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  1. Liberalism and the general justifiability of punishment.Nathan Hanna - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):325-349.
    I argue that contemporary liberal theory cannot give a general justification for the institution or practice of punishment, i.e., a justification that would hold across a broad range of reasonably realistic conditions. I examine the general justifications offered by three prominent contemporary liberal theorists and show how their justifications fail in light of the possibility of an alternative to punishment. I argue that, because of their common commitments regarding the nature of justification, these theorists have decisive reasons to reject punishment (...)
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  • Why punitive intent matters.Nathan Hanna - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):426-435.
    Many philosophers think that punishment is intentionally harmful and that this makes it especially hard to morally justify. Explanations for the latter intuition often say questionable things about the moral significance of the intent to harm. I argue that there’s a better way to explain this intuition.
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  • The Nature of Punishment Revisited: Reply to Wringe.Nathan Hanna - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):89-100.
    This paper continues a debate about the following claim: an agent punishes someone only if she aims to harm him. In a series of papers, Bill Wringe argues that this claim is false, I criticize his arguments, and he replies. Here, I argue that his reply fails.
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  • Positive Retributivism: C. L. TEN.C. L. Ten - 1990 - Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (2):194-208.
    One dark and rainy night, Yuso sexually assaults and tortures Zelan. In escaping from the scene of his crime, he falls heavily and becomes an impotent paraplegic. Instead of treating his fate as divine retribution for his wicked acts, Yuso sees it as sheer bad luck. He shows no remorse for what he has done, and vainly hopes that he will recover his powers, which he now treats as involuntarily hoarded resources to be used on less rainy days. In the (...)
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  • Punitive intent.Nathan Hanna - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):655 - 669.
    Most punishment theorists seem to accept the following claim: punishment is intended to harm the punishee. A significant minority of punishment theorists reject the claim, though. I defend the claim from objections, focusing mostly on recent objections that haven’t gotten much attention. My objective is to reinforce the already strong case for the intentions claim. I first clarify what advocates of the intentions claim mean by it and state the standard argument for it. Then I critically discuss a wide variety (...)
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  • A philosophical investigation of punishment.Rebecca Pates - unknown
    Neither currently prevalent justifications of punishment, nor a modified, contractarian version of a justification that I develop here, can be used to justify actual state punishment, even if some forms of punishment may remain legitimate. I argue in this thesis that alternative punitive practices such as developed by some Canadian aboriginal communities are more likely to conform to the criteria of punitive justice developed by standard justifications, as well as being more likely to conform to criteria developed in feminist ethics.
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  • Are There Counterexamples to Standard Views about Institutional Legitimacy, Obligation, and What Institutions We Should Aim For?Mark Budolfson - 2014 - Philosophy and Law 14 (1).
    A standard view in legal and political theory is that, to a first approximation, (1) we should aim to bring about the most legitimate institutions possible to solve the problems that should be solved at the level of politics, and (2) individual people are required to follow the directives of legitimate institutions, at least insofar as those institutions have the authority to issue those directives, and insofar as other considerations are nearly equal.1 On this standard view, the philosophical analysis of (...)
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