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Why epistemologists are so down on their luck.Wayne Riggs - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):329 - 344.details
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Why we should prefer knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):79-93.details
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Reply to Kvanvig on the Swamping Problem.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Social Epistemology 25 (2):173 - 182.details
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The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg.Matthew Chrisman - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 357-382.details
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How understanding makes knowledge valuable.Ayca Boylu - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):591-609.details
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How Understanding Makes Knowledge Valuable.Ayca Boylu - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):591-609.details
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Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.details
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Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.details
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References.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 361-386.details
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The value of knowledge.J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard & John Turri - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The value of knowledge.Carter J. Adam, Pritchard Duncan & Turri John - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Concept of Testimony.Nicola Mößner - 2011 - In Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement, Papers of the 34. International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 207-209.details
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Conocimiento y entendimiento: discusiones sobre el concepto de valor epistémico.Eleonora Cresto - 2011 - Dianoia 56 (66):165-177.details
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