This article explains Kant’s claim that sciences must take, at least as their ideal, the form of a ‘system’. I argue that Kant’s notion of systematicity can be understood against the background of de Jong & Betti’s Classical Model of Science (2010) and the writings of Georg Friedrich Meier and Johann Heinrich Lambert. According to my interpretation, Meier, Lambert, and Kant accepted an axiomatic idea of science, articulated by the Classical Model, which elucidates their conceptions of systematicity. I show that (...) Kant’s critique of the mathematical method is compatible with his adherence to this axiomatic conception of science. I further show that systematicity furthers traditionally accepted logical ideals of scientific knowledge, which explains why Meier and Kant think that sciences must be ‘systematic’. (shrink)

The present paper argues for the relevance of Immanuel Kant and the German Enlightenment to contemporary social epistemology. Rather than distancing themselves from the alleged ‘individualism’ of Enlightenment philosophers, social epistemologists would be well-advised to look at the substantive discussion of social-epistemological questions in the works of Kant and other Enlightenment figures. After a brief rebuttal of the received view of the Enlightenment as an intrinsically individualist enterprise, this paper charts the historical trajectory of philosophical discussions of testimony as a (...) source of knowledge, via such philosophers as C. Thomasius, C. A. Crusius, J. M. Chladenius, G. F. Meier, and finally Kant. Building on recent work on Kant's epistemology of testimony, the paper considers Kant's broader contributions to social epistemology. This includes an analysis of Kant's comments on the social basis of contingent epistemic standards, e.g. in the sciences, as well as on problems arising from the management of what Kant calls the growing ‘volume of knowledge’. Special attention is paid to the relation between Kant's views and contemporary problems arising both in the context of education and from our increased reliance on scientific experts. (shrink)

The present paper argues for the relevance of Immanuel Kant and the German Enlightenment to contemporary social epistemology. Rather than distancing themselves from the alleged ‘individualism’ of Enlightenment philosophers, social epistemologists would be well-advised to look at the substantive discussion of social-epistemological questions in the works of Kant and other Enlightenment figures. After a brief rebuttal of the received view of the Enlightenment as an intrinsically individualist enterprise, this paper charts the historical trajectory of philosophical discussions of testimony as a (...) source of knowledge, via such philosophers as C. Thomasius, C. A. Crusius, J. M. Chladenius, G. F. Meier, and finally Kant. Building on recent work on Kant's epistemology of testimony, the paper considers Kant's broader contributions to social epistemology. This includes an analysis of Kant's comments on the social basis of contingent epistemic standards, e.g. in the sciences, as well as on problems arising from the management of what Kant calls the growing ‘volume of knowledge’. Special attention is paid to the relation between Kant's views and contemporary problems arising both in the context of education and from our increased reliance on scientific experts. (shrink)

Kant typically is not identified with the tradition of virtue epistemology. Although he may not be a virtue epistemologist in a strict sense, I suggest that intellectual virtues and vices play a key role in his epistemology. Specifically, Kant identifies a serious intellectual vice that threatens to undermine reason, namely enthusiasm (Schwärmerei). Enthusiasts become so enamored with their own thinking that they refuse to subject reason to self-critique. The particular danger of enthusiasm is that reason colludes in its own destruction: (...) enthusiasm occurs when self-conceit and reason’s desire to transcend its boundaries mutually reinforce each other. I conclude by sketching an account of Kantian intellectual virtue that is consistent with Kantian moral virtue. (shrink)

La polémica sobre los prejuicios es un símbolo distintivo de la Ilustración alemana. Este artículo presenta aspectos históricos de esta polémica que resultan útiles para esclarecer el pensamiento de Kant. Se argumenta que la posición kantiana respecto de ella, como una polémica en la que convive una perspectiva que busca la liberación de todo prejuicio (Christian Thomasius) y otra que permite que algunos permanezcan, y hasta los estima como útiles (Georg Friedrich Meier), representa un esfuerzo por conciliar ambas perspectivas, y (...) anticipa la distinción planteada en la “Dialéctica trascendental” entre el uso regulativo y constitutivo de las ideas. (shrink)

RESUMEN La polémica sobre los prejuicios es un símbolo distintivo de la Ilustración alemana. Este artículo presenta aspectos históricos de esta polémica que resultan útiles para esclarecer el pensamiento de Kant. Se argumenta que la posición kantiana respecto de ella, como una polémica en la que convive una perspectiva que busca la liberación de todo prejuicio y otra que permite que algunos permanezcan, y hasta los estima como útiles, representa un esfuerzo por conciliar ambas perspectivas, y anticipa la distinción planteada (...) en la "Dialéctica trascendental" entre el uso regulativo y constitutivo de las ideas. ABSTRACT The controversy over prejudices is a distinctive feature ofthe German Enlightenment. The article addresses some historical aspects of this controversy that are useful to shed light on Kant's thought. Enlightenment positions ranged from the perspective seeking to rid itself of all prejudices, to that which allows for some prejudices and even considers them useful. The article argues that the Kantian position on the matter constitutes an effort to reconcile these perspectives, thus anticipating the distinction set forth in the "Transcendental Dialectic" between the regulative and the constitutive use of ideas. (shrink)