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Extraterrestrial Science

Philosophia Naturalis 21 (2/4):400-424 (1984)

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  1. Diagrams and alien ways of thinking.Marc Champagne - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 75 (C):12-22.
    The recent wave of data on exoplanets lends support to METI ventures (Messaging to Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence), insofar as the more exoplanets we find, the more likely it is that “exominds” await our messages. Yet, despite these astronomical advances, there are presently no well-confirmed tests against which to check the design of interstellar messages. In the meantime, the best we can do is distance ourselves from terracentric assumptions. There is no reason, for example, to assume that all inferential abilities are language-like. (...)
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  • La ciencia como un punto de vista: algunos desafíos a la objetividad científica.Mario Gensollen & Marc Jiménez Rolland - 2018 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 75:43-57.
    Algunos críticos de la ciencia afirman que es sólo un punto de vista entre otros, sin alguna autoridad epistémica especial. No obstante, en este artículo se defiende que la idea de que la investigación científica involucra una perspectiva o punto de vista no impone una restricción a su ideal de objetividad. Primero se presentan algunas aclaraciones sobre la noción de punto de vista, luego se atiende al concepto de objetividad científica, y por último se enfrentan algunos desafíos que se desprenden (...)
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  • “Just-so” stories about “inner cognitive Africa”: some doubts about Sorensen's evolutionary epistemology of thought experiments. [REVIEW]James Maffie - 1997 - Biology and Philosophy 12 (2):207-224.
    Roy Sorensen advances an evolutionary explanation of our capacity for thought experiments which doubles as a naturalized epistemological justification. I argue Sorensens explanation fails to satisfy key elements of environmental-selectionist explanations and so fails to carry epistemic force. I then argue that even if Sorensen succeeds in showing the adaptive utility of our capacity, he still fails to establish its reliability and hence epistemic utility. I conclude Sorensens account comes to little more than a just-so story.
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  • So close no matter how far: counterfactuals in history of science and the inevitability/contingency controversy.Luca Tambolo - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2111-2141.
    This paper has a twofold purpose. First, it aims at highlighting one difference in how counterfactuals work in general history, on the one hand, and in history of the natural sciences, on the other hand. As we show, both in general history and in history of science good counterfactual narratives need to be plausible, where plausibility is construed as appropriate continuity of both the antecedent and the consequent of the counterfactual with what we know about the world. However, in general (...)
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  • The Last Dogma of Positivism: Historicist Naturalism and the Fact/Value Dichotomy.John H. Zammito - 2012 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (3):305-338.
    Has the emergence of post-positivism in philosophy of science changed the terms of the “is/ought” dichotomy? If it has demonstrated convincingly that there are no “facts” apart from the theoretical frames and evaluative standards constructing them, can such a cordon sanitaire really be upheld between “facts” and values? The point I wish to stress is that philosophy of science has had a central role in constituting and imposing the fact/value dichotomy and a revolution in the philosophy of science should not (...)
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  • The one world, one science argument.André Kukla - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):73-88.
    The one world, one science argument (so named by Rescher) is advanced by Carl Sagan and others to support the thesis that we will be able to learn to converse with intelligent extraterrestrials if and when we encounter them. The prima facie obstacle to extraterrestrial communication is that the aliens’ culture and geography are bound to be so different from ours that we would find it extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, to find a common topic on which we can (...)
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  • Seti: On the prospects and pursuitworthiness of the search for extraterrestrial intelligence.André Kukla - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 32 (1):31-67.
    My topic is extraterrestrial intelligence. Following current conventions, I use the abbreviation ‘ETI’ to stand for three related concepts: the abstract idea of extraterrestrial intelligence, individuals who are both extraterrestrial and intelligent, and the hypothesis that there are ETIs. SETI is the search for ETIs, and CETI is the attempt to communicate with ETIs. In this paper, I will try to answer the two most basic questions in extraterrestrial studies. First, what is the status of the ETI hypothesis? In the (...)
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  • Kant and naturalism reconsidered.John H. Zammito - 2008 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):532 – 558.
    Reconstructions of Kant are prominent in the contemporary debate over naturalism. Given that this naturalism rejects a priori principles, Kant's anti-naturalism can best be discerned in the “critical turn” as a response to David Hume. Hume did not awaken Kant to criticize but to defend rational metaphysics. But when Kant went transcendental did he not, in fact, go transcendent? The controversy in the 1990s over John McDowell's Mind and World explored just this suspicion: the questions of the normative force of (...)
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  • Does the Burgess shale have moral implications?Stephen R. L. Clark - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):357 – 380.
    Stephen Jay Gould's Wonderful Life is a study of the fossils of the Burgess Shale of British Columbia. My concern is with the morals that Gould draws, with the ?new picture of life? that, he says, the reinterpreted Burgess animals compel. I conclude that his case is not established. (1) There may have been reasons to do with ?fitness? why most of the Burgess animals left no descendants, even if we cannot guess exactly what they were. (2) We do not (...)
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