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  1. An Appraisal-Driven Componential Approach to the Emotional Brain.David Sander, Didier Grandjean & Klaus R. Scherer - 2018 - Emotion Review 10 (3):219-231.
    This article suggests that methodological and conceptual advancements in affective sciences militate in favor of adopting an appraisal-driven componential approach to further investigate the emotional brain. Here we propose to operationalize this approach by distinguishing five functional networks of the emotional brain: the elicitation network, the expression network, the autonomic reaction network, the action tendency network, and the feeling network, and discuss these networks in the context of the affective neuroscience literature. We also propose that further investigating the “appraising brain” (...)
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  • More on James and the Physical Basis of Emotion.Rainer Reisenzein & Achim Stephan - 2014 - Emotion Review 6 (1):35-46.
    We first present a reconstruction of James’s theory of emotion (JATE) and then argue for four theses: (a) Despite constructivist elements, James’s views are overall in line with basic emotions theory. (b) JATE does not exclude an influence of emotion on intentional action even in its original formulation; nevertheless, this influence is quite limited. It seems possible, however, to repair this problem of the theory. (c) Cannon’s theory of emotion is a centralized version of JATE that inherits from the latter (...)
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  • Emotional Feelings: Evaluative Perceptions or Position-Takings? Introduction to the Special Section.Rainer Reisenzein & Philipp Schmidt - 2022 - Emotion Review 14 (4):233-243.
    Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 233-243, October 2022. This special section of Emotion Review is devoted to the discussion of a recent philosophical emotion theory, the theory of emotions as affective position-takings. The aims of the special section are to provide readers with a spotlight view of recent research in the philosophy of emotion, to advance emotion theory, and support the interdisciplinary dialogue. To increase the accessibility of the special section texts to a nonphilosophical readership, we first discuss (...)
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  • The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: Affective Intentionality and Position-Taking.Jean Moritz Müller - 2022 - Emotion Review 14 (4):244-253.
    Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 244-253, October 2022. This article is a précis of my 2019 monograph The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality. The book engages with a growing trend of philosophical thinking according to which the felt dimension and the intentionality of emotion are unified. While sympathetic to the general approach, I argue for a reconceptualization of the form of intentionality that emotional feelings are widely thought to possess and, accordingly, of the kind of (...)
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  • When is lack of emotion a problem for justice? Four views on legal decision makers’ emotive life.Patricia Mindus - 2023 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 26 (1):88-103.
    Reason and emotion are often cast as opposites. Yet emotion comes in a wide array of manifestations and has a variety of relations with its supposed opposite. Understanding emotion better is key to grasping how jurisprudence casts the relation between psychology and judicial decision making. Jurisprudents disagree on whether and when (lack of) emotion is a problem for decision makers in the justice system. The aim of this paper is to shed light on unarticulated assumptions in mainstream legal theory concerning (...)
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  • How Emotions do not Provide Reasons to Act.Mary Carman - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):555-574.
    If emotions provide reasons for action through their intentional content, as is often argued, where does this leave the role of the affective element of an emotion? Can it be more than a motivator and have significant bearing of its own on our emotional actions, as actions done for reasons? One way it can is through reinforcing other reasons that we might have, as Greenspan argues. Central to Greenspan’s account is the claim that the affective discomfort of an emotion, as (...)
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