Although most people still behave like happy meat eaters, there are good reasons to think that many are in fact ambivalent about meat. Following up on earlier findings, in this paper we describe how, in focus groups, cultured meat triggered much discussion about meat, especially among older people. While young people wondered whether they would eat cultured meat products, older people thought about diet changes in a historical perspective and wondered if and how cultured meat might become a societal success. (...) Beneath the surface of everyday behavior, in which they followed mainstream norms, many of our research participants harbored moral concerns and in various ways expressed an interest in collective change. Reflecting on the focus group discussions, we suggest, first, that appreciating the important role of ambivalence in processes of moral change requires rethinking relations between ambivalence and morality. Second, the entanglement of ambivalence with ambiguity increases the “fluidity” of such processes of change: when it is no longer clear what exactly meat is, the meanings and experiences of eating it also become unsettled. This has implications for thinking about morality in times of change. Studying consumer choices cannot do justice to processes of ambivalence and ambiguity below the surface of behavior. More generally, the idea that morality resides in making up our minds about clear moral choices gives way to the need to become skilled, collectively as well as individually, in dealing imaginatively with ambivalence and ambiguity. (shrink)

Hili Razinsky, free downlad at link. ABSTRACT: Emotional perceptions are objectivist (objectivity-directed or cognitive) and conscious, both attributes suggesting they cannot be ambivalent. Yet perceptions, including emotional perceptions of value, allow for strictly objectivist ambivalence in which a person unitarily perceives the object in mutually undermining ways. Emotional perceptions became an explicandum of emotion for philosophers who are sensitive to the unique conscious character of emotion, impressed by the objectivist character of perceptions, and believe that the perceptual account solves a (...) worry about the possibility of a conflict between an emotion and a judgement. Back into the 1980s Greenspan has argued that emotional ambivalence is possible, her reasons implying that objectivist accounts of emotion are inconsistent with ambivalence. Tappolet has more recently replied that perceptual accounts allow for emotional ambivalence since the opposed values seen in ambivalence are good or bad in different senses. The present paper identifies strict objectivist ambivalence between judgements and between emotional perceptions by contrasting them with such ambivalence of separate values such as evoked by Tappolet. (shrink)

Patients who experience difficulty making medical decisions are often referred to as “ambivalent.” However, the current lack of attention to the nuances between a cluster of phenomena that resemble...

In this study, I juxtapose the views of Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Menachem Fisch on radical changes of mind. I note in particular the common aspects of their proposal that typically, radical change is not, indeed, cannot be justified by reasons. Their responses to and arguments for this threat to rationality are critically examined. Hili Razinsky’s analysis of ambivalence is shown to contribute to the understanding of change by providing a broader perspective on the rationality of belief. Her work thus provides (...) a promising alternative to the above positions and the impasse they confront. (shrink)

Is personal moral inconsistency a challenge to overcome or embrace? This paper opts for the latter and argues for the Virtue of Encompassing the Contrary (VEC). According to VEC, an individual can balance and realize opposite values or virtues through time virtuously. This paper discusses critically various explanations given for moral inconsistency: Circumstantial Relativism, Moral Opportunism, the Consequentialist Solution, Moral Ambivalence, Kant’s Imperfect Duty and Dancy’s Moral Particularism. The paper argues that VEC fares better in answering the moral challenge of (...) inconsistent behavior. (shrink)