Phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness are often said to combine two elements by means of a necessary connection: the primitive and irre- ducible subjective character of experiences and the idealist transcendental constitution of consciousness. In what follows I argue that this connection is not necessary in order for an account of self-consciousness to be phenomenological, as shown by early phenomenological accounts of self- consciousness – particularly in Munich phenomenology. First of all, I show that the account of self-consciousness defended by these (...) phenomenologists was not influenced as much by Husserl as by two important figures in the prehistory of phenomenology: their teacher Theodor Lipps, and – indi- rectly, through Lipps’ influence – Hermann Lotze. Second, I show that their account of self-consciousness takes the metaphysical realism underlying Lotze’s and Lipps’ views on the distinction between feeling and sensations seriously. I argue that this distinction played a central role in the development of many early phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness. (shrink)

Résumé — Bien que le « social » ne soit pas un thème central du néokantisme de Bade, il est néanmoins l’occasion de développer, dans le contexte de ce courant philosophique, ce qu’on appelle aujourd’hui une ontologie sociale, qui peut être élaborée de manière exemplaire dans la perspective de Rickert. La conception fondamentale de la philosophie de l’histoire, que j’analyse, offre chez Rickert la clef d’une détermination formelle de l’ontologie sociale. En outre, Rickert offre une base systématique qui permet de (...) définir le « social ». Les tenants de l’école de Bade, tels Windelband, Bauch, Cohn, voient, comme Rickert, dans le « social » la condition de la réalisation de la culture ; mais à la différence de ce dernier, cette sphère revêt chez eux une coloration éthique.— Although the « social » is not a core concept of the Southwest school of Neo-Kantianism, this philosophy offers beginnings for the development of what is nowadays called social ontology. I develop this point by presenting an analysis of Rickert’s concept of the philosophy of history. He turns out to be the key for a formal determination of a social ontology. Moreover, Rickert also offers a systematic beginning as far as the content of the social is concerned. Like Rickert also other thinkers of the Southwest school conceive the social as a condition for realizing values, but unlike Rickert in their model the sphere of realization has an « ethical » flavour. (shrink)

Este artículo estudia la interpretación del comienzo de la filosofía en términos de una correlación entre sujeto y objeto, desarrollada por el filósofo neokantiano Heinrich Rickert. En primer lugar, se reconstruyen el contexto problemático que conduce a Rickert al problema del comienzo de la filosofía y su distinción entre tres acepciones diferentes del concepto de ‘comienzo’. En segundo lugar, se ofrece una interpretación del comienzo correlacional de la filosofía como una respuesta a la paradoja formulada por Hegel en las primeras (...) páginas de la _Ciencia de la Lógica_. Finalmente, se evalúa la propuesta de un comienzo correlacional en función del proyecto general de una filosofía transcendental. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

ABSTRACT : This paper contributes to explor the historical background of contemporary conceptualism. It suggests that a step forward toward a more promising understanding of this historical background can be made if we focus, not on the much-discussed, controversial position of Kant, but rather on the straightforward position of some main representatives of classical neo-Kantianism. My main hypothesis is that criticisms of Kant’s transcendantal aesthetics coming from Paul Natorp and Bruno Bauch may be regarded as a significant historical source for (...) the so-called “content” conceptualism, insofar as they imply that the contents of perception are conceptual contents. (shrink)

Husserl se esforzó por desarrollar vías de abordaje a la fenomenología que facilitaran su expansión. En “La filosofía como ciencia estricta” traza un diagnóstico de los obstáculos en el entramado de naturalismo e historicismo, y estudia su lógica deconstrucción a través de tres tópicos: apelación al psicologismo como elemento del naturalismo, interpretación de Hume como protofenomenólogo y lectura historicista de Dilthey. Esto permitirá observar datos relevantes sobre el modo como Husserl concibe en este período la especificidad y alcances de la (...) fenomenología. (shrink)

The paper reconstructs the concept of culture that emerges from Heinrich Rickert?s neo-Kantianism, uncovering its major historical-problematic, methodological, and philosophical implications. The central theme of the first section is the idea that modern culture is uniquely characterized by?fragmentation?. It also unpacks the programme of Rickert?s philosophy of culture, which pursues the task of reconstructing the lost unity of culture. The second section explains the methodological implications of the problematic relationship between value and reality established in cultural goods and evaluations. Finally, (...) the third section reconstructs the Rickertian system of values, with its peculiar effort to reconcile historicity and value absoluteness. The last part develops a critical discussion of the Rickertian project. (shrink)

Cassirer’s neo-Kantian epistemology has become a classical reference in contemporary history and philosophy of science. However, the historical aspects of his thought are sometimes seen to be in some tension with his defence of a priori elements of knowledge. This paper reconsiders Cassirer’s strategy to address this tension by positing functional dependencies at the core of the notion of objectivity. This requires the epistemologist to account for the determination of the objects of knowledge within given scientific theories, but also for (...) conceptual changes over time. (shrink)

Cet article présente la philosophie des sciences de Max Frischeisen-Köhler, conçue comme une réponse critique aux néo-kantiens. Frischeisen-Köhler tire son enseignement à la fois de son professeur Wilhelm Dilthey et d’Edmund Husserl. Dans les quatre premières parties j’examine la critique que Frischeisen-Köhler adresse au néo-kantisme de l’École de Marbourg et à celui de l’École de Baden. Cette critique défend l’idée que la réalité joue un rôle dans la cognition en tant qu’élément totalement indépendant que la cognition doit reconnaître et qui (...) ne peut jamais se développer en dehors de sa propre légalité. Dans la cinquième section, je m’attache à la phénoménologie de Frischeisen-Köhler. Sa thèse principale est que la réalité est expérimentée comme telle dans l’action, de sorte que notre conscience de la réalité ne provient pas de considérations théoriques sur les causes hypothétiques de nos sensations, mais de nos activités dans le monde en tant qu’agents. La science part de cette expérience pré-scientifique de la réalité. Je conclus par une critique de la distinction que Frischeisen-Köhler établit entre conscience en général et subjectivité individuelle d’un point de vue phénoménologique. (shrink)

El presente trabajo intenta ofrecer una interpretación general de la filosofía de la historia en el neokantismo de Baden. La interpretación tradicional afirma que la filosofía de la historia neokantiana es una variante de la llamada filosofía crítica de la historia y que el interés de los neokantianos por la historia se origina en las polémicas decimonónicas en torno al método de las humanidades. Nuestra tesis, por el contrario, es que tal filosofía tiene su origen en problemas internos a la (...) formulación de una filosofía transcendental, específicamente, en el problema de trazar un puente entre la esfera transcendental y la esfera concreta. (shrink)

In this paper I present and assess a controversy between Edmund Husserl and Heinrich Rickert on the nature of judgment, in order to bring to light the originality of Husserl's proposal concerning this important issue. In the first section I provide some context for Rickert's theory of judgment by sketching a reconstruction of nineteenth century logical theory and then proceed to introduce Rickert's view. I suggest that nineteenth century logic is characterized by a criticism of the traditional view that sees (...) categorial judgment as the essential form of judgment and the uniting and separating of ideas as sufficient for the constitution of a judgment. Hume inaugurates this criticism, but it finds its most mature expression in the work of Lotze, Brentano, and Rickert. Rickert, in particular, sees simple affirmation and negation of the transcendent value of truth as the essence of judgment. In the second section I present Husserl's criticism of Rickert. Husserl's criticism revolves around the distinction between simple judgments and the higher-order affirmative or negative stance we can adopt with respect to previously articulated simple judgments. Simple judgments register the mereological relation holding among something and one of its properties, and they do not entail an affirmative or negative stance. Their function is to constitute states of affairs drawing on concrete perceptual situations. Higher-order affirmation or negation occurs when we set out to revisit a foregoing simple judgment in order to confirm or disconfirm the veridicality of its proposed state of affairs. In the third part I suggest a diagnosis of the origin of the mistake in earlier theories. Simple judgments are easy to conflate with non-simple, higher-order judgmental stances because they have the same logical value and they cannot be seen without the aid of genuinely phenomenological reflection. In conclusion, I suggest that Husserl's analysis amounts to a vindication of categorial judgment in its traditional form ‘S is P’, which continues to maintain a phenomenological legitimacy even in the wake of Frege's canonical dismissal of subject and predicate. (shrink)

The founding fathers of modern philosophy of culture, the neo-Kantians, and especially the Southwest school, brought the concept of culture into play as a counter concept to that of nature. Taking Heinrich Rickert?s conception of culture as a starting point, the article shows how culture is conceived of as a self-formation of the subject. It leads to transcendental idealism of freedom, typical of a Kantian type of transcendental philosophy. However, in this self and world formation of the subject it is (...) presupposed that nature is to any extent formable by values and thus by freedom. This presupposition cannot be accounted for properly within transcendental idealism. Hegel, by contrast, conceives of culture as a manifestation of the idea, leading to speculative idealism of freedom. The origin of culture, i.e., its original determinacy, should not be conceived of in terms of an opposition to nature, and consequently in the fashion of a subject of thought and action that forms itself by forming its world, culture. Rather, it should be conceived of in terms of a manifestation of the idea as the truly transcendental subject qua absolute ground of validity and thus the ground of being too. Nature and culture are both primarily determined by their ideal character and the relationships emerging therefrom. (shrink)

Le néokantisme – souvent critiqué de façon polémique par Heidegger et ses disciples –, en particulier le néokantisme de son maître, Heinrich Rickert, présente une théorie de la compréhension humaine plus approfondie que celle de Heidegger. D’une part, Heidegger est replacé dans son temps, puis les principes de la théorie de Rickert sur le sens et les valeurs sont esquissés. D’autre part, un problème de base de la phénoménologie est analysé ; il apparaît en fin de compte que la validité (...) – notion fondamentale du néokantisme – fonctionne implicitement aussi comme le fondement du projet ontologique de Heidegger, bien que celui-ci, pour des raisons méthodologiques, ne parvient pas suffisamment à justifier l’usage de cette notion. (shrink)

La réception française d’Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936), au début du xxe siècle, s’inscrit tout d’abord au cœur des débats épistémologiques autour de la constitution des sciences historiques et des sciences sociales, ainsi que l’atteste la controverse entre Paul Lacombe et Alexandru Dimitri Xenopol. Le second volet de la réception de Rickert en France concerne la philosophie des valeurs et le lien qu’elle entretient avec les positions épistémologiques défendues par le néokantien de Bade. L’étude de cet aspect de la réception se fera (...) à partir de la lecture qu’en proposent Georges Gurvitch d’une part, et Raymond Aron d’autre part, tous deux formulant, à leur manière, une accusation visant le formalisme de la théorie rickertienne des valeurs. Si les discussions philosophiques des positions du philosophe allemand sont assez rares, elles constituent néanmoins un révélateur pertinent des débats qui animaient la philosophie et les sciences historiques et sociales de l’époque. (shrink)