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Pluralism: against the demand for consensus

New York: Oxford University Press (1993)

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  1. Consensus, Dissensus, and a Third Way, Learned Ignorance.Dale Hample - unknown
    The simplest statement of the relationship between consensus and dissensus is that arguments are supposed to begin in dissensus and end in consensus. This essay introduces a third state for argumentation, learned ignorance. Nicolas of Cusa’s De Docta Ignorantia lays out both a case and a logic for argumentation that is not designed to end in a clear conclusion. Instead, the arguer pursues a matter up to an inconclusive point, and ends there, satisfied with the results. The underlying logic of (...)
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  • Reconstructing John Hick’s theory of religious pluralism: a Chinese folk religion’s perspective.Wai Yip Wong - unknown
    Hick’s pluralist assumption has remained the most knowable model of religious pluralism in the last few decades. Many have, from the perspectives of various major world religions, questioned his notion that the teachings of all religions are derived from the same Absolute Truth and that salvific-end is one, yet little attention has been paid to the traditions that he graded as unauthentic and non-valuable according to his soteriological and ethical criteriology. The purpose of this thesis was to demonstrate the exclusiveness (...)
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  • Aporetische Anmerkung zum Verhältnis von Pluralismus und Monismus. Kommentar zu Hans Jörg Sandkühler.Gregor Schiemann - 1997 - In H. J. Sandkühler (ed.), Philosophie und Wissenschaften. Peter Lang.
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  • Scientific Pluralism and Inconsistency Toleration.Dunja Šešelja - 2017 - Humana Mente 10 (32):1-29.
    In this paper I examine the problem of inconsistency toleration in the context of scientific pluralism. I argue that, first of all, the notion of inconsistency toleration has to be qualified with respect to the evaluative attitude that one takes towards a given scientific theory or theories. Second, I show which types of inconsistency toleration are compatible with two major approaches to scientific pluralism, the so-called modest and the radical one. In view of this I suggest some points of demarcation (...)
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