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Opacity and the attitudes

In Alex Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Print on Demand. pp. 367--406 (2000)

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  1. Kaplan’s Counterexample to Quine’s Theorem.Paolo Bonardi - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2):196-223.
    In his article “Opacity” (1986), David Kaplan propounded a counterexample to the the- sis, defended by Quine and known as Quine’s Theorem, that establishes the illegitimacy of quantifying from outside into a position not open to substitution. He ingeniously built his counterexample using Quine’s own philosophical material and novel devices, arc quotes and $entences. The present article offers detailed analysis and critical discus- sion of Kaplan’s counterexample and proposes a reasonable reformulation of Quine’s Theorem that bypasses both this counterexample and (...)
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  • Identity, Leibniz's Law and Non-transitive Reasoning.Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert Rooij - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (2):253-264.
    Arguments based on Leibniz's Law seem to show that there is no room for either indefinite or contingent identity. The arguments seem to prove too much, but their conclusion is hard to resist if we want to keep Leibniz's Law. We present a novel approach to this issue, based on an appropriate modification of the notion of logical consequence.
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  • Identity, Leibniz’s Law and Non-Transitive Reasoning.Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (2):253-264.
    Arguments based on Leibniz's Law seem to show that there is no room for either indefinite or contingent identity. The arguments seem to prove too much, but their conclusion is hard to resist if we want to keep Leibniz's Law. We present a novel approach to this issue, based on an appropriate modification of the notion of logical consequence.
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  • Tarski et la suppositio materialis.Claude Panaccio - 2004 - Philosophiques 31 (2):295-309.
    Dans son article de 1944, « The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics », Alfred Tarski réfère en propres termes à la notion médiévale de « suppositio materialis ». L’interprétation qu’il en suggère, cependant, est historiquement trompeuse et l’inexactitude historique se double, en l’occurrence, de ce que l’on peut tenir pour une malencontreuse erreur philosophique. Dans « “la neige est blanche” est vraie », Tarski voit l’expression « la neige est blanche » comme le nom d’une certaine (...)
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  • Referential Opacity and Epistemic Logic.Saloua Chatti - 2011 - Logica Universalis 5 (2):225-247.
    Referential opacity is the failure of substitutivity of identity (SI, for short) and in Quine’s view of existential generalization (EG, for short) as well. Quine thinks that its “solution” in epistemic and doxastic contexts, which relies on the notion of exportation, leads to undesirable results. But epistemic logicians such as Jaakko Hintikka and Wolfgang Lenzen provide another solution based on a different diagnosis: opacity is not, as in Quine’s view, due to the absence of reference, it is rather due to (...)
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  • (1 other version)Semantic innocence and substitutivity.Paul Egré - 2007 - In María José Frápolli (ed.), Saying, meaning and referring: essays on François Recanati's philosophy of language. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
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