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What is wrong with the relational theory of change?

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra

In Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor. New York: Routledge. pp. 184--195 (2002)

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The Situationalist Account of Change.Martin Pickup - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.details In this paper I propose a new solution to the problem of change: situationalism. According to this view, parts of reality fundamentally disagree about what is the case and reality as a whole is unsettled (i.e. metaphysically indeterminate). When something changes, parts of the world irreconcilably disagree about what properties it has. From this irreconcilable disagreement, indeterminacy arises. I develop this picture using situations, which are parts of possible worlds; this gives it the name situationalism. It allows a B-theory endurance (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
Endurantism and Perdurantism.Nikk Effingham - 2012 - In Robert Barnard & Neil Manson (eds.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. Continuum Publishing. pp. 170.details An introduction to the theories of endurantism and perdurantism, and persistence more broadly. Download Export citation Bookmark 11 citations
(1 other version)A Passage Theory of Time.Martin A. Lipman - 2008 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 95-122.details This paper proposes a view of time that takes passage to be the most basic temporal notion, instead of the usual A-theoretic and B-theoretic notions, and explores how we should think of a world that exhibits such a genuine temporal passage. It will be argued that an objective passage of time can only be made sense of from an atemporal point of view and only when it is able to constitute a genuine change of objects across time. This requires that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.details Material objects extend through space by having different spatial parts in different places. But how do they persist through time? According to some philosophers, things have temporal parts as well as spatial parts: accepting this is supposed to help us solve a whole bunch of metaphysical problems, and keep our philosophy in line with modern physics. Other philosophers disagree, arguing that neither metaphysics nor physics give us good reason to believe in temporal parts. Download Export citation Bookmark 38 citations
There is no puzzle about change.Pablo Rychter - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (1):7-22.details This paper argues against the common practice of presenting perdurantism, endurantism, and other views about persistence and time as solutions to an alleged puzzle about change. Various recent attempts to generate a puzzle about change are examined and found unsuccessful. This does not mean, however, that the relevant views about persistence and time are not well motivated, but rather that their interest and purpose is independent of their suitability for solving the alleged puzzle. Download Export citation Bookmark 11 citations
Perdurance, Endurance, and 'Having a Property Atemporally'.Pablo Rychter - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (2):159-171.details In this paper, I argue that both perdurance theory and the ‘relations-to-times’ endurantist view rely on an atemporal notion of property instantiation and relation bearing. I distinguish two possible meanings of ‘atemporal’ which result in two different understandings of what it is for an object to have a property or to bear a relation atemporally. I show that standard presentations of the theories considered are indeterminate as to which of these two understandings is the intended one. I claim that even (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations

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