Results for 'Morten Korsgaard'

99 found
Order:
  1. Google and Facebook Vs Rawls and Lao-Tzu: How Silicon Valley’s Utilitarianism and Confucianism Are Bad for Internet Ethics.Morten Bay - 2020 - AoIR 2020: The 21th Annual Conference of the Association of Internet Researchers.
    The proposed paper presents an argument in favor of a Rawlsian approach to ethics for Internet technology companies (den Hoven & Rooksby, 2008; Hoffman, 2017). Ethics statements from such companies are analyzed and shown to be utilitarian and teleological in nature, and therefore in opposition to Rawls’ theories of justice and fairness. The statements are also shown to have traits in common with Confucian virtue ethics (Ames, 2011; Nylan, 2008).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. The Claims of Animals and the Needs of Strangers: Two Cases of Imperfect Right.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2018 - Journal of Practical Ethics 6 (1):19-51.
    This paper argues for a conception of the natural rights of non-human animals grounded in Kant’s explanation of the foundation of human rights. The rights in question are rights that are in the first instance held against humanity collectively speaking—against our species conceived as an organized body capable of collective action. The argument proceeds by first developing a similar case for the right of every human individual who is in need of aid to get it, and then showing why the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  3. Multicultural Multilegalism – Definition and Challenges.Morten Ebbe Juul Nielsen - 2011 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 6 (2):126-154.
    Multilegalism is a species of legal pluralism denoting the existence of quasi-autonomous “minority jurisdictions” for at least some legal matters within a “normal” state jurisdiction. Multiculturalism in the advocatory sense might provide the justification for establishing such minority jurisdictions. This paper aims to provide 1) a detailed idea about what such a multicultural multilegal arrangement would amount to and how it differs from certain related concepts and legal frameworks, 2) in what sense some standard multicultural arguments could provide a starting (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Training in compensatory strategies enhances rapport in interactions involving people with Möebius Syndrome.John Michael, Kathleen Bogart, Kristian Tylen, Joel Krueger, Morten Bech, John R. Ostergaard & Riccardo Fusaroli - 2015 - Frontiers in Neurology 6 (213):1-11.
    In the exploratory study reported here, we tested the efficacy of an intervention designed to train teenagers with Möbius syndrome (MS) to increase the use of alternative communication strategies (e.g., gestures) to compensate for their lack of facial expressivity. Specifically, we expected the intervention to increase the level of rapport experienced in social interactions by our participants. In addition, we aimed to identify the mechanisms responsible for any such increase in rapport. In the study, five teenagers with MS interacted with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  5. Control and Flexibility of Interactive Alignment: Mobius Syndrome as a Case Study.John Michael, Kathleen Bogart, Kristian Tylen, Joel Krueger, Morten Bech, John R. Ostergaard & Riccardo Fusaroli - 2014 - Cognitive Processing 15 (1):S125-126.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Dialectics, Self-Consciousness, and Recognition: The Hegelian Legacy.Asger Sørensen, Morten Raffnsøe-Møller & Arne Grøn (eds.) - 2009 - Århus Universitetsforlag.
    Hegel's influence on post-Hegelian philosophy is as profound as it is ambiguous. Modern philosophy is philosophy after Hegel. Taking leave of Hegel's system appears to be a common feature of modern and post-modern thought. One could even argue that giving up Hegel's claim of totality defines philosophy after Hegel. Modern and post-modern philosophies are philosophies of finitude: Hegel's philosophy cannot be repeated. However, its status as a negative backdrop for modern and post-modern thought already shows its pervasive influence. Precisely in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. In the Light of Experience: New Essays on Perception and Reasons.Johan Gersel, Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Morten S. Thaning & Morten Overgaard (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Christine Korsgaard’s Constructivism.Hossein Atrak - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations 12 (25):1-20.
    Constructivism is a theory that believes moral judgments are not real things but they are constructed by practical reason in a rational procedure for resolving practical problems in front of us. Christine Korsgaard, a contemporary American philosopher, is a Kantian constructivist, whose theory I consider in this paper. She is a radical constructivist and disagrees with moral realism and denies moral truths even as abstract facts. According to Korsgaard moral judgments are constructed by rational agents. She believes moral (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Christine Korsgaards moralfilosofi.Gunnar Björnsson - 2005 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 1:38–54.
    Critical introduction in Swedish of Christine Korsgaard's Sources of Normativity and Self-Constitution.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Korsgaard's Expanded Regress Argument.Samuel Kahn - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (2):40-65.
    In this discussion note, I aim to reconstruct and assess Korsgaard's recent attempt to extend her regress argument. I begin, in section 1, with a brief recapitulation of the regress argument. Then, in section 2, I turn to the extension. I argue that the extension does not work because Korsgaard cannot rule out the possibility--a possibility for which there is both empirical evidence and argumentative pressure coming directly from the original regress--that we value animality in ourselves qua animality (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Korsgaard's Duties towards Animals: Two Difficulties.Nico Dario Müller - 2022 - Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism 1 (10):9-25.
    Building on her previous work (2004, 2012, 2013), Christine Korsgaard’s recent book Fellow Creatures (2018) has provided the most highly developed Kantian account of duties towards animals. I raise two issues with the results of this account. First, the duties that Korsgaard accounts for are duties “towards” animals in name only. Since Korsgaard does not reject the Kantian conception in which direct duties towards others require mutual moral constraint, what she calls duties “towards” animals are merely Kantian (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard's Rejection of Realism.Nadeem Hussain & Nishi Shah - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Clarendon Press. pp. 265-94.
    Contemporary Kantianism is often regarded as both a position within normative ethics and as an alternative to metaethical moral realism. We argue that it is not clear how contemporary Kantianism can distinguish itself from moral realism. There are many Kantian positions. For reasons of space we focus on the position of one of the most prominent, contemporary Kantians, Christine Korsgaard. Our claim is that she fails to show either that Kantianism is different or that it is better than realism. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  13. Reassessing the foundations of Korsgaard’s approach to ethics.Samuel J. M. Kahn - 2017 - Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia:online.
    In a series of well known publications, Christine Korsgaard argues for the claim that an agent acts morally just in case s/he acts autonomously. Two of Korsgaard's signature arguments for the connection between morality and autonomy are the "argument from spontaneity" and the "regress argument." In this paper, I argue that neither the argument from spontaneity nor the regress argument is able to show that an agent would be acting wrongly even if s/he acts in a paradigmatically heteronomous (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. Christine Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals[REVIEW]Toby Svoboda - 2019 - Environmental Values 28 (6):763-765.
    Immanuel Kant infamously denies that non-rational entities--a class that includes all non-human animals (hereafter “animals”)--have moral standing. He claims that human beings have only indirect duties with regard to animals. Roughly put, on his view we can have moral reasons to treat animals in certain ways, but these reasons depend entirely on duties we owe to ourselves and other human beings. Arguably because of this stance, most animal ethicists have had little use for Kant. Christine Korsgaard’s most recent book, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Metaethics and Its Discontents: A Case Study of Korsgaard.Nadeem J. Z. Hussain & Nishi Shah - forthcoming - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Moral Constructivism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press.
    The maturing of metaethics has been accompanied by widespread, but relatively unarticulated, discontent that mainstream metaethics is fundamentally on the wrong track. The malcontents we have in mind do not simply champion a competitor to the likes of noncognitivism or realism; they disapprove of the supposed presuppositions of the existing debate. Their aim is not to generate a new theory within metaethics, but to go beyond metaethics and to transcend the distinctions it draws between metaethics and normative ethics and between (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  16. Commitments of a Divided Self: Authenticity, Autonomy and Change in Korsgaard's Ethics.Lydia L. Moland - 2008 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (1):25-44.
    Christine Korsgaard attempts to reinterpret Kantian ethics in a way that might alleviate Bernard Williams’ famous worry that a man cannot save his drowning wife without determining impartially that he may do so. She does this by dividing a reflective self that chooses the commitments that make up an agent’s practical identity from a self defined as a jumble of desires. An agent, she then argues, must act on the commitments chosen by the reflective self on pain of disintegration. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. Commitments of a Divided Self: Narrative, Change, and Autonomy in Korsgaard's Ethics.Lydia L. Moland - 2008 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (1):27-46.
    Christine Korsgaard attempts to reinterpret Kantian ethics in a way that might alleviate Bernard Williams’ famous worry that a man cannot save his drowning wife without determining impartially that he may do so. She does this by dividing a reflective self that chooses the commitments that make up an agent’s practical identity from a self defined as a jumble of desires. An agent, she then argues, must act on the commitments chosen by the reflective self on pain of disintegration. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. Christine M. Korsgaard, the constitution of agency. [REVIEW]Fritz J. McDonald - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):235-236.
    Review of Christine Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Christine M. Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals, Oxford University Press, 2018, 252pp., $24.95 (hbk), ISBN 9780198753858. [REVIEW]Joe Saunders - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (1):141-147.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Fellow Creatures, by Christine Korsgaard. Oxford University Press, 2018. ISBN 0198753853. 272 pp. $24.95. [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):258-262.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Review of Korsgaard's The Constitution of Agency (2008, OUP). [REVIEW]Fritz J. McDonald - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. The Concept of Moral Obligation: Anscombe contra Korsgaard.Maria Alvarez - 2007 - Philosophy 82 (4):543-552.
    A number of recent writers have expressed scepticism about the viability of a specifically moral concept of obligation, and some of the considerations offered have been interesting and persuasive. This is a scepticism that has its roots in Nietzsche, even if he is mentioned only rather rarely in the debate. More proximately, the scepticism in question receives seminal expression in Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, a piece that is often paid lip-service to, but—like Nietzsche's work—has only rarely been (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Personal Identity, Moral Agency and Liangzhi: A Comparative Study of Korsgaard and Wang Yangming.Chang Tzuli - 2015 - Comparative Philosophy 6 (1):03-23.
    Christine Korsgaard bases her interpretation of personal identity upon the notion of moral agency and thereby refutes the Reductionist thesis of Derek Parfit. Korsgaard indicates that actions and choices, from the practical standpoint, must be viewed as having agents and choosers. This is what makes them our own actions and choices as well as contributes to the process of self-constitution. Personal identity manifested as the chooser of our desires and author of our actions can be viewed as the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals, by Christine M. Korsgaard[REVIEW]Andrew Chignell - 2020 - Mind 130 (517):363-373.
    A review of "Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals," by Christine M. Korsgaard. New York: Oxford, 2018. Pp. 271.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Review of "Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity", by Christine M. Korsgaard, 2009. [REVIEW]Markus E. Schlosser - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):212-214.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Agency and responsibility.Fritz J. McDonald - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (2):199-207.
    According to Christine Korsgaard, Kantian hypothetical and categorical imperative principles are constitutive principles of agency. By acting in a way that is guided by these imperatives, an individual makes herself into an agent. There is hence, on her theory, an inextricable link between the nature of agency and the practical issue of why we should be rational and moral. The benefits of such an account would be great: in Korsgaard’s view, an account that bases morality on the nature (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Practical Reason and the Unity of Agency.Michael Garnett - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):449-468.
    This is a critical review essay of Christine Korsgaard's Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (OUP 2009).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Does the Origin of Normativity Stem from the Internalization of Dominance Hierarchies?Emilian Mihailov - 2015 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 2 (4):463–478.
    Many natural scientists explain the evolutionary origin of morality by documenting altruistic behaviour in our nearest nonhuman relatives. Christine Korsgaard has criticized such attempts on the premise that they do not put enough effort in explaining the capacity to be motivated by normative thoughts. She speculates that normative motivation may have originated with the internalization of the dominance instincts. In this article I will challenge the dominance hierarchy hypothesis by arguing that a proper investigation into how and when dominance (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  41
    The Problem Of Abstract Thinking In The Categorical Imperative.Bora Barut - 2024 - Meditations: The Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy at Ucla 10 (11):50-76.
    This paper delves into Hegel's critique of Kantian ethics, focusing on the accusation that Kant's Categorical Imperative (CI) represents an abstract ethical philosophy. Hegel argues that Kantian ethics relies on an unproductive form of abstract thinking, exemplified in Kant's emphasis on universalizing maxims without considering the concrete particularities of situations. The author contends that Hegel's critique remains valid even when considering Christine Korsgaard's responses. The paper unfolds by elucidating Hegel's notion of "abstract thinking" and explaining how the CI's emphasis (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. An Adam Smithian Account of Humanity.Nir Ben-Moshe - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (32):908-936.
    In The Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard argues for what can be called “The Universality of Humanity Claim” (UHC), according to which valuing humanity in one’s own person entails valuing it in that of others. However, Korsgaard’s reliance on the claim that reasons are essentially public in her attempt to demonstrate the truth of UHC has been repeatedly criticized. I offer a sentimentalist defense, based on Adam Smith’s moral philosophy, of a qualified, albeit adequate, version of UHC. In particular, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. On Hatzimoysis on sentimental value.Guy Fletcher - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):149-152.
    Despite its apparent ubiquity, philosophers have not talked much about sentimental value. One exception is Anthony Hatzimoysis (The Philosophical Quarterly 53:373–379, 2003). Those who wish to take sentimental value seriously are likely to make use of Christine Korsgaard’s ideas on two distinctions in value. In this paper I show that Hatzimoysis has misrendered Korsgaard’s insight in his discussion of sentimental value. I begin by briefly summarising Korsgaard’s idea before showing how Hatzimoysis’ treatment of it is mistaken.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. Heidegger, Sociality, and Human Agency.B. Scot Rousse - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):417-451.
    According to Heidegger's Being and Time, social relations are constitutive of the core features of human agency. On this view, which I call a ‘strong conception’ of sociality, the core features of human agency cannot obtain in an individual subject independently of social relations to others. I explain the strong conception of sociality captured by Heidegger's underdeveloped notion of ‘being-with’ by reconstructing Heidegger's critique of the ‘weak conception’ of sociality characteristic of Kant's theory of agency. According to a weak conception, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  33. Inescapability and Normativity.Matthew Silverstein - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (3):1-27.
    When we make ethical claims, we invoke a kind of objective authority. A familiar worry about our ethical practices is that this invocation of authority involves a mistake. This worry was perhaps best captured by John Mackie, who argued that the fabric of the world contains nothing so queer as objective authority and thus that all our ethical claims are false. Kantians such as Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman offer accounts of the objectivity of ethics that do without the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  34. Backsliding and Bad Faith: Aspiration, Disavowal, and (Residual) Practical Identities.Justin White - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 26 (1).
    Disavowals such as "That's not who I am" are one way to distance ourselves from unsavory actions in order to try to mitigate our responsibility for them. Although such disclaimers can be what Harry Frankfurt calls "shabbily insincere devices for obtaining unmerited indulgence," they can also be a way to renew our commitments to new values as part of the processes of aspiration and moral improvement. What, then, separates backsliding aspirants from those in denial who seek unmerited indulgence? Drawing on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Kant's fact of reason as source of normativity.Bryan Lueck - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (6):596 – 608.
    In _The Sources of Normativity_, Christine M. Korsgaard argues that unconditional obligation can be accounted for in terms of practical identity. My argument in this paper is that practical identity cannot play this foundational role. More specifically, I interpret Korsgaard's argument as beginning with something analogous to Kant's fact of reason, viz. with the fact that our minds are reflective. I then try to show that her determination of this fact is inadequate and that this causes the argument (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  36. The Value of Nonhuman Nature: A Constitutive View.Roman Altshuler - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):469-485.
    A central question of environmental ethics remains one of how best to account for the intuitions generated by the Last Man scenarios; that is, it is a question of how to explain our experience of value in nature and, more importantly, whether that experience is justified. Seeking an alternative to extrinsic views, according to which nonhuman entities possess normative features that obligate us, I turn to constitutive views, which make value or whatever other limits nonhuman nature places on action dependent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. Ergon and Practical Reason. Anscombe’s Legacy and Natural Normativity.Maria Silvia Vaccarezza - 2023 - Acta Philosophica 32 (2):400-406.
    One of Elizabeth Anscombe’s most decisive legacies is the rejection of modern legalistic morality, in the name of a rescue of Aristotelian-inspired natural normativity. However, as I will argue in this contribution, this legacy does not seem to have been fully collected, neither by those who, like Philippa Foot, are explicitly inspired by Anscombe’s work, nor by those who, while apparently opposing its assumptions, have also somehow recovered it by different routes, as emblematically does Christine Korsgaard in her constitutivist (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. A Kantian Approach to the Moral Considerability of Non-human Nature.Toby Svoboda - 2023 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 36 (4):1-16.
    A Kantian approach can establish that non-human natural entities are morally considerable and that humans have duties to them. This is surprising, because most environmental ethicists have either rejected or overlooked Kant when it comes to this issue. Inspired by an argument of Christine Korsgaard, I claim that both humans and non-humans have a natural good, which is whatever allows an entity to function well according to the kind of entity it is. I argue that humans are required to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Nonaccidental Rightness and the Guise of the Objectively Good.Samuel J. M. Kahn - forthcoming - Journal of Early Modern Studies:Vol. 13, Issue 2, 2024.
    My goal in this paper is to show that two theses that are widely adopted among Kantian ethicists are irreconcilable. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I briefly sketch the contours of my own positive view of Kantian ethics, concentrating on the issues relevant to the two theses to be discussed: I argue that agents can perform actions from but not in conformity with duty, and I argue that agents intentionally can perform actions they take to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Being Bad at Being Good: Zuko's Transformation and Residual Practical Identities.Justin F. White - 2022 - In Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt (eds.), Avatar: The Last Airbender and Philosophy: Wisdom From Aang to Zuko. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 188-196.
    Zuko’s plight illuminates the process of aspiration, including common challenges to the aspirant. As Agnes Callard understands it, aspiration typically involves a “deep change in how one sees and feels and thinks.” And this deep change is often intertwined with a change in what contemporary philosopher Christine Korsgaard calls practical identity, a “description under which you value yourself, . . . under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking.” But as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Practical reason and motivational scepticism.Paul Russell - 2006 - In Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kühn & Dieter Schönecker (eds.), Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen. Felix Meiner Verlag.
    In her influential and challenging paper “Skepticism about Practical Reason” Christine Korsgaard sets out to refute an important strand of Humean scepticism as it concerns a Kantian understanding of practical reason.1 Korsgaard distinguishes two components of scepticism about practical reason. The first, which she refers to as content scepticism, argues that reason cannot of itself provide any “substantive guidance to choice and action” (SPR, 311). In its classical formulation, as stated by Hume, it is argued that reason cannot (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  42. Guilt, Practical Identity, and Moral Staining.Andrew Ingram - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (4):623-645.
    The guilt left by immoral actions is why moral duties are more pressing and serious than other reasons like prudential considerations. Religions talk of sin and karma; the secular still speak of spots or stains. I argue that a moral staining view of guilt is in fact the best model. It accounts for guilt's reflexive character and for anxious, scrupulous worries about whether one has transgressed. To understand moral staining, I borrow Christine Korsgaard's view that we construct our identities (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. How Do You Like Me Now?Gerald Hull - manuscript
    These reflections are an attempt to get to the heart of the "reason is the slave of the passions" debate. The whole point of deliberation is to arrive at a choice. What factors persons find to be choice-relevant is a purely empirical matter. This has significant consequences for the views of Hume, Williams, Nagel, Parfit and Korsgaard regarding practical reason.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Motherhood in Ferrante's The Lost Daughter: A Case Study of Irony as Extraordinary Reflection.Melissa Mcbay Merritt - 2017 - Philosophy and Literature 41 (1):185-200.
    In A Case for Irony, Jonathan Lear aims to advance “a distinguished philosophical tradition that conceives of humanity as a task” by returning this tradition to the ironic figure at its origin — Socrates. But he is hampered by his reliance on well-worn philosophical examples. I suggest that Elena Ferrante’s The Lost Daughter illustrates the mode of ironic experience that interests Lear, and helps us to think through his relation to Christine Korsgaard, arguably the greatest contemporary proponent of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Fight, Flight or Respect? First Encounters of the Other in Kant and Hegel.Lydia L. Moland - 2002 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 19 (4):381-400.
    Immanuel Kant's description of humans' first encounter with each other depicts a peaceful recognition of mutual worth. G.W.F. Hegel's by contrast depicts a struggle to the death. I argue in this paper that Hegel's description of conflict results in an ethical theory that better preserves the distinctness of the other. I consider Christine Korsgaard's description of first encounters as a third alternative but conclude that Hegel's approach better accounts for the specific commitments we make--as family members, works, and citizens (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality.Neil Sinhababu - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (6):1-13.
    Christine Korsgaard argues that Humean views of both action and rationality jointly imply the impossibility of irrational action, allowing us only to perform actions that we deem rational. Humeans can answer Korsgaard’s objection if their views of action and rationality measure agents’ actual desires differently. What determines what the agent does are the motivational forces that desires produce in the agent at the moment when she decides to act, as these cause action. What determines what it is rational (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  47. Principios, atención y carácter: una defensa del particularismo moral.Josep E. Corbi - 2015 - In Pau Luque (ed.), Particularismo. Ensayos de filosofía del derecho y filosofía moral. Marcial Pons. pp. 39-58.
    Entiende Christine Korsgaard que sólo una vida gobernada por principios universales responde a nuestra condición de sujetos, pues, de otro modo, quedaríamos reducidos a un amasijo de impulsos inconexos. Quiere, no obstante, alejarse de la imagen del sujeto escindido entre razón y pasión y reivindica la necesidad de unificar cada una de las partes que lo constituyen. Tal unificación deberá descansar, según Korsgaard, en el respeto a principios morales de carácter universal, si bien confía en que una vida (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Irreplaceability and Unique Value.Christopher Grau - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1&2):111-129.
    This essay begins with a consideration of one way in which animals and persons may be valued as “irreplaceable.” Drawing on both Plato and Pascal, I consider reasons for skepticism regarding the legitimacy of this sort of attachment. While I do not offer a complete defense against such skepticism, I do show that worries here may be overblown due to the conflation of distinct metaphysical and normative concerns. I then go on to clarify what sort of value is at issue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  49. Reason in its Practical Application.E. Sonny Elizondo - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-17.
    Is practical reason a cognitive faculty? Do practical judgments make claims about a subject matter that are appropriately assessed in terms of their agreement with that subject matter? According to Kantians like Christine Korsgaard, the answer is no. To think otherwise is to conflate the theoretical and the practical, the epistemic and the ethical. I am not convinced. In this paper, I motivate my skepticism through examination of the very figure who inspires Korsgaard’s rejection of cognitivism: Kant. For (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  50. Are There Unconscious Perceptual Processes?Berit Brogaard - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):449-63.
    Blindsight and vision for action seem to be exemplars of unconscious visual processes. However, researchers have recently argued that blindsight is not really a kind of uncon- scious vision but is rather severely degraded conscious vision. Morten Overgaard and col- leagues have recently developed new methods for measuring the visibility of visual stimuli. Studies using these methods show that reported clarity of visual stimuli correlates with accuracy in both normal individuals and blindsight patients. Vision for action has also come (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
1 — 50 / 99