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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Plato's Earlier Dialectic
Philosophy 30 (112):67-69 (1955)
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In his critique of historicism and utopian social engineering, Karl Popper treats various writers – notably, Plato, Hegel, and Marx – as expounding these mistaken ideas, and as illustrating the threat they pose to ‘the open society’. Among contemporaries, one of those he singles out for criticism is the sociologist Karl Mannheim. While he spends relatively little time discussing Mannheim’s work compared to that of Plato and Marx, I argue that Ideology and Utopia and Man and Society in an Age (...) |
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This article asks the question “Why did Plato not write the ‘unwritten doctrine’?” and answers it by citing a combination of two obstacles. The first derives from the limitations of the episteme available to an embodied soul about the essence of the good. Even if the dialectician has access to some kind of knowledge, the mismatch between the unchanging essence of the good and the precarious logoi which aim to identify it (and allow others some measure of access to it) (...) |
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Plato's Republic VII suggests that if we ask someone to philosophize when they are too young, they can become corrupted (537e–539d). Republic VII also suggests that to avoid this corruption, we must not expose youth to argument (539a–b). This is not a reasonable option outside of Kallipolis, so a question arises: does Plato describe how to correct corruption if we do not manage to prevent it? This paper shows that a parallel between this passage from Republic VII and a passage (...) |
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Cet article se propose d’étudier les procédés platoniciens de l’exemple, de l’analogie et du paradigme, en insistant à la fois sur leur distinction et sur leur articulation mutuelle. En ce qui concerne l’exemple, il convient d’en distinguer un usage dianoétique, que Platon proscrit, d’un usage proprement dialectique, qu’il encourage et qui peut avoir deux fonctions différentes : faire comprendre une question ou une méthode et faire saisir une structure. L’analogie au sens strict développe cette deuxième fonction, en la complexifiant parfois (...) |
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This paper considers the use that Plato makes of the Principle of Non-Contradiction in his engagements with eristic refutations. By examining Plato’s use of the principle in his most detailed engagements with eristic—in the Sophist, the discussion of “agonistic” argumentation in the Theaetetus, and especially the Euthydemus—I aim to show that the pressure exerted on Plato by eristic refutations played a crucial role in his development of the PNC, and that the principle provided him with a much more sophisticated means (...) |
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Theaetetus, asked what knowledge is, replies that geometry and the other mathematical disciplines are knowledge, and so are crafts like cobbling. Socrates points out that it does not help him to be told how many kinds of knowledge there are when his problem is to know what knowledge itself is, what it means to call geometry or a craft knowledge in the first place—he insists on the generality of his question in the way he often does when his interlocutor, asked (...) |
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The Euthydemus presents a brilliantly comic contrast between Socratic and sophistic argument. Socrates' encounter with the sophistic brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus exposes the hollowness of their claim to teach virtue, unmasking it as a predilection for verbal pugilism and the peddling of paradox. The dialogue's humour is pointed, for the brothers' fallacies are often reminiscent of substantial dilemmas explored seriously elsewhere in Plato, and the farce of their manipulation is in sharp contrast to the sobriety with which Socrates pursues his (...) |
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Plato's Socrates denies that he knows. Yet he frequently claims that he does have certainty and knowledge. How can he avoid contradiction between his general stance about knowledge and his particular claims to have it? Socrates' disavowal of knowledge is central to his defence in the Apology. For here he rebuts the accusation that he teaches – and thus corrupts – the young by telling the jury that he cannot teach just because he knows nothing. Hence his disavowal of knowledge (...) |
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In Athens during the late Classical and Hellenistic periods, it was customary for a man who was borrowing a large sum of money to pledge some property as security for the repayment of his loan. To show that this property was legally encumbered, a flat slab of stone, called a horos, was set up, and an inscription, indicating the nature of the lien on the property, was inscribed on the horos. These horoi served to warn third parties that the man (...) |
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The Regress: Knowledge, we like to suppose, is essentially a rational thing: if I claim to know something, I must be prepared to back up my claim by statingmy reasons for making it;and if my claim is to be upheld, my reasons must begood reasons. Now suppose I know that Q; and let my reasons be conjunctively contained in the proposition that R. Clearly, I must believe that R ;equally clearly, I must know that R . Thus if I know (...) |
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In Mohist philosophy, the gnomon is a metaphor for the standard of valid arguments. This metaphor comes from the method of establishing due east and west by observing gnomon shadows at dusk and dawn. I argue that there is also an overlooked, implicit aspect of the gnomon metaphor that comes from its function of measuring the height of heaven indirectly through proportional calculation. The function of indirect measurement inspires a strategy of argumentation in Mohist ethics, which I call “analogical upscaling.” (...) |
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For several decades, scholars of Plato's dialogues have focussed their efforts on understanding Socrates’ philosophy by unravelling the arguments used to establish it. On this view, Socrates’ philosophy is presented in his arguments, and, as Gregory Vlastos says, ‘Almost everything Socrates says is wiry argument; that is the beauty of his talk for a philosopher.’ In this paper I raise questions about what can be learned about Socrates’ philosophy through analysis of his arguments. One critic of what he views as (...) |
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Given that it seems uncontroversial that Socrates displays considerable contempt towards rhetoric in theGorgias,the title of this paper might strike one as an oxymoron. Indeed, a reading of the text has more than once encouraged scholars to posit an Opposition between the elenctic procedures championed by Socrates and the rhetorical procedures of his interlocutors. At least three features have been highlighted that seem to indicate this contrast:1.the Socratic interest in short questions and answers versus his interlocutors’ use of long speeches(makrologia);2.the (...) |
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In recent years considerable attention has been focused on the question whether Plato ever uses arguments he knows to be sophistical, especially whether he puts such arguments into the mouth of Socrates. Though differing views have been held, at the present time the majority of scholars seem to believe that Plato does not. Though I disagree with this position, I will not attack it directly in this paper. Instead I will discuss what I take to be an important preliminary matter, (...) |
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“Imagine A rather short-sighted person told to read an inscription in small letters from some way off….' So begins the quest for “the real nature of justice and injustice” undertaken in response to the challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus to show that “justice pays”. It is often alleged that the search leads through analogy to a monster “organic” state that lives by devouring individual rights. I believe that these charges are mistaken. Plato's political theory does not derive from an analogy (...) |
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In the Parmenides Plato claims that by relinquishing Forms one would entirely destroy tên tou dialegesthai dunamin. I argue that this peculiar phrase does not indicate, as often suggested, the power or possibility of all discourse or thought, but the power of dialectic, i. e. the highest science; and that its preservation is, for Plato, a decisive reason for the necessity of the Forms. |
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John Mackie famously dismissed the rational tenability of moral objectivism with two quick arguments. The second, the so-called “argument from queerness,” proceeds as follows. A commitment to moral objectivism brings with it a commitment to the existence of moral properties as “queer” as Platonic Forms that are apprehended only through occult faculties like so-called “moral intuition” (Mackie 1977, 38). Since we have no reason to believe that there is any faculty such as moral intuition that serves as a reliable Form (...) |
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This paper argues that the concepts of writing and authorship in Plato are associated with monologism and absence rather than presence. The Phaedrus objects to writing precisely insofar as it creates that unre sponsive figure in the field of discursive which we have subsequently called the 'author'. The dialectical preference for question-and-answer is designed to resist anything resembling an author from entering the field of knowledge: the Socratic method resists monologism on epistemological and ethical grounds. However, the Platonic dialogues are (...) |
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In Aeschines' dialogue Alcibiades, Socrates sees his brilliant young partner's haughty attitude towards the great Themistocles. Thereupon he gives an encomium of Themistocles, a man whose wisdom and arete, great as they were, could not save him from ostracism by his own people. This encomium has an extraordinary effect on Alcibiades: he cries and in his despair places his head upon Socrates' knee, realizing that he is nowhere near as good a man as Themistocles . Aeschines later has Socrates say (...) |
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