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  1. Linnebo's Abstractionism and the Bad Company Problem.J. P. Studd - 2023 - Theoria 89 (3):366-392.
    In Thin Objects: An Abstractionist Account, Linnebo offers what he describes as a “simple and definitive” solution to the bad company problem facing abstractionist accounts of mathematics. “Bad” abstraction principles can be rendered “good” by taking abstraction to have a predicative character. But the resulting predicative axioms are too weak to recover substantial portions of mathematics. Linnebo pursues two quite different strategies to overcome this weakness in the case of set theory and arithmetic. I argue that neither infinitely iterated abstraction (...)
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  • The Potential in Frege’s Theorem.Will Stafford - 2023 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (2):553-577.
    Is a logicist bound to the claim that as a matter of analytic truth there is an actual infinity of objects? If Hume’s Principle is analytic then in the standard setting the answer appears to be yes. Hodes’s work pointed to a way out by offering a modal picture in which only a potential infinity was posited. However, this project was abandoned due to apparent failures of cross-world predication. We re-explore this idea and discover that in the setting of the (...)
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  • Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.
    Though the divide between reason-based and causal-explanatory approaches in psychiatry and psychopathology is old and deeply rooted, current trends involving multi-factorial explanatory models and evidence-based approaches to interpersonal psychotherapy, show that it has already been implicitly bridged. These trends require a philosophical reconsideration of how reasons can be causes. This paper contributes to that trajectory by arguing that Donald Davidson’s classic paradigm of 1963 is still a valid option.
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  • Frege on the Generality of Logical Laws.Jim Hutchinson - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy (2):1-18.
    Frege claims that the laws of logic are characterized by their “generality,” but it is hard to see how this could identify a special feature of those laws. I argue that we must understand this talk of generality in normative terms, but that what Frege says provides a normative demarcation of the logical laws only once we connect it with his thinking about truth and science. He means to be identifying the laws of logic as those that appear in every (...)
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  • The Breadth of the Paradox.Patricia Blanchette - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (1):30-49.
    This essay examines Frege's reaction to Russell's Paradox and his views about the grounding of existence claims in mathematics. It is argued that Frege's strict requirements on existential proofs would rule out the attempt to ground arithmetic in. It is hoped that this discussion will help to clarify the ways in which Frege's position is both coherent and significantly different from the neo-logicist position on the issues of: what's required for proofs of existence; the connection between models, consistency, and existence; (...)
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  • Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, §§ 82-3. [REVIEW]William Demopoulos - 1998 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):407-28.
    This paper contains a close analysis of Frege's proofs of the axioms of arithmetic §§70-83 of Die Grundlagen, with special attention to the proof of the existence of successors in §§82-83. Reluctantly and hesitantly, we come to the conclusion that Frege was at least somewhat confused in those two sections and that he cannot be said to have outlined, or even to have intended, any correct proof there. The proof he sketches is in many ways similar to that given in (...)
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  • The Consistency of predicative fragments of frege’s grundgesetze der arithmetik.Richard G. Heck - 1996 - History and Philosophy of Logic 17 (1-2):209-220.
    As is well-known, the formal system in which Frege works in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent, Russell’s Paradox being derivable in it.This system is, except for minor differ...
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  • Abstract objects.Gideon Rosen - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Ramified Frege Arithmetic.Richard G. Heck - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (6):715-735.
    Øystein Linnebo has recently shown that the existence of successors cannot be proven in predicative Frege arithmetic, using Frege’s definitions of arithmetical notions. By contrast, it is shown here that the existence of successor can be proven in ramified predicative Frege arithmetic.
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  • Speaking with Shadows: A Study of Neo‐Logicism.Fraser MacBride - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):103-163.
    According to the species of neo-logicism advanced by Hale and Wright, mathematical knowledge is essentially logical knowledge. Their view is found to be best understood as a set of related though independent theses: (1) neo-fregeanism-a general conception of the relation between language and reality; (2) the method of abstraction-a particular method for introducing concepts into language; (3) the scope of logic-second-order logic is logic. The criticisms of Boolos, Dummett, Field and Quine (amongst others) of these theses are explicated and assessed. (...)
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  • New V, ZF and Abstraction.Stewart Shapiro & Alan Weir - 1999 - Philosophia Mathematica 7 (3):293-321.
    We examine George Boolos's proposed abstraction principle for extensions based on the limitation-of-size conception, New V, from several perspectives. Crispin Wright once suggested that New V could serve as part of a neo-logicist development of real analysis. We show that it fails both of the conservativeness criteria for abstraction principles that Wright proposes. Thus, we support Boolos against Wright. We also show that, when combined with the axioms for Boolos's iterative notion of set, New V yields a system equivalent to (...)
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  • Frege, Kant, and the logic in logicism.John MacFarlane - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):25-65.
    Let me start with a well-known story. Kant held that logic and conceptual analysis alone cannot account for our knowledge of arithmetic: “however we might turn and twist our concepts, we could never, by the mere analysis of them, and without the aid of intuition, discover what is the sum [7+5]” (KrV, B16). Frege took himself to have shown that Kant was wrong about this. According to Frege’s logicist thesis, every arithmetical concept can be defined in purely logical terms, and (...)
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  • Predicative fragments of Frege arithmetic.Øystein Linnebo - 2004 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (2):153-174.
    Frege Arithmetic (FA) is the second-order theory whose sole non-logical axiom is Hume’s Principle, which says that the number of F s is identical to the number of Gs if and only if the F s and the Gs can be one-to-one correlated. According to Frege’s Theorem, FA and some natural definitions imply all of second-order Peano Arithmetic. This paper distinguishes two dimensions of impredicativity involved in FA—one having to do with Hume’s Principle, the other, with the underlying second-order logic—and (...)
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  • Reals by Abstraction.Bob Hale - 2000 - Philosophia Mathematica 8 (2):100--123.
    On the neo-Fregean approach to the foundations of mathematics, elementary arithmetic is analytic in the sense that the addition of a principle wliich may be held to IMJ explanatory of the concept of cardinal number to a suitable second-order logical basis suffices for the derivation of its basic laws. This principle, now commonly called Hume's principle, is an example of a Fregean abstraction principle. In this paper, I assume the correctness of the neo-Fregean position on elementary aritlunetic and seek to (...)
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  • Frege, Boolos, and logical objects.David J. Anderson & Edward N. Zalta - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):1-26.
    In this paper, the authors discuss Frege's theory of "logical objects" and the recent attempts to rehabilitate it. We show that the 'eta' relation George Boolos deployed on Frege's behalf is similar, if not identical, to the encoding mode of predication that underlies the theory of abstract objects. Whereas Boolos accepted unrestricted Comprehension for Properties and used the 'eta' relation to assert the existence of logical objects under certain highly restricted conditions, the theory of abstract objects uses unrestricted Comprehension for (...)
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  • Frege’s Unification.Rachel Boddy - 2018 - History and Philosophy of Logic 40 (2):135-151.
    What makes certain definitions fruitful? And how can definitions play an explanatory role? The purpose of this paper is to examine these questions via an investigation of Frege’s treatment of definitions. Specifically, I pursue this issue via an examination of Frege’s views about the scientific unification of logic and arithmetic. In my view, what interpreters have failed to appreciate is that logicism is a project of unification, not reduction. For Frege, unification involves two separate steps: (1) an account of the (...)
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  • A Vindication of Logicism.Peter Roeper - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (3):360-378.
    Frege regarded Hume's Principle as insufficient for a logicist account of arithmetic, as it does not identify the numbers; it does not tell us which objects the numbers are. His solution, generally regarded as a failure, was to propose certain sets as the referents of numerical terms. I suggest instead that numbers are properties of pluralities, where these properties are treated as objects. Given this identification, the truth-conditions of the statements of arithmetic can be obtained from logical principles with the (...)
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  • Pluralism in Mathematics: A New Position in Philosophy of Mathematics.Michèle Friend - 2013 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    The pluralist sheds the more traditional ideas of truth and ontology. This is dangerous, because it threatens instability of the theory. To lend stability to his philosophy, the pluralist trades truth and ontology for rigour and other ‘fixtures’. Fixtures are the steady goal posts. They are the parts of a theory that stay fixed across a pair of theories, and allow us to make translations and comparisons. They can ultimately be moved, but we tend to keep them fixed temporarily. Apart (...)
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  • Sense and Basic Law V in Frege's logicism.Jan Harald Alnes - 1999 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 4:1-30.
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  • The state of the economy: Neo-logicism and inflation.Rov T. Cook - 2002 - Philosophia Mathematica 10 (1):43-66.
    In this paper I examine the prospects for a successful neo–logicist reconstruction of the real numbers, focusing on Bob Hale's use of a cut-abstraction principle. There is a serious problem plaguing Hale's project. Natural generalizations of this principle imply that there are far more objects than one would expect from a position that stresses its epistemological conservativeness. In other words, the sort of abstraction needed to obtain a theory of the reals is rampantly inflationary. I also indicate briefly why this (...)
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  • Hume’s Big Brother: counting concepts and the bad company objection.Roy T. Cook - 2009 - Synthese 170 (3):349 - 369.
    A number of formal constraints on acceptable abstraction principles have been proposed, including conservativeness and irenicity. Hume’s Principle, of course, satisfies these constraints. Here, variants of Hume’s Principle that allow us to count concepts instead of objects are examined. It is argued that, prima facie, these principles ought to be no more problematic than HP itself. But, as is shown here, these principles only enjoy the formal properties that have been suggested as indicative of acceptability if certain constraints on the (...)
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  • Speaking with Shadows: A Study of Neo‐Logicism.Fraser MacBride - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):103-163.
    According to the species of neo‐logicism advanced by Hale and Wright, mathematical knowledge is essentially logical knowledge. Their view is found to be best understood as a set of related though independent theses: (1) neo‐fregeanism—a general conception of the relation between language and reality; (2) the method of abstraction—a particular method for introducing concepts into language; (3) the scope of logic—second‐order logic is logic. The criticisms of Boolos, Dummett, Field and Quine (amongst others) of these theses are explicated and assessed. (...)
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  • Frege’s Theorem: AN INTRODUCTION.Richard Heck Jr - 2003 - Manuscrito 26 (2):471-503.
    Frege's work was largely devoted to an attempt to argue that the'basic laws of arithmetic' are truths of logic. That attempt had both philosophical and formal aspects. The present note offers an introduction to both of these, so that readers will be able to appreciate contemporary discussions of the philosophical significance of 'Frege's Theorem'.
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  • Introduction.Øystein Linnebo - 2009 - Synthese 170 (3):321-329.
    Neo-Fregean logicism seeks to base mathematics on abstraction principles. But the acceptable abstraction principles are surrounded by unacceptable ones. This is the "bad company problem." In this introduction I first provide a brief historical overview of the problem. Then I outline the main responses that are currently being debated. In the course of doing so I provide summaries of the contributions to this special issue.
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  • Logicism Revisited.Otávio Bueno - 2001 - Principia 5 (1-2):99-124.
    In this paper, I develop a new defense of logicism: one that combines logicism and nominalism. First, I defend the logicist approach from recent criticisms; in particular from the charge that a cruciai principie in the logicist reconstruction of arithmetic, Hume's Principle, is not analytic. In order to do that, I argue, it is crucial to understand the overall logicist approach as a nominalist view. I then indicate a way of extending the nominalist logicist approach beyond arithmetic. Finally, I argue (...)
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  • Don't throw the baby out with the math water: Why discounting the developmental foundations of early numeracy is premature and unnecessary.Kevin Muldoon, Charlie Lewis & Norman Freeman - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):663-664.
    We see no grounds for insisting that, because the concept natural number is abstract, its foundations must be innate. It is possible to specify domain general learning processes that feed into more abstract concepts of numerical infinity. By neglecting the messiness of children's slow acquisition of arithmetical concepts, Rips et al. present an idealized, unnecessarily insular, view of number development.
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  • Neo-fregeanism naturalized: The role of one-to-one correspondence in numerical cognition.Lieven Decock - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):648-649.
    Rips et al. argue that the construction of math schemas roughly similar to the Dedekind/Peano axioms may be necessary for arriving at arithmetical skills. However, they neglect the neo-Fregean alternative axiomatization of arithmetic, based on Hume's principle. Frege arithmetic is arguably a more plausible start for a top-down approach in the psychological study of mathematical cognition than Peano arithmetic.
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  • Frege on definitions.Sanford Shieh - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):992-1012.
    This article treats three aspects of Frege's discussions of definitions. First, I survey Frege's main criticisms of definitions in mathematics. Second, I consider Frege's apparent change of mind on the legitimacy of contextual definitions and its significance for recent neo-Fregean logicism. In the remainder of the article I discuss a critical question about the definitions on which Frege's proofs of the laws of arithmetic depend: do the logical structures of the definientia reflect the understanding of arithmetical terms prevailing prior to (...)
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  • Natural Numbers and Natural Cardinals as Abstract Objects: A Partial Reconstruction of Frege"s Grundgesetze in Object Theory.Edward N. Zalta - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):619-660.
    In this paper, the author derives the Dedekind-Peano axioms for number theory from a consistent and general metaphysical theory of abstract objects. The derivation makes no appeal to primitive mathematical notions, implicit definitions, or a principle of infinity. The theorems proved constitute an important subset of the numbered propositions found in Frege's *Grundgesetze*. The proofs of the theorems reconstruct Frege's derivations, with the exception of the claim that every number has a successor, which is derived from a modal axiom that (...)
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  • What did Frege take Russell to have proved?John Woods - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3949-3977.
    In 1902 there arrived in Jena a letter from Russell laying out a proof that shattered Frege’s confidence in logicism, which is widely taken to be the doctrine according to which every truth of arithmetic is re-expressible without relevant loss as a provable truth about a purely logical object. Frege was persuaded that Russell had exposed a pathology in logicism, which faced him with the task of examining its symptoms, diagnosing its cause, assessing its seriousness, arriving at a treatment option, (...)
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  • Comparing Peano arithmetic, Basic Law V, and Hume’s Principle.Sean Walsh - 2012 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (11):1679-1709.
    This paper presents new constructions of models of Hume's Principle and Basic Law V with restricted amounts of comprehension. The techniques used in these constructions are drawn from hyperarithmetic theory and the model theory of fields, and formalizing these techniques within various subsystems of second-order Peano arithmetic allows one to put upper and lower bounds on the interpretability strength of these theories and hence to compare these theories to the canonical subsystems of second-order arithmetic. The main results of this paper (...)
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  • On the Philosophical Significance of Frege’s Constraint.Andrea Sereni - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (2):244–275.
    Foundational projects disagree on whether pure and applied mathematics should be explained together. Proponents of unified accounts like neologicists defend Frege’s Constraint (FC), a principle demanding that an explanation of applicability be provided by mathematical definitions. I reconsider the philosophical import of FC, arguing that usual conceptions are biased by ontological assumptions. I explore more reasonable weaker variants — Moderate and Modest FC — arguing against common opinion that ante rem structuralism (and other) views can meet them. I dispel doubts (...)
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  • From numerical concepts to concepts of number.Lance J. Rips, Amber Bloomfield & Jennifer Asmuth - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):623-642.
    Many experiments with infants suggest that they possess quantitative abilities, and many experimentalists believe that these abilities set the stage for later mathematics: natural numbers and arithmetic. However, the connection between these early and later skills is far from obvious. We evaluate two possible routes to mathematics and argue that neither is sufficient: (1) We first sketch what we think is the most likely model for infant abilities in this domain, and we examine proposals for extrapolating the natural number concept (...)
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  • Logic and philosophy of mathematics in the early Husserl.Stefania Centrone - 2010 - New York: Springer.
    This volume will be of particular interest to researchers working in the history, and in the philosophy, of logic and mathematics, and more generally, to ...
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  • A proposta de uma teoria geral de princípios de abstração: uma contribuição à fundamentação da aritmética.André Nascimento Pontes - 2013 - Trans/Form/Ação 36 (2):179-194.
    O objetivo do presente artigo é apresentar a correlação entre o programa logicista fregeano de fundamentação da aritmética, o neologicismo de Crispin Wright e os chamados princípios de abstração. Minha tese é que uma análise geral de princípios de abstração, do ponto de vista lógico e explanatório, é mais basilar que o projeto de fundamentação da aritmética na forma como ele foi proposto pelo logicismo. Isso fica evidente através do fato de que o fracasso do programa logicista esteve intimamente ligado (...)
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  • Quantification and Second-Order Quantification.Paul M. Pietroski - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):259--298.
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  • Reference and Paradox.Claire Ortiz Hill - 2004 - Synthese 138 (2):207-232.
    Evidence is drawn together to connect sources of inconsistency that Frege discerned in his foundations for arithmetic with the origins of the paradox derived by Russell in "Basic Laws" I and then with antinomies, paradoxes, contradictions, riddles associated with modal and intensional logics. Examined are: Frege's efforts to grasp logical objects; the philosophical arguments that compelled Russell to adopt a description theory of names and a eliminative theory of descriptions; the resurfacing of issues surrounding reference, descriptions, identity, substitutivity, paradox in (...)
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  • The Limits of Reconstructive Neologicist Epistemology.Eileen S. Nutting - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):717-738.
    Wright claims that his and Hale’s abstractionist neologicist project is primarily epistemological in aim. Its epistemological aims include establishing the possibility of a priori mathematical knowledge, and establishing the possibility of reference to abstract mathematical objects. But, as Wright acknowledges, there is a question of how neologicist epistemology applies to actual, ordinary mathematical beliefs. I take up this question, focusing on arithmetic. Following a suggestion of Hale and Wright, I consider the possibility that the neologicist account provides an idealised reconstruction (...)
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  • Why, in 1902, wasn't Frege prepared to accept Hume's Principle as the Primitive Law for his Logicist Program?Kazuyuki Nomoto - 2000 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 9 (5):219-230.
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  • Frege's natural numbers: Motivations and modifications.Erich Reck - 2005 - In Michael Beaney & Erich Reck (eds.), Gottlob Frege: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, Vol. III. London: Routledge. pp. 270-301.
    Frege's main contributions to logic and the philosophy of mathematics are, on the one hand, his introduction of modern relational and quantificational logic and, on the other, his analysis of the concept of number. My focus in this paper will be on the latter, although the two are closely related, of course, in ways that will also play a role. More specifically, I will discuss Frege's logicist reconceptualization of the natural numbers with the goal of clarifying two aspects: the motivations (...)
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  • Induction and comparison.Paul Pietrowski - 2007 - University of Maryland Working Papers in Linguistics 15:154-188.
    Frege proved an important result, concerning the relation of arithmetic to second-order logic, that bears on several issues in linguistics. Frege’s Theorem illustrates the logic of relations like PRECEDES(x, y) and TALLER(x, y), while raising doubts about the idea that we understand sentences like ‘Carl is taller than Al’ in terms of abstracta like heights and numbers. Abstract paraphrase can be useful—as when we say that Carl’s height exceeds Al’s—without reflecting semantic structure. Related points apply to causal relations, and even (...)
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  • Frege's Cardinals Do Not Always Obey Hume's Principle.Gregory Landini - 2017 - History and Philosophy of Logic 38 (2):127-153.
    Hume's Principle, dear to neo-Logicists, maintains that equinumerosity is both necessary and sufficient for sameness of cardinal number. All the same, Whitehead demonstrated in Principia Mathematica's logic of relations that Cantor's power-class theorem entails that Hume's Principle admits of exceptions. Of course, Hume's Principle concerns cardinals and in Principia's ‘no-classes’ theory cardinals are not objects in Frege's sense. But this paper shows that the result applies as well to the theory of cardinal numbers as objects set out in Frege's Grundgesetze. (...)
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  • A Logical Foundation of Arithmetic.Joongol Kim - 2015 - Studia Logica 103 (1):113-144.
    The aim of this paper is to shed new light on the logical roots of arithmetic by presenting a logical framework that takes seriously ordinary locutions like ‘at least n Fs’, ‘n more Fs than Gs’ and ‘n times as many Fs as Gs’, instead of paraphrasing them away in terms of expressions of the form ‘the number of Fs’. It will be shown that the basic concepts of arithmetic can be intuitively defined in the language of ALA, and the (...)
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  • Ramified Frege Arithmetic.Richard G. Heck Jr - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (6):715 - 735.
    Øystein Linnebo has recently shown that the existence of successors cannot be proven in predicative Frege arithmetic, using Frege's definitions of arithmetical notions. By contrast, it is shown here that the existence of successor can be proven in ramified predicative Frege arithmetic.
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  • On Fundamental Differences between Dependent and Independent Meanings.Claire Ortiz Hill - 2010 - Axiomathes 20 (2-3):313-332.
    In “Function and Concept” and “On Concept and Object”, Frege argued that certain differences between dependent and independent meanings were inviolable and “founded deep in the nature of things” but, in those articles, he was not explicit about the actual consequences of violating such differences. However, since by creating a law that permitted one to pass from a concept to its extension, he himself mixed dependent and independent meanings, we are in a position to study some of the actual consequences (...)
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  • The Grundgesetze [review of Gottlob Frege, Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Derived Using Concept-script ].Nicholas Griffin - 2014 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 34 (2):176-183.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:176 Reviews c:\users\ken\documents\type3402\rj 3402 050 red.docx 2015-02-04 9:19 PM THE GRUNDGESETZE Nicholas Griffin Russell Research Centre / McMaster U. Hamilton, on, Canada l8s 4l6 [email protected] Gottlob Frege. Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Derived Using Concept-script. Volumes i and ii. Translated and edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg with Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford U. P., 2013. Pp. xxxix + xxxii + 253 + xv + 285 + A–42 + (...)
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  • Frege and the origins of model theory in nineteenth century geometry.Günther Eder - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5547-5575.
    The aim of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of Frege’s views on semantics and metatheory by looking at his take on several themes in nineteenth century geometry that were significant for the development of modern model-theoretic semantics. I will focus on three issues in which a central semantic idea, the idea of reinterpreting non-logical terms, gradually came to play a substantial role: the introduction of elements at infinity in projective geometry; the study of transfer principles, especially (...)
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  • A Puzzle About Ontological Commitments.Philip A. Ebert - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (2):209-226.
    This paper raises and then discusses a puzzle concerning the ontological commitments of mathematical principles. The main focus here is Hume's Principle—a statement that, embedded in second-order logic, allows for a deduction of the second-order Peano axioms. The puzzle aims to put pressure on so-called epistemic rejectionism, a position that rejects the analytic status of Hume's Principle. The upshot will be to elicit a new and very basic disagreement between epistemic rejectionism and the neo-Fregeans, defenders of the analytic status of (...)
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  • The Contemporary Interest of an old Doctrine.William Demopoulos - 1994 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994 (2):208-216.
    My purpose in this talk is to give an overview of the rediscovery of Frege's theorem together with certain of the issues that this rediscovery has raised concerning the evaluation of Frege's logicism—the ‘old doctrine’ of my title.The contextual definition of the cardinality operator, suggested in §63 ofGrundlagen— what, after George Boolos, has come to be known as Hume's principle—assertsThe number of Fs = the number of Gs if, and only if, F ≈ G,where F ≈ G (the Fs and (...)
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  • Critical Notice.William Demopoulos - 1993 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):477-497.
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