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  1. Alethic Reference.Lavinia Picollo - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (3):417-438.
    I put forward precise and appealing notions of reference, self-reference, and well-foundedness for sentences of the language of first-order Peano arithmetic extended with a truth predicate. These notions are intended to play a central role in the study of the reference patterns that underlie expressions leading to semantic paradox and, thus, in the construction of philosophically well-motivated semantic theories of truth.
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  • Modality and Axiomatic Theories of Truth II: Kripke-Feferman.Johannes Stern - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):299-318.
    In this second and last paper of the two part investigation on "Modality and Axiomatic Theories of Truth" we apply a general strategy for constructing modal theories over axiomatic theories of truth to the theory Kripke-Feferman. This general strategy was developed in the first part of our investigation. Applying the strategy to Kripke-Feferman leads to the theory Modal Kripke-Feferman which we discuss from the three perspectives that we had already considered in the first paper, where we discussed the theory Modal (...)
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  • More on 'A Liar Paradox'.Richard Heck - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):270-280.
    A reply to two responses to an earlier paper, "A Liar Paradox".
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  • A Liar Paradox.Richard Heck - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):36-40.
    The purpose of this note is to present a strong form of the liar paradox. It is strong because the logical resources needed to generate the paradox are weak, in each of two senses. First, few expressive resources required: conjunction, negation, and identity. In particular, this form of the liar does not need to make any use of the conditional. Second, few inferential resources are required. These are: (i) conjunction introduction; (ii) substitution of identicals; and (iii) the inference: From ¬(p (...)
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  • Reference in Arithmetic.Lavinia Picollo - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (3):573-603.
    Self-reference has played a prominent role in the development of metamathematics in the past century, starting with Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. Given the nature of this and other results in the area, the informal understanding of self-reference in arithmetic has sufficed so far. Recently, however, it has been argued that for other related issues in metamathematics and philosophical logic a precise notion of self-reference and, more generally, reference is actually required. These notions have been so far elusive and are surrounded (...)
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  • Omega-Inconsistency Without Cuts and Nonstandard Models.Andreas Fjellstad - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (5).
    This paper concerns the relationship between transitivity of entailment, omega-inconsistency and nonstandard models of arithmetic. First, it provides a cut-free sequent calculus for non-transitive logic of truth STT based on Robinson Arithmetic and shows that this logic is omega-inconsistent. It then identifies the conditions in McGee for an omega-inconsistent logic as quantified standard deontic logic, presents a cut-free labelled sequent calculus for quantified standard deontic logic based on Robinson Arithmetic where the deontic modality is treated as a predicate, proves omega-inconsistency (...)
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  • Faithfulness for Naive Validity.Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4759-4774.
    Nontransitive responses to the validity Curry paradox face a dilemma that was recently formulated by Barrio, Rosenblatt and Tajer. It seems that, in the nontransitive logic ST enriched with a validity predicate, either you cannot prove that all derivable metarules preserve validity, or you can prove that instances of Cut that are not admissible in the logic preserve validity. I respond on behalf of the nontransitive approach. The paper argues, first, that we should reject the detachment principle for naive validity. (...)
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  • Self-Reference in Arithmetic II.Volker Halbach & Albert Visser - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (4):692-712.
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  • Self-Reference in Arithmetic I.Volker Halbach & Albert Visser - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (4):671-691.
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  • Response to Heck.David Ripley - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):254-257.
    In Heck, Richard Heck presents variants on the familiar liar paradox, intended to reveal limitations of theories of transparent truth. But all existing theories of transparent truth can respond to Heck's variants in just the same way they respond to the liar. These new variants thus put no new pressure on theories of transparent truth.
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  • On Heck's New Liar.Julien Murzi - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):258-269.
    Richard Heck has recently drawn attention on a new version of the Liar Paradox, one which relies on logical resources that are so weak as to suggest that it may not admit of any “truly satisfying, consistent solution”. I argue that this conclusion is too strong. Heck's Liar reduces to absurdity principles that are already rejected by consistent paracomplete theories of truth, such as Kripke's and Field's. Moreover, the new Liar gives us no reasons to think that (versions of) these (...)
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