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  1. Indexical Concepts and Compositionality.Francois Recanati - 2001 - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Clarendon Press. pp. 249-257.
    In the first part of this paper I sketch a theory of indexical concepts within a broadly epistemic framework. In the second part I discuss and dismiss an argument due to Jerry Fodor, to the effect that any epistemic approach to concept individuation (including the theory of indexical concepts I will sketch) is doomed to failure.
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  • Deferential Concepts and Opacity.Neftali Villanueva Fernandez - unknown
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  • The Nature of Unnaturalness in Religious Representations: Negation and Concept Combination.Bradley Franks - 2003 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 3 (1):41-68.
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  • The Dynamics and Communication of Concepts.Simon James Prosser - unknown
    The central claim of this thesis is that concepts, the components from which cognitively significant truth evaluable content (thought) is composed, are unstructured entities an account of whose individuation makes no essential reference to other concepts in the possession of the thinking subject or to any particular means by which the reference of the concept is identified by the thinking subject. This position is called Conceptual Atomism and contrasts with Inferential Role Semantics, according to which concepts are individuated by their (...)
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  • Can Groups Have Concepts? Semantics for Collective Intentions.Cathal O'Madagain - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):347-363.
    A substantial literature supports the attribution of intentional states such as beliefs and desires to groups. But within this literature, there is no substantial account of group concepts. Since on many views, one cannot have an intentional state without having concepts, such a gap undermines the cogency of accounts of group intentionality. In this paper I aim to provide an account of group concepts. First I argue that to fix the semantics of the sentences groups use to make their decisions (...)
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