Duas hipóteses guiaram o desenvolvimento deste trabalho. A primeira afirma o _status_ necessariamente epistêmico e, portanto, não ontológico, do espaço e do tempo na filosofia transcendental. A segunda é a de que o espaço e o tempo como formas _a priori_ da intuição sensível apresentam uma dimensão essencialmente não conceitual da experiência perceptiva. Em vista disso, neste artigo, nossa intenção é trilhar o caminho argumentativo da constituição da idealidade transcendental do espaço e do tempo a fim de compreender esse estatuto (...) epistêmico e não conceitual da intuição. O objetivo é o de analisar as consequências dessas duas hipóteses para a filosofia neo kantiana contemporânea que tenta compatibilizar os argumentos kantianos com os de uma posição não conceitualista. Para tanto, vamos analisar o desenvolvimento das noções de espaço e tempo, no chamado período de transição da filosofia kantiana, da fase pré-crítica à fase crítica, bem como no próprio período crítico, que culmina na doutrina da idealidade transcendental do espaço e do tempo. (shrink)

This article argues that time-asymmetric processes in spacetime are enantiomorphs. Subsequently, the Kantian puzzle concerning enantiomorphs in space is reviewed to introduce a number of positions concerning enantiomorphy, and to arrive at a dilemma: one must either reject that orientations of enantiomorphs are determinate, or furnish space or objects with orientation. The discussion on space is then used to derive two problems in the debate on the direction of time. First, it is shown that certain kinds of reductionism about the (...) direction of time are at variance with the claim that orientation of enantiomorphic objects is intrinsic. Second, it is argued that reductive explanations of time-asymmetric processes presuppose that enantiomorphic processes do not have determinate orientation. (shrink)

This article argues that time‐asymmetric processes in spacetime are enantiomorphs. Subsequently, the Kantian puzzle concerning enantiomorphs in space is reviewed to introduce a number of positions concerning enantiomorphy, and to arrive at a dilemma: one must either reject that orientations of enantiomorphs are determinate, or furnish space or objects with orientation. The discussion on space is then used to derive two problems in the debate on the direction of time. First, it is shown that certain kinds of reductionism about the (...) direction of time are at variance with the claim that orientation of enantiomorphic objects is intrinsic. Second, it is argued that reductive explanations of time‐asymmetric processes presuppose that enantiomorphic processes do not have determinate orientation. (shrink)

Kant uses incongruent counterparts in his work before and after 1781, but not in the first Critique. Given the relevance that incongruent counterparts had for his thought on space, and their persistence in his work during the 1780s, it is plausible to think that he had a reason for leaving them out of both editions of the Critique. Two implausible conjectures for their absence are here considered and rejected. A more plausible alternative is put forth, which explains that textual absence (...) as a result of the synthetic method of presentation intended for the Critique. (shrink)