For Sengzhao (374−414 CE), a leading Sanlun philosopher of Chinese Buddhism, things in the world are ontologically indeterminate in that they are devoid of any determinate form or nature. In his view, we should understand and use words provisionally, so that they are not taken to connote the determinacy of their referents. To echo the notion of ontic indeterminacy and indicate the provisionality of language, his main work, the Zhaolun, abounds in paradoxical expressions. In this essay, I offer a philosophical (...) analysis and rational reconstruction of Sengzhao’s linguistic thought, with a view to exploring the rationale for and purpose of his use of paradoxical language. (shrink)

Comparing the Bhagavad Gītā and the Buddhist essay “Prajñā is Not-knowing” (Panruo Wuzhi 般若無知) yields interesting insights. The texts have similar dialogical structures and discuss complex philosophical matters. Rhetorically, both texts weave together quotations and allusions from other texts, make liberal use of paradox, and have decidedly spiritual intentions. Their differences, though, remain striking. They emerge from distinct circumstances and their original languages (Sanskrit, Chinese) differ markedly. Stylistically, “Prajñā” is more intellectual and less devotional, espousing a distinctly “this worldly” ideal; (...) by contrast, the Gītā is more dramatic. While espousing “this worldly” ideals, the Gītā is more inclusive and thus more accessible to a broad audience; on the contrary, “Prajñā” has a subtler effect, its “dark” qualities appealing to a more select group. Therefore, while these texts are not “the same,” reading across their convergences and divergences can lead to a deeper understanding of mysticism and cross-cultural spirituality. (shrink)

Seng Zhao and his collection of treatises, the Zhao lun, have enjoyed a particularly high reputation in the history of Chinese Buddhism. One of these treatises, The Immutability of Things, employs the Madhyamaka argumentative method of negating dualistic concepts to demonstrate that, while "immutability" and "mutability" coexist as the states of phenomenal things, neither possesses independent self-nature. More than a thousand years after this text was written, Zhencheng's intense criticism of it provoked fierce reactions among a host of renowned scholar-monks. (...) This paper explores Zhencheng's main points as well as the perspectives and motives of his principal adversaries in order to shed light on the nature of philosophical discourse during the late Ming dynasty. (shrink)

This article proposes an interpretation of the ‘Thesis that Things do not Shift’ (_Wu bu qian lun,_ 物不遷論) of the early Chinese Buddhist philosopher Sengzhao. We understand Sengzhao to be proposing a version of the philosophy of time found in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, and then interpreting statements about time from Mahāyāna texts in light of that account. But whatever his limitations as a cross-cultural interpreter, we find Sengzhao surprisingly impressive philosophically, as he proposes a view that is noticeably more advanced towards (...) a modern conception of time than the accounts found in South Asian Buddhist sources. Ironically, his earnest efforts to present his view as falling within the Mahāyāna may have functioned to conceal Sengzhao’s true philosophical achievement. (shrink)