The informal logic movement began as an attempt to develop – and teach – an alternative logic which can account for the real life arguing that surrounds us in our daily lives – in newspapers and the popular media, political and social commentary, advertising, and interpersonal exchange. The movement was rooted in research and discussion in Canada and especially at the University of Windsor, and has become a branch of argumentation theory which intersects with related traditions and approaches (notably formal (...) logic, rhetoric and dialectics in the form of pragma-dialectics). In this volume, some of the best known contributors to the movement discuss their views and the reasoning and argument which is informal logic’s subject matter. Many themes and issues are explored in a way that will fuel the continued evolution of the field. Federico Puppo adds an insightful essay which considers the origins and development of informal logic and whether informal logicians are properly described as a “school” of thought. In considering that proposition, Puppo introduces readers to a diverse range of essays, some of them previously published, others written specifically for this volume. (shrink)

This paper compares current ways of modeling the inferential structure of practical reasoning arguments, and proposes a new approach in which it is regarded in a modular way. Practical reasoning is not simply seen as reasoning from a goal and a means to an action using the basic argumentation scheme. Instead, it is conceived as a complex structure of classificatory, evaluative, and practical inferences, which is formalized as a cluster of three types of distinct and interlocked argumentation schemes. Using two (...) real examples, we show how applying the three types of schemes to a cluster of practical argumentation allows an argument analyst to reconstruct the tacit premises presupposed and evaluate the argumentative reasoning steps involved. This approach will be shown to overcome the limitations of the existing models of practical reasoning arguments within the BDI and commitment theoretical frameworks, providing a useful tool for discourse analysis and other disciplines. In particular, applying this method brings to light the crucial role of classification in practical argumentation, showing how the ordering of values and preferences is only one of the possible areas of deep disagreement. (shrink)

In this chapter, we begin by sketching in the broadest possible strokes the ideas behind two formal systems that have been introduced with to goal of explicating the ways in which reasons interact to support the actions and conclusions they do. The first of these is the theory of defeasible reasoning developed in the seminal work of Pollock; the second is a more recent theory due to Horty, which adapts and develops the default logic introduced by Reiter to provide an (...) account of reasons. However, the implementations are complex enough, in both cases, to prevent anything more than this sketch. And we would not want to give the impression that we think that work on the logic of reasons must follow the path mapped out in either of these theories—indeed, we feel that the field is wide open. In the remainder of the chapter, therefore, will concentrate on a number of issues bearing on the logic of reasons that are either not treated in the work of Pollock and Horty, or whose treatment there is, we feel, either inadequate or incomplete. These are: first, the question of whether it is necessary to understand logical interactions among reasons themselves, rather than simply between reasons and the actions or conclusions they support, and if so, what principles might govern these interactions; second, priority relations among reasons and the notion of reason accrual; and third, some problems posed by undercutting defeat. (shrink)

The doctrine of precedent, as it has evolved within the common law, has at its heart a form of reasoning—broadly speaking, alogic—according to which the decisions of earlier courts in particular cases somehow generalize to constrain the decisions of later courts facing different cases, while still allowing these later courts a degree of freedom in responding to fresh circumstances. Although the techniques for arguing on the basis of precedent are taught early on in law schools, mastered with relative ease, and (...) applied on a daily basis by legal practitioners, it has proved to be considerably more difficult to arrive at a theoretical understanding of the doctrine itself—a clear articulation of the underlying logic. (shrink)

Many philosophers have been attracted to the view that reasons are premises of good reasoning – that reasons to φ are premises of good reasoning towards φ-ing. However, while this reasoning view is indeed attractive, it faces a problem accommodating outweighed reasons. In this article, I argue that the standard solution to this problem is unsuccessful and propose an alternative, which draws on the idea that good patterns of reasoning can be defeasible. I conclude by drawing out implications for the (...) debate over pragmatic reasons for belief and other attitudes and for one influential form of reductionism about the normative. (shrink)

Argumentation involves offering and/or exchanging reasons – either reasons for adopting various attitudes towards specific propositional contents or else reasons for acting in various ways. This paper develops the idea that the force of reasons is through and through a normative force because what good reasons accomplish is precisely to give one a certain sort of entitlement to do what they are reasons for. The paper attempts to shed light on what it is to have a reason, how the sort (...) of entitlement arising from reasons differs from other species of entitlement and how the norms by which such entitlement is assessed obtain their status as norms. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of "action" standardly take an action to be a doing which _satisfies some description that is semantically related to the content of a propositional attitude of the subject's which _explains why that doing occurred. Causal theories of action require that the explanation in question must involve the causation of action-doings by propositional attitudes (typically intentions, volitions, or combinations of belief and desire). I argue that there are actions whose status, as such, cannot be acknowledged by any causal theory, (...) since no such theory can allow that they fulfill the satisfaction condition. (shrink)

Suppose an agent has made a judgement of the form, 'all things considered, it would be better for me to do a rather than b (or any range of alternatives to doing a)' where a and b stand for particular actions. If she does not act upon her judgement in these circumstances would that be a failure of rationality on her part? In this paper I consider two different interpretations of all things considered judgements which give different answers to this (...) question, one suggested by Donald Davidson, the other by Paul Grice and Judith Baker. I argue that neither interpretation is adequate. However, a third interpretation that combines features of the Grice/Baker view with the Davidsonian view is possible. In the final section of the paper I defend this interpretation against two objections. (shrink)

In this review article I refer to some of the most relevant recent publications in the field of practical rationality, mainly drawing on two new anthologies by Wallace and Millgram that contain the principal arguments in the current debate, and on new books and articles by Bittner, Dancy, Nida-Rümelin and Raz. The purpose of the article is to offer an overview of the relevant positions in the current debate, to clarify the main arguments against the belief-desire model, and to situate (...) some of the problems - e.g. what counts as a reason - within the wider field of practical rationality as a whole - e.g. how to argue about practical reasoning from the point of view of our self-understanding as autonomous agents. (shrink)

I argue against Reasons Internalism, the view that possession of a normative reason for the performance of an action entails that one can be motivated to perform that action, and Motivational Existence Internalism, the view that if one is obligated to perform an action, then one can be motivated to perform that action. My thesis is that these positions cannot accommodate the fact that reasonable moral agents are frequently motivated to act only because they believe theircontemplated actions to be morally (...) obligatory. The failure to accommodate this fact is reason to reject these two types of internalism about reasons. (shrink)

Argumentation schemes are forms of reasoning that are fallible but correctable within a self-correcting framework. Their use provides a basis for taking rational action or for reasonably accepting a conclusion as a tentative hypothesis, but they are not deductively valid. We argue that teleological reasoning can provide the basis for justifying the use of argument schemes both in monological and dialogical reasoning. We consider how such a teleological justification, besides being inspired by the aim of directing a bounded cognizer to (...) true belief and correct choices, needs to take into account the attitudes of dialogue partners as well as normative models of dialogue and communicative activity types, in particular social and cultural settings. (shrink)

Abstract.Legal philosophy must consider the way in which laws function as reasons for action. “Simple positivism” considers laws as merely reasons in the balance of reasons. Joseph Raz, as a representative of “sophisticated positivism,” argues that laws are exclusionary reasons for action, not merely reasons in the balance of reasons. This paper discusses Raz's arguments for his view. The Functional Argument provides no more reason for positivism than against it. The Phenomenological Argument is best supported by an account of how (...) character traits function in explaining behaviour. But then the distinction between exclusionary reasons and expressive reasons is obliterated. Legal positivism cannot absorb laws as expressive reasons for action. Raz's positivism implies the correctness of an anti‐positivistic legal theory. (shrink)

Argues for a conception of reasons as premises of practical reasoning. This conception is applied to questions about ignorance, advice, enabling conditions, "ought," and evidence.

There is a puzzle about how to understand the conclusion of a successful instance of practical reasoning. Do the considerations adduced in reasoning rationalize the particular doing of an action, as Aristotle is sometimes interpreted as claiming? Or does reasoning conclude in the formation of an attitude – an intention, say – that has an action-type as its content? This paper attempts to clarify what is at stake in that debate and defends the latter view against some of its critics.

Applied sociology will be understood in the following discussion as a unique and original form of sociology; i.e., in its logic and practice distinguished from traditional sociology it is understood as an explanatory body of knowledge and an intellectual discourse about intentional/purposeful social action and behavior. The application of sociology proper to such substantive fields as family, art, law and sport, commonly called applied sociology, which reproduce the body of sociological knowledge just a second time, is not part of such (...) understanding. Applied sociology in its original sense has its own logic in which purpose, implementation and the process of social-problem solution are crucial. It will in the end lead to an applied action or implementation theory. It is, to paraphrase Lazarsfeld, the methodology of “sociology in action” (1960). (shrink)

Essential to Peirce's distinction among three kinds of reasoning, deduction, induction and abduction, is the claim that each is correlated to a unique species of validity irreducible to that of the others. In particular, abductive validity cannot be analyzed in either deductive or inductive terms, a consequence of considerable importance for the logical and epistemological scrutiny of scientific methods. But when the full structure of abductive argumentation — as viewed by the mature Peirce — is clarified, every inferential step in (...) the process can be seen to dissolve into familiar forms of deductive and inductive reasoning. Specifically, the final stage is a special type of practical inference which, if correct, is deductively valid, while the creative phase, surprisingly, is not inferential at all. In neither is abduction a type of inference to the best explanation. The result is a major reassessment of the relevance of Peirce's views to contemporary methodological studies. (shrink)

According to the view we may term “strong cognitivism”, all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject takes objects to have independently of her attitudes towards these objects. The main concern of this paper is to argue against strong cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. The central argument to this effect is a top-down argument: it proceeds by an analysis of the complex phenomenon of (...) love and derives a conclusion regarding the nature of more basic mental phenomena—particular desires. More specifically, its starting point is the crude intuition that the significance conferred by love upon its objects is of a distinctively personal kind—an intuition that is expressed by the apparent non-substitutability of two similar subjects only one of whom is loved with respect to their importance for the lover. I argue that the initial notion of non-substitutability can be refined and modified so as to form a real challenge to all versions of strong cognitivism and to establish the existence of attitude-dependent reasons. (shrink)

Qualities of personal character would appear to play a significant role in the professional conduct of teachers. It is often said that we remember teachers as much for the kinds of people they were than for anything they may have taught us, and some kinds of professional expertise may best be understood as qualities of character After (roughly) distinguishing qualities of character from those of personality, the present paper draws on the resources of virtue ethics to try to make sense (...) of the former. In the course of this, it is argued that while the key virtue ethical concept of phronesis orpractical wisdom has been widely deployed to account for aspects of professional teacher expertise, it has also been subject to rather un-Aristotelian interpretation as a kind of situation specific productive reasoning. The present paper seeks to show that it is better employed for understanding character in general and character in teaching in particular. The paper concludes with some observations about the professional education or cultivation of character. (shrink)

This volume contains 12 papers addressed to researchers and advanced students in informal logic and related fields, such as argumentation, formal logic, and communications. Among the issues discussed are attempts to rethink the nature of argument and of inference, the role of dialectical context, and the standards for evaluating inferences, and to shed light on the interfaces between informal logic and argumentation theory, rhetoric, formal logic and cognitive psychology.

This chapter as the whole book are a result of a Globethics conference in March 2018 at the Catholic University of East Africa (CUEA) in Kenya, focused on the integration of Ethics in Higher Education. The book captures the potential for sharing of knowledge, and triggering interdisciplinary collaboration and research across a wide variety of issues ranging from research practice, religion, entrepreneurship, leadership, fundraising and corruption. While some of the chapters focus on the understanding of ethics and its relationship with (...) the various other aspects of life, others concentrate on the methods and strategies of effectively teaching ethics. Our chapter is concerned by the ways research practices and the value of integrity might be at risk, in very limited situations. We have good hope that responsible answers and proportionate reason-based actions in confronting some of these risks - as with plagiarism - can protect the giving virtues necessary for dynamical and effective research processes, which are all ultimately built on the value of trust. (shrink)

To be able to say what practical reasoning is, we first need to say what reasoning is and what the conclusion of a process of reasoning is. I shall do this in sections 1 and 2. We can then make a distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning. There are three main ways to do this, which I shall survey in sections 3 to 5. I shall end by suggesting that there are different kinds of practical reasoning.

از زمان ارسطو عقل عملی یا فرونسیس ، یعنی فضیلت مندانه عمل کردن. چنین معنایی برای این واژه تازمان هیوم باقی بود، اما هیوم باتاکید بر نقشی که امیال، انگیزه ها وانفعالات ما، هنگام اتخاذ تصمیمات اخلاقی ایفامی کنند، بر نقش امیال ونگیزه ها وعوامل روان شناسانه در عقل عملی، تاکیدکرد.کانت بعدازهیوم، بواسطه ویژگی هایی که برای عقل عملی ذکر کرد، همچون خودبنیادیِ آن واهمیت بیشتر قائل شدن برای اراده، تعریف جدیدی از عقل عملی ارائه داد که آراء هیوم را (...) دراین مساله با چالش های جدی مواجه ساخت؛ وی تلاش زیادی کردتا نقش امیال وانگیزه های روانشناسانه را ازحوزه تصمیم اخلاقی حذف کند؛ اماتلاشهای کانت وپیروانش برای بنا نهادن وجدان اخلاقی صرفاً بر مبنای عقل واراده، راه به جایی نبرد وهمچنان انتقادات مهمی به تفسیرصرفاً عقلانیِ کانت از عقل عملی وارد است. درعصرحاضر، عده ای از فیلسوفان اخلاق از جمله خانم فیلیپا فوت وفیلسوفان نوارسطویی دیگر، ضمن نقد وردّ تفسیر کانتی از عقل عملی با ارائه تعریفی جدید از عقلانیت عملی، تلاش دارند تا بین عقل وسایرمنابع انگیزشی ازجمله امیال وانگیزه ها، دراتخاذتصمیم صحیح اخلاقی سازش ایجاد کنند. دراین مقاله به بررسی انتقادات برخی فلاسفه برکانت درباب عقل عملی، پرداخته می شود. (shrink)