our control (...) – can be formulated. Based on these claims, we can clarify both the grounds and content of our obligations to future generations. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to consider the prospects of a liberal conception of religious freedom in some Muslim-majority states. Part I offers a brief sketch of three approaches to religious freedom that inform my view. Part II then presents a liberal framework for religious toleration that draws ideas from Rainer Forst’s Toleration in Conflict, as well as some perennial themes in classical liberal thought. I briefly examine three case studies in Part III: the Turkish Republic; the Arab Spring (...) states; and the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia. This is followed by a short conclusion. (shrink)

This paper presents a rival proposal to that presented by Dietsch and Rixen to ensure international background justice. It explains the notion of background justice and how this is challenged by the lack of international co-operation on taxation policy. It then presents the principles which Dietsch and Rixen propose in order to respond to this concern: the principle of membership and the principle of constraint. The paper proposes alternative principles of relationship and counter-incentive, which are argued to be superior means (...) to achieve the aim of global background justice. This is because the alternative principles do not interfere with the right of states to set the tax-rates that they desire. The counter-incentive approach instead rewards the states who set higher taxes and provides them with revenues from taxpayers who have left either to seek lower taxes elsewhere or for any of a number of other reasons. (shrink)

The meaning of privacy has been frequently disputed in the philosophical and -/- legal literature since Warren and Brandeis first argued for it as a distinct and -/- important personal and social value. Nevertheless, while the meaning of privacy -/- is held to be vague, there is general agreement that Warren and Brandeis were -/- correct in their assessment of its value. Theorists of democracy, on the other hand, -/- have been ambivalent towards the realm of the private. This paper (...) interrogates the -/- intersection between privacy and democracy, questioning the place of privacy as a -/- distinctly democratic value. (shrink)

It is hard to disagree with the idea of responsible innovation (henceforth, RI), as it enables policy-makers, scientists, technology developers, and the public to better understand and respond to the social, ethical, and policy challenges raised by new and emerging technologies. RI has gained prominence in policy agenda in Europe and the United States over the last few years. And, along with its rising importance in policy-making, there is also a burgeoning research literature on the topic. Given the historical context (...) of which RI emerges, it should not be surprising that the current discourse on RI is predominantly based on liberal democratic values. Yet, the bias towards liberal democratic values will inevitably limit the discussion of RI, especially in the cases where liberal democratic values are not taken for granted. As such, there is an urgent need to return to the normative foundation of RI, and to explore the notion of ‘responsible innovation’ from nonliberal democratic perspectives. Against this background, this paper seeks to demonstrate the problematic consequences of RI solely grounded on or justified by liberal democratic values. This paper will cast the argument in the form of a dilemma to be labelled as The Decent Nonliberal Peoples’ Dilemma and use it to illustrate the problems of the Western bias. (shrink)

This article argues that, despite its reputation as a homogenising and authoritarian system, the political thought of Bernard Bosanquet contains resources with which to develop a robust and culturally sensitive model of liberal multiculturalism. Throughout the discussion, Bosanquet's thought is located within contemporary theoretical debates. The first section rehearses the critique of Millian liberalism developed by Bhikhu Parekh and others, which alleges that the considerations of individuality and autonomy underlying such a political order preclude it from showing adequate respect for (...) cultures which do not conceive of personal identity in essentially individualistic terms. The next section sketches Bosanquet's social theory, as a preclude to the rebuttal of allegedly insurmountable barriers to the theory's accommodation of cultural diversity. Specifically, section three counters the objection that Bosanquet sanctions the imposition of internal restrictions on personal dissent. The final section rebuts the claim that a General Will cannot exist within a culturally diverse society, showing that in reality Bosanquet's theory leads us to endorse the ‘fundamental beliefs’ of a multi-ethnic society outlined recently in the Parekh Report. It is concluded that, when drawing on Bosanquet's thought, a liberal multicultural society can take different forms and yet still show proper respect for cultural diversity. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article addresses what we owe to the civilians of a state with which we are militarily engaged. The old notion of noncombatant immunity needs to be rethought within the context of both human rights and into the postwar phase. No doubt, civilians will be killed in war. However, much more can be done during and after the fighting to protect civilians’ basic human rights from the ills of war. I argue for making belligerents accountable ex post by requiring them (...) to repair destroyed dual-purpose facilities that are essential for securing basic human rights of the civilian populace. I argue also that a belligerent’s targeting decisions should be reviewed ex post by an impartial commission. (shrink)

Some theorists hold that there is no serious, significant issue concerning cosmopolitanism. They hold that cosmopolitanism is either the anodyne doctrine that we have some duties to distant strangers merely on the ground of shared humanity or the absurd doctrine that we have no special moral duties based on special-ties such as those of friendship, family, and national community. This essay argues against this deflationary position by defending (1) a very extreme cosmopolitan doctrine that denies special-tie moral duties altogether and (...) (2) a slightly milder but still extreme form of cosmopolitanism that allows that there might be special-tie moral duties to intimate associates such as friends and family members but denies that broader social group associations such as those of subjection to a national state or national or ethnic community memberships ever constitute special ties that ground special moral duties. The defense proceeds by rebutting bad arguments leveled against extreme cosmopolitanisms. (shrink)

What is the relationship between human rights and the rights of states? Roughly, while cosmopolitans insist that international morality must regard as basic the interests of individuals, statists maintain that the state is of fundamental moral significance. This article defends a relational version of statism. Human rights are ultimately grounded in a relational norm of reciprocal independence and set limits to the exercise of public authority, but, contra the cosmopolitan, the state is of fundamental moral significance. A relational account promises (...) to justify a limited conception of state sovereignty while avoiding the familiar cosmopolitan criticisms of statist accounts. (shrink)

The following paper investigates the possibility of an account of cosmopolitan thought inspired by Hegel's treatment of Kant's ethical theory and his associated social concept of recognition. Cosmopolitanism requires the agent to recognize themself as a global agent participating in a shared community, but conventional political strategies do not possess the resources to satisfy this demand for self-understanding. Such a self-understanding is enabled by the objective freedom of a common shared humanity grounded in rational self-determination. The paper shows that it (...) is possible to extrapolate Hegel's outline of the state in the Philosophy of Right to describe a global community coherent with such a subject. (shrink)

This paper treats the political and ethical issues associated with the new caretaking technologies. Given the number of feminists who have raised serious concerns about the future of care work in the United States, and who have been critical of the degree to which society “free rides” on women's caretaking labor, I consider whether technology may provide a solution to this problem. Certainly, if we can create machines and robots to take on particular tasks, we may lighten the care burden (...) that women currently face, much of which is heavy and repetitious, and which results in injury and care “burnout” for many female caretakers. Yet, in some contexts, I argue that high-tech robotic care may undermine social relationships, cutting individuals off from the possibility of social connectedness with others. (shrink)

In this essay, Ben-Porath begins from the assumption that just war theory should be extended to include a jus post bellum component. Postwar conduct should be significantly informed by a care ethics perspective, particularly its political aspects as developed by Joan Tronto and others. Care ethics should be extended to the international postwar arena with one significant amendment, namely, weakening the aim of ending dependence.

At stake for this essay is the distinction between politics and war and the extent to which politics can survive war. Gender analysis reveals how high these stakes are by revealing the complexity of militarism. It also reveals the impossibility of gender identity as foundation for a more robust politics with respect to war. Instead, a non-ideal normative differentiation among kinds of violence is affirmed as that which politically cannot not be wanted.

In this essay, Ben-Porath begins from the assumption that just war theory should be extended to include a jus post bellum component. Postwar conduct should be significantly informed by a care ethics perspective, particularly its political aspects as developed by Joan Tronto and others. Care ethics should be extended to the international postwar arena with one significant amendment, namely, weakening the aim of ending dependence.

We argue for the existence of a state constitutional legal right to language. Our purpose here is to develop a legal framework for protecting the civil rights of the deaf child, with the ultimate goal of calling for legislation that requires all levels of government to fund programs for deaf children and their families to learn a fully accessible language: a sign language. While our discussion regards the United States, the argument we make is based on human rights and the (...) nature of law itself, and can likely be adapted to any country.We begin with an introduction to the biological facts surrounding language acquisition and how these facts impact the deaf child, where lack of language has devastating effects on individuals and negative effects on society in general. (shrink)

Associative duties—duties inherent to some of our relationships—are most commonly discussed in terms of intimate associations such as of families, friends, or lovers. In this essay I ask whether impersonal associations such as state or nation can also give rise to genuinely associative duties, i.e., duties of patriotism or nationalism. I distinguish between the two in terms of their objects: the object of patriotism is an institutionalized political community, whereas the object of nationalism is a group of people who share (...) a common identity, often grounded in a belief in shared history, and an aspiration for collective self-government together. I explore three arguments for the thesis that a special concern for one’s polity and fellow-citizens, or one’s nation and co-nationals, is an associative duty: from reciprocity, from collective self-determination, and from the well-being of compatriots or co-nationals. I argue that the relationship among compatriots is a more plausible contender for generating associative duties than the relationship among co-nationals, although even in this case there are questions whether these are genuinely associative duties, or simply special duties. Although the relationship among co-nationals is a less plausible contender for associative duties, the well-being argument does apply to the relationship among both co-nationals and compatriots. I also suggest that there is a certain privileging of the status quo in the way that associative duties arguments work, because they tend to operate from existing relations and associations. (shrink)

The principle of absolute sovereignty may have been consigned to history, but a strong presumption against foreign intervention seems to have been left in its stead. On the dominant view, only massacre and ethnic cleansing justify armed intervention, these harms must be already occurring or imminent, and the prudential constraints on war must be satisfied. Each of these conditions has recently come under pressure. Those looking to defend the dominant view have typically done so by invoking international peace and stability, (...) or the value of communal self-determination. But the internal aspect of legitimacy has been overlooked in all of this. If a government insists on defending the human rights of foreigners, it must also be sure not to violate the rights of its own citizens in the process. I argue that the current presumption against humanitarian intervention cannot be substantially relaxed for internal reasons, or given the obligations that states owe to their own constituents. (shrink)

Food trade is of economic importance for both developed and developing countries. Food, however, is a special commodity. Firstly, the lack of food -- hunger, under-nourishment, and starvation -- is one of the world's pressing moral problems. But food is not only special because it is necessary for our survival; food is also special because it is strongly related to our social and cultural identity. Two recent transatlantic trade conflicts over food -- over the use of artificial growth hormones in (...) beef production and over the use of biotechnology in food production -- show that food is a specific commodity. In these trade-conflicts, the obligations flowing from free-trade treaties collide with the cultural and social meanings of food. Current international trade agreements neglect this point and force countries to fight their case in the field of food safety science. This causes a bias in the discussion. Europe's resistance towards artificial growth hormones and GM-food is not strictly science based; it is also culture based. For a fair resolution of trade-conflicts, this needs to be accommodated in international trade legislation. With the help of the notion of public reason I defend that precaution with regard to scientific uncertainty, and the possibility for compulsory labelling with regard to sensitive non-nutritional properties of foodstuffs, need to be incorporated in international food trade regulations. (shrink)

In "Evangelium Vitae" Pope John Paul II calls for a renewal of culture to combat the culture of death. He criticizes various aspects of a pluralistic, liberal society--a type of society that he claims is based on moral relativism and a view of democracy that becomes a substitute for moral law. He maintains that such a view trivializes moral choice. In this essay I argue that John Rawls's notion of a liberal society as an overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines can (...) avoid relativism while allowing for reasonable debate among opposed positions. While Rawls maintains that comprehensive doctrines, including religions, should employ a form of public reason that is not a unique feature of any one comprehensive doctrine, I argue that this requirement is too strong. One is often justified in appealing to features of comprehensive doctrines other than one's own, features that are unique to the doctrines themselves. Such an appeal does not pretend to be neutral as public reason would seem to be. In the final section of the paper I discuss some suggestions made by the Pope regarding actions in civil society that are independent of debates about legal change and suggest some ways in which they might contribute to desired cultural transformation. (shrink)

In this paper, we critique the emergent international normative framework of growth – the knowledge economy. We point out that the standardized character of knowledge economy's flagship – intellectual property rights (IPRs) – has an adverse impact on women in emerging economies, such as India. Conversely, this impact on women, a significant consumer segment, has a feedback effect in terms of market growth. Conceptually, we analyze the consequences of knowledge economy and standardized IPR through a feminist lens. We extend the (...) analyses by pointing to various contradictions surrounding growth norms; for example, there are inherent contradictions between established "formal" legalistic interpretation ofIPR, "soft law" norms of corporate social responsibility, a fluid situation of moral claims of human rights, and different institutional capabilities at the international and domestic level. Consequently, we are able to demonstrate how standard IPR laws fail to deliver equity for all. We argue our case through exploring the growth aspects of the agricultural sector in India and the adverse impact of standard biopatenting on women farmers' rights (as producers and consumers) and preservation of environment. We suggest that desired gendered equity is better achieved when there is a constellation of actors – private–sector business, the state, and civil-society leaders – working together to ensure a balanced development through tailoring of IPR to local needs. (shrink)

Climate change represents a significant challenge to the entire planet and its inhabitants. While few, if any, will be able to escape totally the effects of climate change, it will fall most heavily, at least initially, on the poor, regardless of where they reside. We may observe already possible scenarios. The tragic situation in Darfur may be less an ethnic conflict and more a clash between marginal farmers and herdsmen in an increasingly more arid local climate. More powerful storms on (...) the scale of hurricane Katrina, which affected the poor more than other economic groups, may become commonplace. The alteration of the maple sugar cycle may be a harbinger of stress on the world's flora and fauna that humanity depends upon. Mainstream climatologists have concluded that human behavior, primarily the effects of industrialization, causes human-induced climate change. Left unchecked climate change will have serious consequences for humanity, especially the poor. Business, the primary agent of industrialization, is both the problem and the solution. This paper will apply the ethics of philosophers John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Aristotle, along with the work of strategist Michael Porter. Understanding how climate change management fits into a firm's strategic opportunity will contribute to the ability of business to develop the technologies and business processes necessary to cope with climate change. The paper will conclude with a brief discussion of GE's Ecomagination program as an example of a promising moral response to climate change. (shrink)

In this paper I compare the roles that the explicit and implicit educational theories of John Dewey and John Rawls play in their political works to show that Rawls’s approach is skeletal and inappropriate for defenders of democracy. I also uphold Dewey’s belief that education is valuable in itself, not only derivatively, contra Rawls. Next, I address worries for any educational theory concerning problems of distributive justice. Finally, I defend Dewey’s commitment to democracy as a consequence of the demands of (...) productive public inquiry and education. (shrink)

In this essay, I first outline the contexts in which the idea of cosmopolitanism appears in Kant's moral and political philosophy. I then survey the three main debates regarding his political cosmopolitanism, namely, on the nature of the international federation he advocated, his theory of cosmopolitan right, and his views on colonialism and ‘race’, and I consider the relation between patriotism and cosmopolitanism in Kant's work. I subsequently discuss Kant's moral cosmopolitanism. Kant is widely held to be a defender of (...) moral cosmopolitanism, but the terminology of world citizenship is in fact strikingly rare in Kant's writings on moral theory. I offer a two-part explanation for why this is the case. (shrink)

When we make public policy choices, is it helpful to know how utopia would look? Amartya Sen argues that it is neither necessary, nor sufficient, nor even contributory. He claims that before making a policy choice one should compare several feasible institutional designs to see which promotes justice most, and that it is misleading to use the perfect design as a standard in those comparisons. Principles of justice are the proper standard. The present article contends that the perfect design has (...) nevertheless an important role to play in the prior task of identifying and refining our principles of justice. It also shows that the perfect design—in at least one sense of this term—may be a legitimate long-term goal for present policy choices. (shrink)

Is territorial jurisdiction over natural resources justified? This paper argues that a freedom-based account of self-determination coupled with ‘functionalist’ justifications of territorial right support territorial jurisdiction over natural resources. This justification simultaneously gives rise to limits on the permissible exercise of the right: the principles of reciprocity and generality, and of equal freedom. This ‘reciprocal’ view on territorial jurisdiction over natural resources, defended here, differs from two alternatives: the traditional sovereignty view on the one hand and the transnational jurisdiction view—which (...) favours the transfer of sovereignty over natural resources from states to transnational institutions—on the other hand. (shrink)

This article begins with an examination of Peter Singer's ‘solution’ to global poverty as a way to develop a theory of ‘justice in assistance.’ It argues that Singer's work, while compelling, does not seriously engage with the institutions necessary to relieve global poverty. In order to realise our obligations it is necessary to employ secondary agents, such as non-governmental organisations, that produce complex social relationships with the global poor. We should be concerned that the affluent and their secondary agents are (...) complicit with unjust institutions or can be the source of injustice. What is needed is a theory of justice in assistance. This is a distinct area of justice theory because these agents are not primary agents, like states, but they often provide the basic social goods that we associate with primary agents. The article ends by putting forward a provisional conception of justice in assistance based on the republican idea of non-domination. (shrink)

This paper focuses on examining the right to development. More specifically, the paper examines two questions relating to the right to development. The first focuses on the issue of justification: can the right to development that appears in the UN Declaration on the Right to Development be provided an adequate philosophical justification? The second question focuses on the function of the right to development: If the right to development simply ‘repackages’ duties correlative to other existing human rights – as it (...) may be argued to be the case with the right enshrined in the Declaration on the Right to Development – does it serve any meaningful function? In answering the first question, the paper argues that the right to development enshrined in the Declaration on the Right to Development is essentially a derivative right, and ultimately its philosophical justification is dependent on whether or not the legal human rights the realisation of which it seeks to enable can be provided an adequate philosophica.. (shrink)

Según cuentan algunos de sus colegas y discípulos, al momento de su temprana muerte, en 1993, Carlos Nino estaba comenzando a estudiar la posibilidad de trasladar sus teorías al plano internacional. En este trabajo pretendo retomar al menos un aspecto de aquel proyecto, preguntándome cómo hubiera trasladado Nino su teoría de la democracia al plano global. En otras palabras, intentaré especular respecto de cómo podrían insertarse las ideas nineanas en la discusión actual en materia de democracia global. Mi hipótesis es (...) que, por un lado, Nino habría reclamado la creación de nuevas instancias de participación popular en los procesos de creación e implementación del derecho internacional; pero a la vez, por otro lado, habría defendido el núcleo duro de la “constitución histórica” del derecho internacional, basada en un sistema interestatal y descentralizado. According to some of his colleagues and disciples, when Carlos Nino died, in 1993, he was beginning to work on a project trying to extrapolate his theories to the international realm. In this paper, I pick up at least an aspect of that project, and I analyze how Nino would have extrapolated his theory of democracy to the global arena. In other words, I speculate regarding how could Nino’s ideas be inserted into the current debates on global democracy. My hypothesis is that, on the one hand, Nino would have demanded new instances of popular participation in the processes of creation and implementation of international law, and on the other hand, that he would have somehow defended the “historical constitution” of the international community, based on an decentralized, inter-state system. (shrink)

This article responds to an article by Francis J. Beckwith that argued that the consistent application of generic liberal principles requires that same-sex marriage not be recognised in civil law. This response demonstrates that Beckwith's article contains a series of interpretative and substantive flaws that render his argument unsuccessful. These relate to a misinterpretation of core liberal principles and a sidestepping of the matter of undue bias against same-sex partners. In correcting these flaws I tentatively propose a Voltairean argument in (...) favour of same-sex civil marriage for those citizens with moral qualms about same-sex relationships derived from their reasonable comprehensive doctrine. (shrink)

Peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) are universally binding prohibitions that override any consideration for non-compliance (e.g., genocide and slavery). The question is how nonconsensual norms emerge from a consensual international legal order. It appears that either the peremptoriness of jus cogens renders consent superfluous to the norm’s binding force or consent divests jus cogens of its peremptory status. The goal of this paper is to resolve the dilemma by explaining why jus cogens is exempt from the general (...) requirement of consent that binds states to the rules of international law. The paper provides an impartiality-based account of enforcement that explains why a state’s refusal to give consent to jus cogens may be overridden in a consensual legal order. (shrink)

John Rawls claims that “benevolent absolutisms” honor human rights without honoring political participation rights. Critics argue that he is mistaken. One objection appeals to the instrumental value of political participation rights. This objection holds that without political participation rights, individuals cannot secure the content of their rights against encroachment. Given this, individuals without political participation rights cannot be said to have rights at all. Here, I evaluate this instrumental objection. I identify three ways of relating political participation rights to human (...) rights and show that one makes sense of Rawls’s claim. I then defend this view from instrumental objections. This has implications beyond the realm of Rawls scholarship. Many societies are not democratic and are not democratizing. We must determine whether any of these societies can secure at least the content of human rights and, if so, what shape their social and political institutions must take to do so. (shrink)

Proponents of practice-dependent egalitarianism argue that egalitarian duties and entitlements only apply among participants in morally relevant practices. In this paper, I argue that these views are implausible because they allow for objectionable treatment of non-participants. I show that it is impossible, on the basis of practice-internal considerations alone, to determine the extent to which the pursuit of practices can permissibly limit the opportunities of non-participants. There are opportunities beyond the current holdings of practices to which no one has a (...) privileged claim (such as unowned natural resources), and the distribution of which is a matter of justice. A just distribution of such unowned distributive goods, though, requires a practice-independent distributive baseline. I further show that such a baseline can only be egalitarian because all alternative baselines face serious objections. From this I conclude that any plausible theory of distributive justice must accept some form of equal practice-independent distributive entitlements. (shrink)