When thinking about designing social media platforms, we often focus on factors such as usability, functionality, aesthetics, ethics, and so forth. Epistemic considerations have rarely been given the same level of attention in design discussions. This paper aims to rectify this neglect. We begin by arguing that there are epistemic norms that govern environments, including social media environments. Next, we provide a framework for applying these norms to the question of platform design. We then apply this framework to the real-world (...) case of long-form informational content platforms. We argue that many current long-form informational content platforms are epistemically unhealthy. The good news? We provide concrete advice on how to take steps toward improving their health! Specifically, we argue that they should change how they verify and authenticate content creators and how this information is displayed to content consumers. We conclude by connecting this guidance to broader issues about the epistemic health of platforms. (shrink)

I argue that the concept of an epistemic interface is a useful one to add to the epistemic ecology toolkit in order to enrich our investigations concerning the complex epistemic phenomena arising on social media. An epistemic interface is defined as any informational interface (be it technical, human or institutional) that facilitates the transfer of epistemic goods from one epistemic environment to its outside, be that another epistemic environment or a person. When assessing the kinds of epistemic environments emerging on (...) social media platforms, we should not only look at their epistemic health or hostility as environments, but also look at how these environments interact with each other, at their interfacing. I show that several epistemic problems specific to social media such as epistemic bubbles, echo chambers and epistemic flooding can be understood also in terms of faulty epistemic interfacing, which adds a layer of complexity to the discussion. The paper proposes two criteria for healthy epistemic interfacing: preserving the flourishing of epistemic agents, and preserving in some form the value of epistemic outcomes as these cross the environment to the outside world. These criteria should give rise to specific norms and design requirements for healthy interfacing, but such norms will need more empirical work before these get formulated. (shrink)

Bystander information is information about others’ attitudes towards a text (i.e. about whether they agree or disagree with it). Social media platforms force bystander information upon us when we read posts thereon. What effect does this have on how we respond to what we read? The dominant view in the literature is that it changes our minds (the so-called “bandwagon effect”). Simplifying a little: if we see that most people agree (disagree) with what a post says, we are more likely (...) to agree (disagree) with what it says. This paper argues that we should take seriously a competitor view and care about the difference between it and the dominant view. The competitor view proposes that bystander information changes what a text seems to us to say: although bystander information may lead us to change what attitude we express toward a post, that’s not because we’ve changed our attitude toward any fixed content (i.e. fixed thing that the post says). This paper argues that, if this competitor view is correct, then social media is likely to be an especially hazardous place for the practice of sharing content. (shrink)

Despite social epistemologists’ condemnation of epistemic bubbles (Nguyen, 2018; Miller & Record, 2013; Pariser 2011; Simpson, 2012; Sunstein 2017), we defend that they may be epistemically beneficial for marginalized communities, especially when they help insiders to make sense of their lived experiences, that is, acquiring hermeneutical resources. Building on the previous work of Anderson (2021), Sunstein (2017) and Frost-Arnold (2021), who have already highlighted the epistemic benefits of certain bubbles, we focus on the case of Cystic Fibrosis (CF), a chronic (...) illness with severe symptoms, whose patients face difficulties to understand their own experience (for example, what being ‘young’ means with a reduced life expectancy). We then explain how they engage in what we assess as, following Medina & Whitt (2021), “epistemic activism” in a Facebook group meant for patients to share and interact with their favourite CF-related memes. The case illustrates how conditions of isolation and technological affordances contribute to a hermeneutical gain in the marginalized community (augmenting the community’s agency, amplificating their voices, and allowing them to develop and exercise their epistemic capacities). Lastly, we present the ethical guidelines (inspired in Frost-Arnold 2023) we have followed to engage in this sort of online research. (shrink)

This article aims to provide a coherent and comprehensive theoretical framework of the main socio-epistemic features of social media. The first part consists of a concise discussion of the main epistemic consequences of personalised information filtering, with a focus on echo chambers and their many different implications. The middle section instead hosts an analytical investigation of the cognitive and epistemic environments of these platforms aimed at establishing whether, and to what extent, they allow their users to be epistemically vigilant with (...) respect to their sources and the content recommended to them. Finally, in the last part, of a more exquisitely normative nature, some strategies are proposed and discussed that, by reducing the epistemic opacity of social media, could contribute to greater epistemic justice within social media and, concurrently, to augmenting the epistemic autonomy of users. (shrink)

Models of content-sharing behavior on online social media platforms typically represent content spread as a diffusion process modeled on contagious diseases; users’ behavior is modeled with single-agent decision theory. However, social media platforms are interactive spaces where users care about reactions to, and further spread of, the content they post. Thus, social media interaction falls under the intended use cases for game theory. In contrast to existing models leaving strategic reasoning out, we capture agents’ social media decisions within a cognitive (...) hierarchy framework, which can be interpreted as making formally precise how agents make strategic choices based on mutual expectations of rationality. Analytically, we identify limit cases in which a platform can be swamped with content that no agents personally like but all expect to elicit reactions (think obvious fake-news). We then use agent-based simulations to show that a range of more realistic cases give rise to similar outcomes. (shrink)

This article suggests several design principles intended to assist in the development of ethical algorithms exemplified by the task of fighting fake news. Although numerous algorithmic solutions have been proposed, fake news still remains a wicked socio-technical problem that begs not only engineering but also ethical considerations. We suggest employing insights from ethics of care while maintaining its speculative stance to ask how algorithms and design processes would be different if they generated care and fight fake news. After reviewing the (...) major characteristics of ethics of care and the phases of care, we offer four algorithmic design principles. The first principle highlights the need to develop a strategy to deal with fake news on the part of the software designers. The second principle calls for the involvement of various stakeholders in the design processes in order to increase the chances of successfully fighting fake news. The third principle suggests allowing end-users to report on fake news. Finally, the last principle proposes keeping the end-user updated on the treatment in the suspected news items. Implementing these principles as care practices can render the developmental process more ethically oriented as well as improve the ability to fight fake news. (shrink)